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PREFACE
Over six years ago we approached the W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research with a simple proposal. We wanted to examine
a series of cooperative and contentious labor negotiations to better
understand negotiations at the extremes. Much has happened since
then.
First, it became clear to us that the "extremes" were becoming the
norm. The highly cooperative and highly contentious negotiations were
increasingly common, while the traditional, arm's-length interactions
were becoming the exception. As a result, we now see this study as
speaking to the mainstream of labor-management relations.
Second, in examining these highly contrasting cases, we found our
selves building on and extending the Behavioral Theory of Labor
Negotiations, written by Walton and McKersie in 1965. We came to see
the behavioral theory as a useful framework for understanding bargain
ing processes. We added to the theory new thoughts about the ways
that strategy and structure interact with process. Together, these
insights allowed us to develop a theory of negotiated change in labormanagement relations, which is presented in the book, Strategic Nego
tiations: A Theory of Change in Labor-Management Relations, pub
lished by the Harvard Business School Press (1994).
In Strategic Negotiations, we developed structured analysis based
on a series of case studies cutting across three industries. This book
features detailed presentations for twelve of the thirteen case studies of
cooperative and contentious negotiations analyzed in Strategic Negoti
ations. Thus, some of the individual quotes and vignettes presented in
the theory of negotiated change are now presented here in the context
of the full case studies. In Strategic Negotiations we also explored
practical implications of the theory. In this book we build on those
practical implications in order to offer additional tools and guidance
for strategic negotiators traveling along various pathways to change.
This book should be a valuable companion and resource for readers
interested in learning more about the cases upon which the Strategic
Negotiations thesis was developed. To the extent possible, the cases
have been updated to capture the longer-term consequences of the
strategies that we first encountered in our field work during the late
1980s and early 1990s.

Overview

The introductory chapter of this book addresses the threshold issue,
"why change?" We conclude that major change is an almost inevitable
objective for parties in traditional relationships who are wrestling with
contentious issues at the same time that their common interests are
growing. Further, we find that major change requires negotiations. To
set the stage for presenting case studies of negotiated change, we draw
on two key concepts from Strategic Negotiations: (1) the contrasting
strategies of forcing and fostering change, and (2) the juxtaposition of
substantive and relationship outcomes.
The following four chapters of the book feature our case studies.
The cases are organized around distinct change strategies. Chapter 2
features three cases involving forcing strategies, while chapter 3 fea
tures three cases involving fostering strategies. Chapters 4 and 5 also
have three cases each, focusing first on the sequence of forcing fol
lowed by fostering and then on concurrent forcing and fostering. At the
conclusion of each of the twelve cases, we highlight salient lessons.
The final two chapters summarize lessons that extend across the
cases. Chapter 6 presents general lessons about the context for negotia
tions over change, while chapter 7 highlights specific tools and tech
niques to guide the strategic negotiator.
This book completes the first cycle of work in developing a theory
of negotiated change and presenting supporting materials. Yet, in many
ways, the concluding thoughts to this book represent the beginning of
the next round of analysis. We see the principles of strategic negotia
tions as generalizable to other contexts where change is the agenda.
These include change initiatives in nonunion settings, as well as nego
tiated change in the context of strategic alliances, joint ventures, crossfunctional integration initiatives, and customer-supplier relations.
Like any major research undertaking, we find that our research per
spective and agenda have changed as a result of the journey we have
taken. We have just begun to grasp the potential for undertaking the
change process from the vantage of strategic negotiations. In present
ing the theory of negotiated change in Strategic Negotiations, com
bined with the detailed cases and guidance for practitioners contained
in this book, we are inviting our colleagues and strategic negotiators to
join us in this new journey.
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PATHWAYS
to
CHANGE
Case Studies
of
Strategic Negotiations

Change is on the agenda. At negotiating tables around the world,
parties are bargaining over fundamental changes. Sometimes the focus
is on substantive changes revisions in existing contracts, agreements,
or understandings. Sometimes the focus is on changes in relation
ships ranging from the building of more cooperative relationships to
changes that threaten the other party's legitimacy and even its very
existence. In most cases, changes in substantive terms and changes in
relationships are concurrently on the agenda.
Why negotiate over change? Why not act unilaterally? Parties often
do. Other stakeholders, however, are usually prompted to respond. At
that point, negotiations tacit or explicit are under way. Viewed
through a negotiations lens, unilateral action and reaction represent
early moves in an unfolding, back-and-forth process. The process may
involve escalation and collapse on the part of one or both parties. The
process may involve pressure and capitulation. The process may even
involve dialogue and increased understanding reflected in joint deci
sions and mutual agreements. Whether or not it intends to negotiate, a
party taking unilateral action to drive change that affects others as well
will almost inevitably find itself on a path of negotiated change.
Why negotiate over change? Why not act on the basis of consensus?
Parties often do. Rarely, however, is the consensus complete. Subtle
and even glaring differences usually emerge. At that point, negotia
tions tacit or explicit are under way. Viewed through a negotiations
lens, the cooperative overture is an early move in an unfolding, backand-forth process. The process may be punctuated by the emergence of
unexpected, divisive issues between the parties. And the process may
surface splits within one or both parties. The process may even involve
dialogue and understanding reflected in joint decisions and mutual
agreements. Whether or not the initiating party explicitly planned to
negotiate, the party seeking to act on the basis of consensus and team
work will inevitably find itself on a path of negotiated change.
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Thus, where change is on the agenda, negotiations are certain to fol
low. This is because change involves both initiating and responding
parties. Whether the initiating party is acting unilaterally or inviting
cooperation, change seldom looks the same to the initiating party and
to the recipient. It is the interaction between their two perspectives that
places parties on various pathways of negotiated change.
This book focuses on two contrasting change strategies forcing
change and fostering change. It features a close look at a wide range of
highly cooperative and highly contentious change initiatives both of
which are pathways of change that build on the strategies. Studying the
back-and-forth dynamics in these cases has revealed useful insights
into why change initiatives succeed or fail.

Why Study Labor-Management Negotiations?
Our particular focus is on change initiatives in the workplace. Fur
ther, we have only studied unionized workplaces. These collective bar
gaining relationships are important to study. They account for almost
one-sixth of U.S. employment, and their influence on the U.S. and even
the world economy is substantial in both economic and social terms.
Also, studying cooperative and contentious initiatives in the context of
these formal, bilateral relationships has provided a rich terrain for sur
facing new ideas and insights into the fundamental nature of negotiated
change.
As background, it is important to understand that negotiations repre
sent important events in labor-management relations. They present
defining moments at which parties develop or revise the terms and con
ditions of employment. Further, it is important to recognize that, even
between rounds of formal contract bargaining, negotiations over griev
ances and other aspects of contract administration also involve critical
decisions made either by the parties or by labor arbitrators.
During certain eras in U.S. history, negotiations occurring within the
time frames of contract bargaining and contract administration have
assumed great historical significance. Not only were the negotiations
important events for the parties during these eras, they were also key
indicators and powerful influences on social relations more generally.
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For example, during the 1930s, conflicts over the representational
claims of industrial unions reflected not just narrow economic strug
gles, but a broader set of issues involving societal adjustments to the
implications of mass production industries. Similarly, negotiations
over health care, pension, and other fringe benefits in the 1950s and
1960s reinforced the U.S. public policy emphasis of an employer-cen
tered approach to extending various social benefits (in contrast to many
other industrialized nations). The implications of these choices are par
ticularly evident in current debates over health care reform and social
security.
A core thesis of this book is that we are once again in an era where
labor negotiations have broad social ramifications. The give and take
between labor and management in the present era in collective bar
gaining, grievance procedures, labor-management committees, and
around various forms of worker participation reflects a broad social
process of adjustment to international competition and technological
change. In studying the interactions of unions, employers, and employ
ees in this era, we find vivid and instructive illustrations of alternative
pathways to change.

Why Focus on Cooperative and Conflictual Extremes?
There are still labor-management relationships where changes take
place on an incremental basis through routine, arm's-length negotia
tions. Recent evidence suggests, however, that these types of negotia
tions are in the minority. Based on one sample of collective bargaining
relationships, for example, they may only account for approximately a
third of labor-management negotiations with fully two-thirds of col
lective bargaining tending toward the extremes (Walton, Cutcher-Gershenfeld, and McKersie 1994, pp. 3 Iff). Although comparable data
from earlier time periods are not available, there is enough circumstan
tial evidence to suggest that a pattern of many relationships falling at
the extremes is a recent phenomena. To make the point differently, a
majority of unions and employers find themselves negotiating on new
terrain, where traditional actions can generate unexpected results. This
book is targeted for leaders at all levels who find themselves engaged
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in these strategic negotiations. We hope to offer useful insights and
guidance.
Also, when negotiations tend toward either cooperative or conflictual extremes, key elements of the process are thrown into sharp relief.
As such, we are better able to articulate general lessons about the pro
cess of negotiated change. Many of these lessons have potential appli
cability far beyond union-management relationships with
implications for employment relations in nonunion settings and for
parties seeking change in the context of joint ventures, strategic part
nerships, cross-functional integration, and customer-supplier relations.

Guiding Principles and Frameworks
Three main guiding principles or frameworks will be helpful to
readers of this book. First, we make a core assumption about employ
ment relationships specifically, the mixed-motive nature of employ
ment relations. Second, we utilize a particular framework for
classifying change strategies into forcing and fostering, with a third
strategy, escape, as a backdrop to the two primary strategies. Third, we
make a key distinction around outcomes focusing both on substan
tive and relationship dimensions. These guiding ideas all build on the
analysis contained in Strategic Negotiations: A Theory of Change in
Labor-Management Relationships.
A Mixture of Common and Competing Interests

We refer to labor-management relationships as "mixed-motive,"
reflecting the mixture of common and competing motives that parties
bring to the employment relationship. [ While the mixture of common
and competing interests is most salient between labor and management
representatives, there are typically multiple stakeholders with distinct
concerns within labor (for example, skilled trades versus production
employees) and within management (for example, line versus staff
support). As well, other stakeholders (such as external customers and
government) bring a mixture of common and competing interests to
their interactions with labor and management.
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All of our cases involve negotiations over fundamental (or poten
tially fundamental) changes. The first lesson that emerges from these
detailed cases stems from the mixed motive assumption. We find that,
for a change process to have any chance of success, negotiations must
attend to both the resolution of conflict and the pursuit of common
interests. The point may seem obvious, but too many practitioners and
theorists downplay or ignore the need for articulation and even synthe
sis of these distinct elements.
The potential for labor-management relations to involve bitter,
intractable conflicts is well established. In the decades of the 1980s and
1990s the experiences at A. E. Staley, Phelps-Dodge, Pittston Mines,
Greyhound Bus Lines, Caterpillar, and the New York Daily News to
mention a few examples provide ample evidence of the conflictual
nature of labor-management relations. For this study, we selected sev
eral cases that typify pathways involving bitter, seemingly intractable
conflicts. For example, the strikes at the International Paper mill in Jay,
Maine, and at the AP Parts plant in Toledo, Ohio were both highly con
tentious and widely perceived as almost unavoidable, given the con
flicting interests at play.
A close look at these conflictual cases, however, reveals specific
points at which the negotiations changed sharply and where the various
tactics employed hampered efforts to repair relations. For example, the
hiring of permanent replacement workers in the Jay, Maine case
marked a sharp deterioration in relations, complicated relations after
the strike, and ultimately set the stage for the decertification of the
union.
In contrast, other cases we selected also involved bitter strikes, but
the story line evolved along a very different path. Though these cases
looked just as contentious at the outset, actions taken (or avoided) dur
ing and after the strikes facilitated the restoration of constructive rela
tions. For example, in Boise Cascade's DeRidder, Louisiana paper
mill, the company forced deep concessions around work rules but did
not press its advantage around wage concessions. This restraint proved
instrumental to the subsequent repair of relations after the strike. Simi
larly, the union at Adrian Fabricators helped temper hard feelings after
an acrimonious strike by using its own funds to repair broken factory
windows and other physical damage incurred during the strike.
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The potential for labor-management relations to be centered on
cooperation and partnership is also well established historically. Dur
ing the 1980s, considerable attention was paid to the key role of labormanagement cooperation in the competitive resurgence at Xerox
(Cutcher-Gershenfeld 1988). Similarly, the partnership structure at Sat
urn broke sharply with traditional adversarial and hierarchical struc
tures (Kochan, Rubenstein, and Bennett 1994). The interest in these
cases reflects a broader awareness on the parts of labor and manage
ment regarding the mutual benefits if ways can be found to increase the
size of the proverbial economic pie.
We have selected several cases in this vein because they also feature
initiatives designed to encourage joint planning and mutually benefi
cial implementation of fundamental change. A close look at these path
ways reveals a complex portrait of cooperative initiatives. For example,
labor and management at Packard Electric worked together to promote
flexible job assignments and cost savings in the context of a lifetime
job security guarantee, a multitier wage system, and an increased man
agement capacity to utilize temporary workers. In retrospect, the Pack
ard Electric story may seem well planned and rooted in extensive
labor-management cooperation. In fact, a closer look at the case
reveals several interesting features: a major internal conflict within the
union, a hard confrontation by the union with management over job
security, and continuing contention over the use of temporary workers.
Thus, the path-breaking cooperative achievements rested on a founda
tion of complex, difficult, and constantly unfolding interactions
many of them conflictual.
At CSX, the parties attempted to develop a collaborative structure to
address common concerns. Despite the clear advantages of working
together and coordinating efforts, the decision of one key union to
withdraw from the joint effort highlighted the many areas of conflict
that remained between labor and management in the system.
While each case is unique, the contrasting experiences with various
tactics suggest that the individual choices of unions and employers
matter a great deal along these various pathways to change. Choices in
negotiations sometimes led to the collapse of relations and at other
times set the stage for the repair of relations. Similarly, our cases
involving joint change initiatives highlight the negotiated nature of
cooperation. In some instances hard confrontations were instrumental
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in moving in a cooperative direction, while a breakdown in internal
negotiations within a party could substantially reduce the scope of a
joint, cooperative initiative.
Thus, the cases illustrate: (1) that change processes are character
ized by stakeholders with both common and conflicting interests, (2)
that pursuit of common interests and the resolution of conflicts are
negotiated processes, and (3) that choice of strategies and tactics in
these negotiations are central to the success of the change process.
The Distinct Strategies of Forcing and Fostering
During periods of stability, bargaining outcomes are primarily
shaped by tactical choices and broad external forces such as the cycli
cal economic swings characteristic of many industries. In the present
era, however, we see the emergence of distinct change strategies that
become powerful driving forces. These strategies may or may not
begin as intentional change efforts, but they are identifiable after a
series of patterned interactions.2
We will concentrate our attention on the two primary strategies
forcing and fostering and then various combinations. Escape, a strat
egy of a very different sort, will also be analyzed. Before outlining the
structure of the book, it is instructive to provide some guidance as to
the essence of forcing and fostering.
The inherent calculus to accept change differs between the two strat
egies. Simply put, stakeholders who are on the receiving end of a forc
ing strategy agree to changes because one side (usually management in
the present era) has the power to compel acceptance of the demands.
The workers find themselves in an avoidance-avoidance predicament.
On the one hand, they want to avoid changes or concessions, but they
find themselves in a situation where the alternatives (e.g. strike or plant
shutdown) are even more costly.
By contrast, a fostering process operates on the premise that solu
tions can be found to common problems that leave all sides better situ
ated. However, the expectation that there will be important gains can
create difficulties when it comes to the ratification phase, as will be
illustrated in one of our cases where leaders of a key union expected a
proportionate share of the joint gains, and when this was not forthcom
ing they voted against the new package.
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How do the parties themselves see the differences in these two
change strategies? In answering this question, one executive summa
rized his viewpoint as follows:
One way to view forcing versus fostering is to distinguish when
you want to assume your major risks. Under the forcing approach,
your risks are all up-front. Employee attitudes will deteriorate.
The politicians will beat up on you. And, if a work stoppage
results, you must anticipate suffering and erosion of traffic. How
ever, if meaningful contractual changes are implemented, your
cost structure will be lowered and your productivity structure will
be improved. A rebuilding process can then begin, and both the
company and the employees can begin to reap benefits.
In the fostering approach, your risks will come later. You certainly
do not have the type of up-front risks associated with the forcing
strategy. However, if the change process does not evolve beyond
the talk stage, a few years down the road a company can find itself
in a competitively disadvantageous position. This can be espe
cially dangerous if your competitors already have implemented
changes.

Clearly, the choice of forcing versus fostering hinges on dramati
cally different preferences with respect to the desired timetable and the
associated risks. Under the forcing approach, management sees some
degree of risk, either that the relationship will deteriorate or that the
changes may not be forthcoming. On the other hand, the fostering
strategy, while it involves less risk, often takes considerably more time
and for an extended period may not show any benefits. As we will see
in a number of our cases, the parties can improve attitudes but nothing
else seems to change.
Thus, the challenge that the parties face when embarking upon the
fostering approach is to translate the potential that is present with bet
ter attitudes into the realization of real changes in operating practices.
Once changes are agreed upon via the fostering approach, then the
implementation can be fairly straightforward, since the positive atti
tudes lead to some measure of joint support for the new arrangements.
In fact, in some instances labor and management will establish joint
implementation committees to ensure that the spirit and not just the let
ter of new agreements is observed.
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Both the forcing and fostering strategies work with the same two
variables of behavior and attitude change, but the emphases are quite
different. Simply put, the forcing strategy compels behavioral changes
in the short run, hoping that attitudes will not deteriorate too signifi
cantly. The presumption is that over the longer run, management will
be in a position to attend to these consequences in order to derive the
maximum benefit from the behavior changes realized in the short run.
By contrast, the fostering approach emphasizes joint processes of prob
lem solving and attitude change that lead to the design of new systems
capable of commanding wide acceptance and new behaviors from the
various stakeholders.
Organization of the Book
Three cases, which are included in chapter 2, feature strategies that
unfold along a path that we have labeled "forcing." In each case, man
agement was the moving party, and change initiatives went far beyond
traditional distributive bargaining tactics. In each of the cases, labor
matched management's tactics and forged its own forcing response.
Sometimes the forcing initiative was part of a fully developed plan. For
example, in the Guilford case, the changes sought in work rules were
linked with a series of railway purchases and a restructuring of owner
ship, all of which required considerable planning and preparation. In
other cases, the actions of the parties took on increasing intensity as the
conflict escalated, leading to an emerging strategy of forced change.
In another three of the cases, which are included in chapter 3, the
parties were embarked on a path characterized by what we have termed
"fostering" strategies. Again, management was the moving party.
Many fostering initiatives evident today are part of larger, explicit
change strategies aimed at increased flexibility, improved quality,
reduced cost, and enhanced organizational effectiveness. In our three
fostering cases, however, the strategy was more emergent and less visi
ble at the outset. For example, the efforts at Bidwell began with a rela
tively narrow focus on employee involvement, while the efforts at CSX
began with a similarly specific focus on a multiunion, labor-manage
ment committee. In both cases, the initial tactical moves were coopera
tive in nature and suggested a larger fostering strategy, but the efforts
were circumscribed by dynamics within labor and within management.

10 Why Change?

The third case Anderson Pattern is a robust example where the fos
tering proceeded without being undercut as it was in the other two
cases.
In chapter 4, we present three of the cases containing multiple time
periods in which the parties' path involved a sequence of distinct strat
egies forcing followed by fostering. In two of the cases, Boise Cas
cade's DeRidder Mill and Adrian Fabricators, the forcing included a
bitter strike. In the third case, Conrail, forcing occurred in the context
of a governmental restructuring of the railroad. In all three cases, the
initial round of forcing had important consequences for subsequent
fostering initiatives.
Finally, in chapter 5 we present three cases that feature a combina
tion of concurrent forcing and fostering strategies, the most complex
path in our study. All of the cases featuring combinations of forcing
and fostering initiatives are at times sequential in character and at other
times truly concurrent. For example, at the Budd Company, forcing
around wage concessions occurred concurrent with fostering around
employee involvement. Ultimately all of these cases matured to stages
of predominant fostering, but each continued to include either episodic
distributive confrontations or (in one case) a subsequent forcing initia
tive.
Embedded in many of our cases is another strategy that has impor
tant implications for forcing and fostering, as well as mixed strategies,
namely, the strategy of escape. In some of our forcing cases, such as
AP Parts, Guilford, and Jay, the intensity of the forcing battle was
partly fueled by labor's perception that management aimed to go down
the path of escaping from the labor-management relationship. In the
Anderson Pattern case, which involved extensive fostering, escape
issues were part of the larger context in that most of the unionized pat
tern-making firms in the community had either gone out of business or
experienced a decertification election. In some of the mixed cases, such
as Budd and Packard Electric, management moved work out of exist
ing unionized facilities to either southern nonunion plants or to loca
tions in Mexico which was perceived by labor as a strategy of partial
escape from the union-management relationship.
In all of these cases, it is clear that change strategies (whether
explicit or implicit) adopted by the parties interact and powerfully
influence the course of the negotiations. We find clear evidence that
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negotiations can be classified distinctly into forcing and fostering strat
egies, with time periods when there is a mixture of forcing and foster
ing, as well as a broader context that may include a strategy of escape.
The various combinations of these strategies define somewhat (but not
completely) predictable paths along which negotiations unfold. We
address later the dynamics that can abruptly alter the pathway taken.
Substantive and Relationship Outcomes—Anticipating
Unintended Consequences

There are two broad types of outcomes in labor negotiations (and in
most other negotiations). First, there are substantive outcomes. These
include agreements (or disagreements) on the terms and conditions of
employment, as well as agreements about specific work practices. Sec
ond, there are relationship outcomes. These include agreements (or
disagreements) about the degree of joint activities, the amount of trust
among the parties, and the directions desired for labor-management
relations. One clear lesson from the cases is that the destination along
these pathways to change includes outcomes that contain both substan
tive and relationship dimensions. In some cases, management was pri
marily seeking substantive changes and was not prepared for the
degree to which relationship issues were also at stake. For example, a
concessionary demand may be seen by management as a purely eco
nomic matter, while labor may view the demand as part of the larger
strategy to undermine the power and legitimacy of the union.
In other cases, management primarily sought improvements in rela
tionships and was equally unprepared for the degree to which these
relationship changes necessarily were linked to substantive changes.
For example, management may have initiated a joint labor-manage
ment participative process around employee involvement only to dis
cover that continued union and worker support for the initiative
depended on substantive issues such as gainsharing and job security. In
all cases, labor was faced with the complex task of not only ordering its
priorities on substantive matters, but also assessing its priorities around
choices of whether to pursue labor-management cooperation or to view
management's moves as a threat to the institutional stability of the
union.
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Since in the United States there is no well-established tradition legit
imatizing social compacts that affirm the status of unions and the legit
imacy of broad strategic business decisions, adding these topics to the
negotiations agenda introduces a substantial measure of uncertainty
and ambiguity. Not only must the parties sort out their views on mat
ters such as seniority, wages, and job classifications, but they must also
assess the underlying values and intentions of each other regarding the
institutional relationship itself.
As a result of these relationship issues, when unions responded with
a forceful rejection of proposals for rollbacks, management in turn
exhibited a reaction that was usually stronger than the union antici
pated. Management was frustrated that the union would not acknowl
edge the legitimacy of the competitive pressures facing the company.
The result was often an unanticipated escalation into a protracted con
flict.
Thus, the outcomes of negotiations can be measured against the
objectives of both parties, but the negotiations also produce unintended
consequences, and these have the potential to overshadow the desired
outcomes. These intended and unintended consequences occur with
respect to substantive outcomes, as well as the nature of the relation
ship.

Conclusion
This chapter is entitled, "Why Change?" which is often the first
response of a party confronted with a change initiative. Sometimes the
question is answered by an attempt to demonstrate that change is in
everyone's mutual interest. At other times the question is answered
with threats about the consequences of resisting the change. Most com
plicated of all, there are times when threats and mutual interests
become interwoven.
We have seen in this chapter that whatever answer is provided, plac
ing change on the agenda initiates a negotiation process. To help
understand this process, a set of guiding principles and frameworks has
been highlighted. These ideas set the stage for the presentation and
interpretation of the cases featured in this book. The principles and
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frameworks should also be helpful for generalizing about the role of
negotiations over fundamental change in other settings.
Our main point that change affecting multiple stakeholders inevi
tably involves negotiations is deceptively simple. Change is not
always seen as inherently involving negotiations. Occasionally, when
one party can fully escape the relationships, prolonged negotiations
may be avoided. Most typically, however, some form of negotiations is
an inevitable outcome of interactions between a party desiring change
and a party affected by the change.
To understand the nature of these negotiations, we make the key
assumption that employment relations are inherently mixed-motive in
nature. Again, this is a deceptively simple point. It might seem obvious
to hold that all relationships involve a mixture of common and compet
ing interests. In fact, however, many parties act as though employment
relations are either entirely cooperative or entirely conflictual in nature.
The mixed-motive assumption sets the stage for forcing and foster
ing strategies. The inevitable conflicts in relations often prompt forcing
strategies, while the common concerns typically underlie fostering
strategies. A fundamental challenge, as we will see in the later chapters
of this book, is for the parties to find means for coordinating the two
strategies.
The strategies take on new and deeper meaning when we broaden
the focus to include relationships as well as substantive provisions as a
critical matter at stake in the negotiations. Treating relationships as a
subject of bargaining is not an entirely new concept. It is rarely pre
sented in a systematic fashion, however.
We hope that the principles and frameworks will serve as useful
touchstones for understanding the cases in the following chapters. The
heart of the book, of course, is the cases themselves. Today, finding
detailed case descriptions of change initiatives is all too rare. Yet, it is
only by tracing the twists and turns in the change process that we can
fully appreciate why the pathways to change are so complex and why
unintended consequences are an inevitable part of a successful journey
to improved economic performance and robust labor-management
relations.
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NOTES
1. In contrast to the mixed-motive assumption, some scholars and practitioners operate from
assumptions that employment relations are inherently and primarily conflictual in nature (with a
primary focus on the economic, social, or legal implications of the conflict). Others operate from
assumptions that employment relations are essentially cooperative (with a primary focus on build
ing consensus, shared vision, and the most effective organizational designs). An exclusive focus
just on conflict or just on cooperation will bring the risk of discounting the negotiated nature of
change.
2. For a more detailed discussion of these strategies, see Walton, Cutcher-Gershenfeld, and
McKersie 1994.

2
Forcing
Hard Bargaining Over Fundamental Change

This chapter examines how managements in several industries have
employed forcing strategies in an attempt to negotiate radical shifts in
the patterns of wage and benefit settlements, as well as increasing man
agement control over work assignments. Given a management judg
ment that its objectives require an attempt to force change, how does it
formulate its negotiating objectives? What negotiating processes and
structures does it employ to support a forcing strategy? What union and
worker responses do these management actions elicit? And, finally,
how does management cope with the dilemmas it encounters along the
forcing path?
We explore these issues in three cases in which the initial forcing
began during the 1980s: (1) an auto parts firm (AP Parts), where man
agement's campaign to reduce costs led to a bitter strike; (2) a labor
dispute at several International Paper (IP) mills, focusing on confronta
tions at the Jay, Maine facility during 1987 and 1988; and (3) a
regional freight railroad (Guilford) that used a series of confrontations
to restructure labor agreements and union representation.
Many labor-management negotiations today involve journeys down
the forcing path. This chapter illustrates a variety of ways to travel
down this path. Among the ways that management signaled forcing
strategies in our cases are: beginning collective bargaining with
demands for extensive changes, threatening and actually moving work
from one location to another, emphasizing customer cost pressures,
soliciting community support for its cause, utilizing replacement work
ers during a strike, and unilaterally imposing a contract on a union. We
also find instances of uncharacteristically tight supervision on the shop
floor and direct communications with workers in effect bypassing the
union. The cases illustrate the reduced effectiveness of the strike as a
forcing tactic for unions, as well as the emergence of alternate
responses available to unions, including not striking when it is
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expected, working to rule, soliciting community and government sup
port, and mobilizing other locals and even other international unions.
The cases differ on a number of key dimensions as summarized in
the following chart.
Key Aspects of Cases Featuring Forcing
Management
Agenda

AP Parts
Reduce
compensation
costs

Union Actions
Work to Rulea
at Deadline
Management Actions
Replacements3
at Deadline
Status of Replacement Terminated
Workers at Conclusion
of Negotiations

Jay
Reduce
compensation
costs; increase
productivity
Strike

Guilford
Increase
productivity

Replacements

Replacements
Placed in reserve
status

Substantive Changes
Relationship with
Union

Minimal
Restored

No contract
signed;
replacements
retained
Large
Decertification

Relationship with
Workers

Restored

Not clear

Strike

Large
One union
established (UTU)
for all craftsb
Deteriorated

a. At the deadline, the union did not strike; however, several weeks later a strike was called and
management brought in replacements.
b. Although eventually the various craft unions regained representation rights.

The three cases split on the approach taken to reducing unit labor
costs, with two focusing primarily on compensation levels and one on
productivity, e.g., work rules (though all of the negotiations involved
some compensation and some productivity issues). At the deadline, the
tactics adopted by the parties differed, though all the parties engaged in
confrontation tactics that escalated to the point that relationships with
the unions were severely ruptured. In the post strike period, however,
the cases varied greatly in the extent to which working relations were
restored.
Taken together, the forcing cases illustrate most of the hard bargain
ing tactics common in the present era. They also illustrate the range of
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possible dynamics and outcomes-suggesting some of the complexity
associated with forcing strategies.

THE UNFOLDING OF A FORCING STRATEGY
AP Parts and UAW Local 14
The case of AP Parts (AP) begins in 1984 with management's initia
tive aimed at forcing deep substantive changes. 1 The company was
apparently convinced that it needed substantial concessions to meet the
economic pressures of supplying the auto industry. Anticipating strenu
ous resistance from the union, the company decided to recruit and train
replacement workers. For its part, the union decided to throw manage
ment off balance by conducting an in-plant strategy when the contract
expired. Eventually, relations became so strained that the union struck,
and only after a bitter seven-month strike were the parties able to sign a
new contract.

Significant Features
The AP case illustrates many dynamics common to forcing strate
gies.
Each of the parties in the AP case came to believe that its organiza
tional survival was at stake. Management's own economic analysis
indicated it could not compete without concessions by labor. Labor
saw threats to its survival in the ambitious and extensive nature of
management's demands and the way in which they were
"dropped" on labor accompanied by handbills distributed in the
plant by supervisors.
The AP company derived bargaining power from its ability to
transfer operations.
The union's response blunted the initiatives of management and
ultimately led to the rehiring of the strikers.
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The dispute in this negotiation took on broader significance for
management and unions elsewhere.
Community leaders offered their services, but their effectiveness
was undercut when they came be seen by management as an ally
with labor.
AP management failed to negotiate a plan for the implementation
of the work cell structure it won in formal contract negotiations.
The acrimony associated with severe confrontational bargaining
tactics continued to live on after the settlement.
The severity of the conflict made both parties eager to negotiate the
next contract early and with minimal changes.
After the dispute the parties normalized the previous relationship,
but did not embrace labor-management cooperation and worker
participation.

Background
AP Parts has produced mufflers in the Toledo area since 1927. For
most of its existence, the company has produced mufflers for cars and
trucks in the aftermarket, as distinct from serving as a supplier to origi
nal equipment manufacturers (OEM). Although the firm was under the
guidance of its founder and owner, John Goerlich, for many years, it
has been bought and sold at least three times in the last decade. In addi
tion to its home manufacturing plant in Toledo, the firm operated facil
ities in Michigan and North Carolina and, as of the early 1990s, was in
a start-up phase for a facility in Indiana.
The stamped muffler produced by AP Parts represents an important
and relatively recent technical innovation in the industry. While a con
ventional automobile muffler typically has as many as seventeen pieces
to be individually assembled, a comparable stamped muffler has only
four pieces. More than the savings in assembly cost, however, the chief
virtue of the stamped process is its flexibility. The company can
quickly develop dies that are custom tailored to diverse applications.
UAW Local 14, an amalgamated local, incorporated the AP Parts
bargaining unit and three other units, the largest of which is a General
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Motors drive-train plant. The local was established in 1938. The histor
ical relationship between the AP Parts and the UAW was a traditional
"New Deal" set of interactions with arm's length collective bargain
ing and formal contract administration. The fact that the local also con
tained a facility owned by an original equipment manufacturer
(General Motors) helped ensure that the tone for the relationship and
the substantive issues in collective bargaining were closely tied to
negotiations between the UAW and the OEMs.
Inability to Adjust Within a Traditional, Arm's-Length
Social Contract
During the two years prior to the 1984 strike, the facility came under
increasing economic pressure and made a number of adjustments all
within the rubric of a traditional, arm's-length social contract. In 1982,
the firm lost a major customer Sears for whom it had been a sup
plier of replacement mufflers. Subsequently, there was a round of con
cession bargaining that included a 50 cents-per-hour reduction in
wages. As well, a quality of worklife (QWL) process was initiated in
1982. These two contrasting responses of contending and cooperating
were conceived and implemented solely as incremental adjustments
within the existing labor-management relationship. They were not con
ceived as part of a change process leading to a new relationship with
labor.
Both the wage reduction and the QWL efforts proved inadequate for
the pressures facing the firm. The Toledo facility experienced further
financial losses in 1983, creating pressure for yet further cost reduc
tions. While the QWL program generated suggestions from some
employees, it did not generate sufficient ideas for management to see
this effort as a vehicle for addressing the competitive pressures. The
union, which had mixed feelings about the QWL idea in the first place,
concluded that management was not sufficiently committed to the pro
gram, and it chose not to endorse the QWL concept. Instead, it
remained neutral neither opposing nor supporting the process.
After the loss of the Sears business, management decided to move
the aftermarket work to a smaller, nonunion facility in Goldsboro,
North Carolina. The Toledo facility was then dedicated solely to pro
ducing for OEMs, which represented the most competitive part of the
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industry. This placed great pressures on cost, quality, and delivery per
formance. Thus, coming into the 1984 negotiations, the company was
looking for broad changes in the collective bargaining agreement,
while the union membership felt they had already made substantial
concessions.
Dynamics of the Case

Building on the above history and context, our analysis of this case
has been organized into two sections. In the first section, we examine
the 1984 collective bargaining negotiations, which led to the collapse
of the relationship. We trace the dynamics associated with a bitter,
seven-month strike. By the end of this strike, fundamental expectations
had been violated with respect to all stakeholders management,
labor, the community, and customers and the traditional, arm'slength mode of interaction had been replaced by a form of armed war
fare. Our analysis will be highly detailed in order to capture the micro
process by which a contentious negotiation deteriorates. While there is,
of course, a long history of contentious strikes in this country, the high
profile of such strikes during the 1980s and the 1990s makes this
examination pertinent.
Following the strike, the parties (with new faces on both sides of the
table) entered into a process of reconstructing the relationship. For a
variety of reasons, the parties ended up recreating a traditional, arm'slength mode of interaction. This set of relations provided a useful foun
dation for subsequently negotiating an unprecedented five-year con
tract and reestablishing a traditional process of give-and-take between
labor and management on matters of contract administration.
As we present a prognosis in the final section, we note certain
sources of tension associated with attempting to sustain a traditional
arm's-length social contract in a context of severe competitive pres
sures. These include issues associated with the greenfield facility in
North Carolina, the management philosophy regarding labor-manage
ment relations in the Toledo facility, and the turnover of leadership
within the local union.
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The Collapse of a Relationship
The 1984 negotiations between AP Parts and the UAW involved
deep conflicts over wage, work-rule, and benefit issues. But, as we will
see, the interactions were more than a ritualized haggling over specific
contract language. From the outset, basic expectations of all parties
about the negotiations process were violated. Further, there were
deeper interests at stake for both sides. For management, it was the
very survival of the plant. For the union, its very institutional legiti
macy was under attack. These violations of expectations and the result
ing deeper undertones of conflict are critical to understanding how a
traditional relationship deteriorated to the point of armed warfare.
The Company Takes the Initiative

From the outset, management signaled to the union that this negotia
tion was going to be a departure from their past pattern of negotiations.
Procedurally, the company broke from the familiar mode whereby the
union makes most of the opening demands and the employer refrains
from communicating directly with the union members. As one union
leader characterized the opening of the 1984 negotiations:
It was at the opening meeting that they dropped the entire pro
posal on us. We weren't expecting anything like that. At the same
time they had supervisors in the plant passing out handbills stating
that "we are committed to staying in Toledo."

Both the large set of initial employer demands and the active use of
supervisors to communicate directly with employees violated tradi
tional norms that had governed collective bargaining in past years.
Management's ambitious proposals clearly surprised the union.
According to a dismayed union official, the workers were faced with
the following demands from AP Parts:
The company requested $5.84 in wage concessions, replacement
of the individual incentive system with a measured day work sys
tem, elimination of the thirty-and-out provision, freedom to sub
contract, introduction of new job classifications, and the
reorganization of the plant around work cells.
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This opening round of bargaining in effect represented a key pivotal
event, where fundamental substantive changes were placed on the
table, calling into question the social contract between the parties. With
respect to the substantive demands, the bargaining was explicit and the
potential change deep. With respect to the labor-management relation
ship, the company was engaging in a tacit form of bargaining over the
rules of the game. In effect, the company signaled that these interac
tions would have to be different from the prior negotiations that had led
to concessions and the QWL initiative.
The Union's Response: Counterforcing

By departing from the usual norms of interaction, the company was
signaling the depth of the changes it needed. Whether anticipated or
not, the effect of such departures is usually to put the other side off bal
ance. The union attempted to interpret or make sense of the company's
shifting behaviors as a way of reestablishing stability. Thus, every
action taken by AP Parts was carefully studied by the union to assess
whether the crisis was as severe as the company suggested or whether
the severity had been exaggerated in order to wrest deeper concessions
from the workforce and undermine the union. The fact that several
other auto supply firms in other parts of the country were actively
attempting to weaken or escape from collective bargaining provided a
context in which this was a plausible interpretation.2
The union considered the company's strike preparations a critical
signal of the company's intentions. As one union leader recalled:
They erected a chain link fence around the plant on the same day
that we sat down to begin negotiations. There had not been one
prior to that. The company took down a sign outside the personnel
office indicating there was no hiring and replaced it with a sign
requesting employment applications.
Nuckles Security [a private security firm] brought in a van load of
big, ugly men in uniforms. They tried to put fear in the guys, but
our men were the wrong people for that. They got a reaction
they got a lot of hate, but our people were the wrong guys for fear.

Once the union decided that its own institutional security might be
at risk, it began counteracting management's initiatives. One union
official characterized their strategy as follows:
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We played tit for tat. We reacted to what they did. If they sent a
four-page letter to all employees, we would come back with a
five-page letter.

By the contract expiration date of March 1, 1984, the drama was
well established. The company wanted the union to take their final
offer to the membership. The union refused to recommend this pack
age. The company requested that a vote be held anyway, which
occurred on March 5th. The package was rejected by a vote of 425 to
30.
The Union's Surprise Tactic at the Deadline

When the contract expiration date arrived, the union anticipated that
the company would be expecting a strike. It came to this conclusion on
the basis of management's actions, such as installing a security fence
around the property, advertising for replacement workers, and hiring a
security firm associated with union decertification efforts in other loca
tions. As a tactical response, then, the union instructed the workforce to
show up for work, ready to continue working under the terms of the
company's final offer.
Apparently, the union's decision caught the AP management by sur
prise. When workers arrived for work, they reportedly found the secu
rity guards hurriedly packing up food, cots, and other supplies that
might have been used to sustain a replacement workforce confined
overnight in the factory. This time, it was the union's departure from
established norms that brought tactical advantage and that marked a
second major pivotal event in the negotiations.
At this point, both sides clearly were pursuing forcing strategies.
Each made choices at critical moments (the opening of the negotiations
for management and the expiration of the contract for the union) aimed
at gaining leverage via distributive bargaining and designed to increase
uncertainty for the other party.
Increasing Tensions Under Counterposed Forcing Strategies

Although the union members continued to work, relations were very
tense. For example, security guards regularly video-taped all activities,
and workers responded with taunts. Additionally, the workers were
paid at the rate of the company's last offer, which involved a cut in
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wages and benefits of $5.84 per hour and the imposition of new shop
rules giving the company more freedom in its utilization of workers.
During the first month, over 150 workers were laid off (bringing plant
employment to 232), and disciplinary notices were given to over 80
employees for violations of the new work rules. In all, over 200 repri
mands were given to employees during the three-week period after the
contract expiration.
In response to what it regarded as "surface bargaining" and other
violations of the National Labor Relations Act, the union filed an unfair
labor practice (ULP) charge with the National Labor Relations Board
on March 22, 1984.3 The NLRB response to the union's charge was
delayed, reportedly because of the White House's failure to appoint an
interim replacement for the board's general counsel. Still, on April 30,
1984, the regional director of the NLRB rejected the union's ULP
charge.4
The third pivotal event occurred when the union indicated it was on
strike after learning of the NLRB's action. The employer then began
bringing in workers to maintain production. Approximately 125 picket
ing workers met 40 replacement workers as they arrived at the plant.
After various episodes of punctured tires and broken windshields, a
court order was issued limiting union picketing. At this point, the strike
was fully underway with management seeking to run the plant with
replacement workers and with the union intent on disrupting such
efforts.
Each side sought to weaken the other. Management put pressure on
the workers, while the union responded with further unfair labor prac
tice charges. Both sets of actions further increased tensions. Continued
escalation was not, however, inevitable. For example, a different deci
sion by the NLRB might have set the stage for a different sequence of
events. If the NLRB had ruled for the union, the company might have
resorted to a lockout, or it might have taken steps to resolve the negoti
ations without a strike.
Tactical Dynamics Contributing to the Deterioration
of Social Relations

On May 12, 1984, a federal mediator brought the two sides together
for the first time in two months. There was a news blackout for three
days as the parties met. However, the parties did not come to agree
ment and this initiative collapsed.
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Meanwhile, the conflicts between picketing employees, security
guards, and replacement workers became even sharper. In addition to
daily taunting, stone throwing, and other exchanges, the union staged a
number of public demonstrations outside the facility. The largest dem
onstration occurred on May 22, 1984, following a company announce
ment on the previous day of a reward of $10,000 for any information
concerning vandalism during the strike.
The demonstration involved approximately 3,000 people and turned
violent when a group of demonstrators attempted to crash the plant
gate with an eighteen-wheel semi truck. Tear gas canisters were used
by the police to break up the protest, which in turn generated a public
outcry (since some of the canisters had warnings on them that they
could be deadly). One union official reflected on the experience and the
overall strike as follows:
This was a war, full of wounds. Vietnam was easy compared to
this. I was over there. This was like a goddamn tour of duty in a
war. Imagine months and months with no income. We had suicide,
alcoholism, and divorce.

The demonstration made vivid the degree to which the relationship
(and hence a shared understanding of the social contract) had deterio
rated, foreclosing any substantive discussions. Formal negotiations
were officially broken off and the parties settled into a war of attrition.
The Parties'Inability to Reconstruct Social Relations

In mid-June, the company proposed to the union that secret talks
begin at a site away from Toledo in Ann Arbor, Michigan. The com
pany also changed law firms. The union agreed to the new initiative,
despite its concern that the new law firm had a reputation for providing
advice on union avoidance. Meetings began in Ann Arbor with a tone
that was open and informal, signaled in part by the casual attire of par
ticipants on both sides.
At the same time, however, the new law firm indicated that it would
not honor any existing tentative agreements; the negotiations were to
start from scratch. Such an approach served to exacerbate the distribu
tive elements already dominant in the negotiations. For example, the
company brought large binders with proposed contract language
changes, each reportedly containing only small word changes from
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earlier demands. The union expressed resentment about the extensive
time devoted at the beginning of each meeting to pulling out old pages
and updating the binders with new ones. In response, the union handed
out its own large binders full of its own proposed changes. The fight
then shifted to a debate over whose binders would be the point of refer
ence for discussions. By mid August, this new round of talks had come
to a halt. It is not clear how serious the company was in seeking resolu
tion at this stage, but certainly the tactics with the binders and related
actions blocked communications and, hence, substantive discussions.
A Competition for Community Support

The growing tensions between the parties increasingly spilled over
into the community. The Toledo community had seen its share of plant
closings and industrial disinvestment, and its citizens had become con
cerned about the deteriorating relations between AP Parts and the
UAW. Each of the parties, early in the negotiations, sought ways to use
community concern to its advantage in gaining leverage over the other.
Thus, the company advertised in the local newspaper that it was com
mitted to Toledo, and the union responded with full page advertise
ments of its own, proclaiming "The Truth About the AP Negotiations."
Prior to the strike, but after the expiration of the contract, the parties
continued their competition for community support. In public state
ments, management representatives indicated that, without major con
cessions, the company might have to close the facility. In response,
Toledo's mayor, Donna Owens, called for a labor-management citizens
committee, but the company indicated that it would be unwilling to
turn the negotiations over to such a group. It did, however, send a long
editorial on April 1st to the Toledo paper explaining its position.
In this piece, the company explained that there had been a 40 per
cent reduction in exhaust industry production from 1973 to 1981,
which drove the first round of concessions at AP Parts. AP Parts then
explained the shift of its Toledo facility to production for the OEM
market. It argued that this location was within 250 miles of 60 percent
of all North American automobile assembly plants. Further, the com
pany projected a loss of $10 million, which it explained as follows:
The hourly labor costs and the restrictive collective bargaining
agreement are the two items most responsible for our predica-
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ment. . . . We are now faced, quite literally, with the question of
whether the Toledo plant can survive. Survival is possible only
after major surgery the total and complete overhaul of the wage
and benefit package and a full rewrite of our collective bargaining
agreement.

The director of UAW Region 2B, which included Local 14,
responded on April 8 with an editorial that attributed the economic
losses to start-up problems with a new assembly process, misquotes on
bids, the slow development of new process controls, and the use of
unsuitable steel. Further, he stated that AP Parts was departing from a
forty-year history of collective bargaining in which "gains have been
made painstakingly through honest, good-faith negotiations." He stated
that: "It is not concessions that AP seeks here, it is the demolition of
the union contract."
In the middle of the various exchanges, AP Parts was awarded a $20
million contract to make mufflers for General Motors the largest con
tract in the company's history. Production was scheduled to begin in
January 1985. The company used this news in the battle for community
support. It announced that its successful bid on the contract was based
on the "terms of the new agreement at the Toledo plant." The company
also held the GM contract up as evidence that it wanted to remain in
Toledo.
In addition to serving as a potential partner on a partisan basis with
one side or another, the community had its own independent interests
(centering on labor peace). Highly visible violence and a festering war
of attrition were directly contrary to the desired economic climate.
Hence, after the mass demonstration on May 22, 1984, the mayor of
Toledo appointed a five-member community committee, which
included representatives from the Toledo Area Labor-Management
Committee (a longstanding community organization consisting of
many top local union and management leaders). In announcing the
establishment of the committee, the mayor stated:in the paper:
We've reached the point where this is no longer a labor-manage
ment dispute. We've been working hard to turn the image of the
city around.

The entry of a potentially neutral third party frequently represents a
pivotal event in negotiations. In the best case, the third party can be
instrumental in bringing the bargaining process closer to a settlement.
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It is also possible, for the third party to become another vehicle for
contention, which is what took place in this case. A union official
described the situation as follows:
At one point the area labor-management group recommended a
settlement. [The recommended settlement] had many of the com
pany demands, but still was strong on cost-of-living and on the
thirty-and-out pension. We instantly bought it we would take a
chance on it. The panel consisted of many prominent people from
labor and management in the community. Management turned it
down. That helped our image.

The union's rapid acceptance and the company's rejection served to
undercut the potential for the area labor-management committee to be
an effective third party. Instead, their position became a new element in
the parties' contest for partners as they battled one another.
The Management of Internal Differences During the Strike

The impact of the strike also rippled through the internal ranks of
both the company and the union. Although public information on this
point is scarce, at least one of the principal owners of the company sold
his shares as a result of the festering conflict. As well, members of the
management community in Toledo increasingly separated themselves
from the management of this firm. For example, management as well
as union members of the area labor-management committee expressed
frustration over the rejection of their proposal. This division within the
management community was consistent with the union's forcing strat
egy it hoped to separate AP management from others in the manage
ment community.
While management sought to similarly divide the union, the local
was able to blunt such efforts by reaching beyond the region to the
international union. In particular, the UAW's regional director (who
was deeply involved in the negotiations) made the case to the interna
tional union and the larger labor movement that the AP Parts strike was
a bellwether in the region: if the UAW won, it would temper the
actions of other employers; if the employer won, it would open the way
for similar strategies in other locations. In response, union members
from elsewhere in the UAW and from other unions all over the United
States sent food and money to help the striking workers.
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Perhaps the most vivid example of the way the union sought to
maintain internal solidarity took place in the late summer of 1984. In a
coordinated move, UAW Vice-President Donald Ephlin and UAW
Vice-President Stephen Yokich broke off their national negotiations
with General Motors and the Ford Motor Company, respectively, to
join the picket line in Toledo in front of the AP Parts plant. Needless to
say, the move was not only instrumental in managing internal differ
ences within the union, it was also a multilateral development in the
sense that it brought the AP situation to the attention of two primary
customers of AP Parts.
Resolution of the 1984 Strike

In September, the mayor again sought to bring the parties together
but she quickly denounced the company owners for refusing to meet
with her and, at the same time, not empowering their representatives to
come to a settlement. On September 19, 1984, the company announced
that the $20 million contract with GM would go to its nonunion plant
in North Carolina due to the difficulties of expanding production in
Toledo. Talks did not resume until the very end of October, when the
union indicated a willingness to consider the company's demand for a
work-cell concept. Amnesty for striking workers then emerged as a key
stumbling block.
Throughout the months of November and December, talks would
begin and then break off. At one point, in mid-December, the union
presented the last company offer to the membership, which included
amnesty for all but twenty-one union members. This contract was
rejected in a vote of 225 to 5. The company charged that the vote was
"a terrible breach of faith" and again broke off negotiations.
While the plant continued to operate during the strike, inventories
became depleted and customers began to question AP Parts regarding
its ability to make deliveries. Ultimately, however, the event that pre
cipitated the end of the strike was a petition filed on January 31, 1985,
by the Maritime Engineers Beneficial Association for a representation
election. While it is hard to assess how significant this was to the firm,
shortly afterwards the company did agree to a settlement with the
union that included some wage and benefit concessions, the addition of
a plant productivity bonus system, a two-year freeze on the cost-of-liv-
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ing increase, some work-rule changes providing more flexibility for
temporary job transfers, language regarding the use of a team-based
work-cell structure for welding, retention of holidays and retirement
benefits, and an agreement that no worker would be fired for any
picket-line activity. The replacement workers were terminated at the
same time. This contract was ratified by a vote of 254 to 72.

The Reconstruction of the Relationship
The resolution of the 1984 strike marked the conclusion of a sus
tained period of deterioration in the relationship between the UAW and
AP Parts. It was, however, an ambiguous resolution. With respect to the
social contract between the company and the union, there was evidence
to suggest that the agreement reflected the successful application of
union leverage in a context where each side had inflicted extensive
harm on the other. There were no pronouncements regarding what kind
of a relationship the company and the union desired each side just
agreed to sign a contract. With respect to the relationship between the
company and its employees, the situation was equally ambiguous. Any
company claim to mutuality with its employees was undercut by its use
of replacement workers. Within the union, the management of internal
differences had forged a high level of internal solidarity, though here
too there were many people who had suffered financially, losing their
cars and even in some cases their homes. Thus, it was unclear what
future claims the union might be able to make regarding its members'
commitment to concerted activity.
De-Escalation and the Arrival of New Personalities

Reportedly, shop-floor relations remained tense for more than a year
after the return to work. Incidents that took place in the heat of the
strike did not immediately fade from memory. Little disagreements
would apparently flare up, driven by feelings not far below the surface
among those who had been involved with the strike.
For some workers and most of the supervisors, this tension was too
much to take. Within a few years after the strike, the lower-level man-
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agement group had almost entirely turned over and many workers had
left. As well, turnover occurred among some key higher-level manag
ers, such as the plant manager and the personnel director.
Within the union, a new group of leaders was elected to office on a
platform oriented around rebuilding labor-management relations.
Thus, just two years after the strike, there were new faces on both sides
of the table. As difficult as the strike had been, the arrival of new lead
ers set the stage for an affirmative step toward the reconstruction of the
relationship.
A Successful, Traditional Negotiation
In 1987, the relationship between the company and the union took a
significant turn. As the current personnel director recalls:
March 1988 would have been the expiration of the contract. The
plant manager and I contacted the local president to try to get
early negotiations. We got together with the union and created an
imaginary deadline. . . . We agreed, let's go for two weeks. If we
don't reach it by then, all bets are off.
The company began the negotiations with relatively few demands, in
contrast to the set of sweeping issues that it had placed on the table a
few years earlier. As the personnel director commented:
We decided not to change any of the contract language. There was
nothing there that either side could not live with. Negotiations
basically revolved around economics. There were some minor
language changes. We spent the first week on language and the
second week on economics.
Within higher management, the approach of the new personnel director
and the new plant manager was greeted with skepticism. As one man
ager commented, "Our people downtown, who were intimately
involved with the strike, did not think we could do it."
For the union, the entire tone of the negotiations stood in strong con
trast to the experiences a few years earlier. One international union
official recalled:
Last June [1987] the company approached us about opening nego
tiations early. Ford and GM were pressuring them to have one
year of inventory going into bargaining or they would pull all
work. The company said, "Let's get an early agreement, with the
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incentive that the wage increase could take effect early." Here it
was two years later and it was like old traditional bargaining. Each
day we accomplished something. Since the settlement, employ
ment has been up and new work is coming in.

Despite the contentious strike, in which many traditional norms of col
lective bargaining were violated, both sides were apparently able to
reestablish traditional modes of interaction just two years later.
Undoubtedly, the change in the management ranks was a key factor,
but so too was the willingness of the new individuals to engage in giveand-take.
The Elements of a Reestablished Traditional Social Contract

Even in the early 1990s, many years afterwards, the strike still cast a
shadow over the company and the union. For example, one manager
noted that:
The media will not let us forget about the strike. If we get in the
newspaper for something good, the last two paragraphs of the arti
cle will mention something about the strike.

A key question, therefore, was whether the parties had put those ten
sions behind them, or whether they would resurface in some new way.
Given that the parties appeared to have reverted back to a traditional,
arm's-length relationship, what would prevent them from entering into
another round of escalating conflict?
A close look suggests that certain aspects of the relationship were
different from what they had been prior to the strike. For example, a
union official reported:
The level of information sharing is much higher now. The union
officials will often be called in to meet with customers, and they
all go through the plant together. Of course, Ford and GM are
demanding it. GM and Ford want to know how AP and the UAW
are getting along.

Clearly, this reported change was primarily externally driven. Inter
nally, the work-cell structure, which was a key issue during the strike,
had not been fully implemented, primarily because the team-based sys
tem was not in place.
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Indeed, many features of the case suggested little shift towards a
new relationship. Consider, for example the way the personnel director
characterized management's style:
Our plant manager and I hold that we should be running the com
pany, not the union. I guess you would call it a more traditional
approach. I've been through all those programs like zero-defects,
management by objectives, quality circles, and on and on. They
are all gone.
The traditional approach taking shape within management during
the early 1990s was matched by developments within the union. The
union leadership elected following the strike was replaced by a slate of
leaders who advocated an arm's-length relationship with the company.
Many of the new leaders had served on the bargaining committee dur
ing the 1984 strike. Thus, both parties were moving more solidly into
arm's-length, adversarial roles.

Analysis
An observer of the AP story would have to conclude that the yield
for the parties was rather low, given all of the resources invested in the
forcing campaign and the lingering resentment embedded in the social
relationships. The outcomes are summarized in the following chart.
Thus, the AP Parts story affords a window into a classic deteriora
tion and collapse of a labor-management relationship. Because each
side had fundamental interests at stake, initial tactical moves took on
great significance, and an escalation of conflict ensued. The escalation
was fueled as each side sought to derive power by breaking from tradi
tional norms of negotiations. The union's ultimate decision to strike,
management's use of replacement workers, and the tit-for-tat tactics
(e.g., around the binders), all afforded tactical advantage, but also
served to erode any vestiges of a relationship upon which a settlement
might be constructed.
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Significant Outcomes—AP Parts
ManagementSubstantive
outcomes
union relations
Two major rounds Movement from an
of wage and benefit adversarial
relationship, to
concessions
armed warfare, to a
reestablished
adversarial
relationship

Managementemployee relations
Limited
cooperation with a
QWL program
Complete collapse
of working relations
during the strike
(with the use of
replacement
workers)
Reestablished
management
control system

Other outcomes
Mutually costly
strike
Turnover of union
leadership and
management
personnel

Explanation for the Standoff

The best way to characterize the above balance sheet, in terms of
short-run costs and gains, is that all sides lost. Basically, the stalemate
can be explained in terms of a relatively balanced power equation.
Management gained leverage by its ability to transfer work to a new
union facility and to hire replacements when the union struck. For its
side, the union was able to mobilize pressure more generally from the
union movement and the community. Quite significantly, when the set
tlement was finally reached the union was able to secure its demand
that the strike replacements be terminated a position that the unions
in the other two forcing cases (as we will see) were not able to sustain.
The question needs to be asked as to why the parties were not able
to negotiate an accommodation to the new economic realities, espe
cially given their joint efforts during the early 1980s. It should be noted
that, similar to many companies that started to experience cost pres
sures in the 1980s, AP Parts management set in motion several pro
grams for closing the gap (for example, QWL and a round of wage
concessions). Then, as the competitive standing of the company wors
ened, management unveiled its proposals for a reduction in hourly
compensation costs of almost $6.00, which may or may not have been
designed to precipitate a confrontation with the union.
Significantly, the earlier concessions and QWL effort at adjustment
did not pave the way for the round of hard bargaining that we exam-
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ined. Rather, the early adjustments apparently served to immunize the
union leadership and the rank and file from accepting arguments about
the need for additional changes. A response that "we have already
given" often develops in labor-management relationships when man
agement comes to the table with additional concessionary proposals.
Thus, the stage was set for a showdown.
Alternate Scenarios

The question should be asked whether the parties in the AP Parts
case could have arrived at a new platform for change without all of the
turmoil inherent in unrestrained forcing. We attempt to answer this
important question in terms of several key choices made by the parties.
First, should the company have presented a more modest proposal
than the $5.84 reduction in compensation costs and other contractual
changes as a way of easing into an adjustment program? Certainly
making a credible case for such deep wage concessions would first
require a justification of the company's strategic decision to shift from
the aftermarket to supplying OEMs. The company saw this as an
essential business decision, while the union considered it to be a power
tactic. Under these circumstances, if management's business calcula
tions were legitimate, then it must have felt that it had no choice but to
open bargaining with an extreme demand. However, management did
not provide the union with sufficient financial information to justify the
claim, which led the union to interpret the bargaining position as a
challenge to the legitimacy of the union.
Second, once the bargaining had begun, could the parties have
altered their tit-for-tat sequence of tactics at any point (e.g., the battle
of letters to employees, the one-upmanship of elaborate binders, the
use of rallies by the union, and diversion of work by the company)? It
is unlikely, given the political realities within the union and the esprit
de corps within management that the leadership of either side could
have backed away from an all-out fight.
Third, given the onset of what all sides saw as a holy war, was there
a way for the parties to save face and end the hostilities? Possibly.
When community leadership offered to mediate, it was probably a mis
take for the company to dismiss the offer out of hand. Certainly, the
company did not want to lose control or to have a settlement dictated
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by a third party, but it could have entered into discussions, and the
agreement that eventually emerged might have been reached sooner.
Similarly, there is evidence to suggest that the NLRB decision could
have favored the union, which would have provided another opportu
nity for resolution.
Throughout the escalating conflict, each side made assumptions
about the motives of the other. Due to the strained communications and
low levels of trust, these assumptions were rarely checked directly.
Rather, related incidents were treated as corroboration, and each then
felt even more justified in its forcing strategy. Since management was
the moving party seeking dramatic concessions, the burden fell on
management to persuade the union of the merits of its position. Mere
claims of financial necessity were not effective a fairly dramatic quid
pro quo involving real power sharing in exchange for concessions
would have likely been required. Thus, management had two real alter
natives in this case force dramatic concessions sure to alienate the
union and its members (which is what occurred) or enlist the union
(and/or its members) as full partners in facing a competitive crisis.
Future Possibilities

The first point to note is that the AP Parts/UAW relationship reverted
back to a traditional pattern of interaction, and this occurred with sur
prising speed. Instrumental in this reconstruction of the relationship
was new leadership at the table as well as customer pressure for labor
stability. Since the reconstruction occurred around a traditional rela
tionship, however, it remained to be seen if this would be sufficient to
meet management's long-term needs regarding cost and flexibility, as
well as labor's long-term needs regarding employment security and
institutional stability.
One aspect of the relationship, however, will be fundamentally dif
ferent in the years to come. In the early 1990s, the company purchased
and restored an auto parts facility in Indiana capable of producing muf
flers. New employees were offered a benefit package and a participa
tive system of work organization designed to maintain a nonunion
status. While the company did not link this acquisition to the future of
the Toledo plant, the presence of a nearby nonunion facility clearly was
an ominous development for the union.
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Several other factors may be sources of instability-the parties face
continued customer pressures on cost, quality, and schedule; manage
ment has increased its strategic options with the above-mentioned
greenfield facility; and the union has reemphasized its solidarity and
willingness to confront management. Yet these same circumstances
may also provide each side with the impetus to take each other seri
ously. The question that remains is whether they will be able to attend
sufficiently to one another's interests within a traditional social con
tract.
Thus from a short-run perspective, the AP Parts story requires a
sober recognition of the high costs. However, from a longer-run point
of view, the possibility of more fundamental changes may be present.
Certainly, the lesson has been learned by the parties that the process of
adjustment to new economic realties has to be conducted in a manner
different from their escalation saga of the 1980s.

A MUTUALLY COSTLY DISPUTE
International Paper, Jay, Maine, 1987-1988
Contract negotiations between International Paper (IP) management
and the two locals of the United Paperworkers International Union
(UPIU) at Jay, Maine during 1987-1988 were characterized by an unre
strained forcing campaign that was costly to both parties.5 The negotia
tions involved a seventeen-month strike, which ended in November
1988 when labor abandoned its demands and accepted even less-favor
able terms than it had voted down seven months earlier. In the first few
months after the strike ended, only about 100 strikers returned to the
Jay mill, filling only those positions opened by turnover of the perma
nent replacements hired by IP during the strike. The international
union appeared to be weakened and divided in the aftermath of the
strike. The ultimate blow for the union occurred at a subsequent decer
tification election in which the UPIU was defeated. As of 1994 the
plant was still nonunion.
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Significant Features
The Jay case illustrates a number of facets that are often present
when forcing takes on an unrestrained character, specifically:
Despite pooling and linking of separate mill negotiations by the
union, the company still had only a fraction of capacity tied up at
the locations affected by the various strike and lockout actions.
The corporate campaign represented a multifaceted asset for the
union.
The company's replacement tactic led some strikers to break ranks.
The International union was unable to expand beyond the initial
pool of locals willing to support the strike.
Community, state, and national politics become entwined in the
labor dispute.
The resulting hostility on both sides contributed to an escalation
that did not serve the interests of either side.
With respect to outcomes, the Jay case can be distinguished from AP
Parts in a number of respects. First, the union, UPIU, lost out com
pletely in the Jay mill as a result of the power struggle. Second, while
the AP Parts hostilities were focused on just one plant, Jay was one of
four IP plants involved in this episode of protracted conflict. Third,
while at AP Parts the UAW exhibited considerable internal solidarity,
the Jay episode was characterized by considerable division within the
union. Our analysis will attempt to explain these contrasts as well as
management's strategy, the union's strategic response, and the out
come. We also describe the implementing tactics and the process
dynamics.

Background
IP's Jay mill is located on the Androscoggin River in western Maine.
In 1987 the mill employed 1,200 people in a 5,000-person town. This
region is not the vacation part of Maine; western Maine's economy is
depressed by the industrial decline of New England and largely
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untouched by the high-tech boom of the early 1980s. Although some
observers liked to refer to "hardy, independent" Maine workers prone
to strike, the last strike at IP's Jay mill, built in 1898, had occurred in
1920.
Concerned about low profits in the late 1970s, IP management at the
corporate level embarked on a belt-tightening program of familiar out
line: shutdowns of unprofitable capacity and reductions in salaried
workforce. IP managers also pursued two other standard avenues: they
built a nonunion mill and they pushed for concessions in contract nego
tiations in their union mills.
The UPIU, which represented a majority of IP paperworkers,
responded to early attempts to gain concessions by hiring, in 1983, cor
porate campaign consultant Ray Rogers. Rogers had founded Corpo
rate Campaigns Inc. in 1981 to work with unions to pressure
companies through veiled secondary boycotts and direct approaches to
large customers as well as to members of their boards of directors.
Before Rogers' general campaign against IP could be implemented,
however, IP officers and UPIU representatives agreed to meet twice a
year to discuss labor relations.
Pressures for Concessions Increase

In 1986, IP's profits were again rising, it had embarked upon a pro
gram of acquisitions, and it was pushing aggressively for contract con
cessions. The 550-member Natchez, Mississippi locals accepted the
loss of Sunday premium pay in 1986; by December of that year the Jay
locals had offered to renew their contract with neither a wage raise nor
loss of Sunday premium pay. IP refused the Jay union proposal. Rela
tions between IP and the UPIU then deteriorated rapidly.
Lockouts and Strikes

In March of 1987, a contract dispute resulted in an IP lockout of the
1,200-member UPIU local at its Mobile, Alabama mill. In April, IP
delivered an eighteen-item agenda to the Jay locals, including the elim
ination of Sunday premium pay and 178 jobs. In June, the company
made its final offer, softening the Sunday premium pay elimination
into a three-year phaseout and job elimination with an attrition pro
gram. The UPIU local refused the offer, and a strike began June 16.
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UPIU also initiated coordinated strikes against IP in DePere, Wiscon
sin (300 workers) and Lock Haven, Pennsylvania (720 workers). In
effect, the several UPIU plants that were negotiating at the time had
formed a "pool" to coordinate negotiations with IP.

Strike Dynamics at Jay
IP hired permanent replacement workers soon after the strike
started. Although the UPIU regarded this action as a deliberate insult
and threat, industry observers pointed out that the scale of the simulta
neous strikes against several IP mills would have made other manage
ment strategies difficult (e.g., moving in supervisory personnel from
other company mills). The mills' rural locations also made temporary
hiring problematic because of high local tensions. Replacement work
ers were recruited throughout Maine, some of them driving several
hours each way every workday.
Industry observers also suggested that the outside hires were not
part of a long-term strategy, and that both IP and UPIU leaders proba
bly developed their strike "strategies" as they went along, reacting to
unfolding events in the glare of publicity. Two presidential elections
the United States and the UPIU contributed to intraorganizational ten
sions as well. The Jay strike became a cause celebre among Demo
cratic presidential candidates, attracting far greater public attention
than might otherwise have been expected by corporate strategists antic
ipating a strike. It was suggested, as well, that since UPIU President
Wayne Glenn was facing a contested reelection, it was harder for him
to advocate restraint in the multilocation negotiations than would have
been the case in a nonelection year.
A bargaining session in September, held at the request of the Maine
governor, lasted only a few minutes. By October, the Jay UPIU local
president had asked UPIU international president, Wayne Glenn, to
support hiring Ray Rogers to coordinate a corporate campaign against
IP, and Glenn had agreed reportedly with some reluctance. Jesse
Jackson appeared at a UPIU rally in Mobile in October. The Jay local
also had been instrumental in instigating an investigation that led to an
OSHA levy of $250,000 in fines for hazardous plant conditions, and
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both sides had filed unfair labor practice charges, sought injunctions,
and subsequently filed charges of injunction violations. The town of
Jay adopted UPIU-supported ordinances banning strikebreakers,
restricting temporary housing, and appropriating funds for environ
mental law enforcement under Maine statutes. Workers at the Mobile
and Jay plants were awarded unemployment benefits because of the
lockout in Alabama and the provision of a Maine law: the replacement
workers had returned the Jay plant to more than 70 percent of normal
production.
The conflict continued unabated at Jay. By November of 1987, IP
had implemented a "best and final offer" contract containing job reduc
tions, Sunday premium pay reductions, and "project productivity" that
eliminated jurisdictional lines between crafts. IP also announced that
988 permanent replacements had been hired, that there would be only
12 more jobs open to any returning strikers (with the additional news
that 200 individuals had applied for those positions). All told, almost
3,500 UPIU workers remained on strike or lockout at the IP mills in
Jay, DePere, Lock Haven, and Mobile.
The parties met for four hours in December in the Washington
offices of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. The IP vicepresident of human resources and the UPIU president emerged to issue
a joint statement:
Despite our best efforts to explore all possible avenues to lessen
the differences that exist between the two sides, nothing came
from the discussions that could lead us to believe any resolution
can be expected in the near future. We will obviously continue to
see if other avenues exist to be explored.

Meanwhile, the corporate campaign was in full swing. Jay strikers
organized themselves into caravans that traveled through Maine, and
then to other New England areas, to garner support. They appeared in
Boston in February of 1988, where the Democratic mayor declared
"UPIU Local 14 Solidarity Day" - and also pledged to avoid buying IP
products for the city. Democratic presidential candidates Michael
Dukakis and Jesse Jackson vied for supportive opportunities. Rogers
identified several major companies-including Coca-Cola, Avon,
Anheuser-Busch, and a Boston bank-that bought paper or shared
directors with IP and orchestrated picket lines, boycott lists, and letter
campaigns that publicized their connections.
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Rogers' goal was to demonstrate to board members that they would
be treated as integral parts of IP management in every aspect of their
lives. Board members encountered pickets everywhere. Political debate
spread from the Maine legislature to the Democratic presidential cam
paign. The Maine governor drafted a bill that would keep non-Maine
companies from providing strikebreakers. Each side went to great
lengths to demonstrate the destructiveness, greed, and ultimate hope
lessness of the other side's strategy.
Intraorganizational Activity

Every effort was made by each party to strengthen its unity and to
undermine the other party's internal consensus. IP successfully sued
the UPIU for injunction violations and distributed the proceeds to
strikebreakers and outside contractors. The usual heckling of strike
breakers continued answered on paydays with brandished pay checks.
UPIU members attempted to enlist support from shareholders and
board members on various fronts. For its side, IP tried assiduously to
break the power of the corporate campaign by reaching settlements at
other locations.
Ultimately, out of 1,250 UPIU members at Jay, less than 70 strikers
crossed the picket line and returned to work. Although the availability
of unemployment insurance for an extended period blunted the appeal
of returning to work, observers suggested that, in large part, this mod
est hireback reflected the power of the corporate campaign in giving
strikers an active focus and reinforcement for their anger at IP and their
resolve not to give up the strike. In a small town in which the same
family could include hourly workers and managers, the corporate cam
paign allowed strikers to fix upon unfamiliar faces and to engage in
antagonistic encounters in other locations.
Finally, in March of 1988, at the urging of mediators and, it can be
surmised, as a result of the erosion of intraorganizational consensus in
the face of months of bruising and expensive combat three weeks of
contract talks were scheduled in Knoxville, Tennessee. IP was reported
to hold a "genuine desire" to reach a settlement; former Labor Under
secretary Malcolm Lovell was prepared to expand the role he had
already played in scheduling negotiating sessions; and UPIU President
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Glenn issued a statement at least ostensibly reflecting a new sense of
optimism about the potential for bridging the company's and employ
ees' interests:
[The UPIU is ready] to begin developing a positive, long-term
relationship dedicated to the competitiveness of the company and
the welfare of the employees.

Rogers' corporate campaign also was suspended for the duration of
the talks; of course IP announced that it had been "terminated," while
the UPIU declared that it had merely been put "on hold."
Negotiations lasted for two and a half weeks, resulting in a proposed
agreement which the UPIU insisted must be ratified by pooling votes
from all strike locations. For the union, the major features of the IP
proposal were provisions for early retirement and a guarantee of work
within one year somewhere in the IP system for all striking workers.
The contract was rejected overwhelmingly-with the UPIU refusing to
reveal the locals' specific votes.
The Strike Ends
The union then went into its convention in August 1988 with strong
support for continuing both the strike and the corporate campaign of
Ray Rogers. It was anticipated that, as other plants came up for negoti
ations, they would join the "pool."
This plan came apart in November when Glenn called union presi
dents together from all of the IP locals for a meeting in Nashville. The
national leadership tested support for the idea that plants with upcom
ing negotiations would "join the pool" and found that there was not
much enthusiasm among delegations from these plants. In fact, some
expressed concern that IP might proceed to replace all 12,000 workers.
Other depressing factors for the union were a rumor at Jay that the
company was planning to bring on another 200-300 workers, and
growing fear on the part of local union leaders that some junior work
ers would break ranks and cross the picket line quite a plausible
response among the striking workers at Jay whose jobs appeared
almost irretrievable after a one-year strike.
The national leadership, in conjunction with the presidents of the
various locals at IP, agreed to call off the strike as of November 9. As a
result, the workers were forced to accept less-favorable terms than they
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had rejected months earlier. The result was widely regarded as a defeat
for the UPIU strikers were not to be rehired en masse, and the most
senior strikers who rilled the handful of openings went back to posi
tions many rungs down the job ladder.
IP's immediate fortunes suffered relatively slight setbacks: only a
small percentage of its capacity had been affected; moreover, the coin
cidence of the strike and rising demand for paper had helped to mini
mize any financial strain on the company as a result of the strike.
Some costs of the dispute to IP, however, continued after the strike
ended. First, important skills and experience were lost. Second, as
replacement employees left the Jay mill, their positions were filled by
strikers, numbering 100 by early 1990, and tensions between the
strikebreakers and former employees increased. Thus, although the use
of replacement workers largely insulated the mill from the antagonisms
created by the bargaining tactics for a period, these antagonisms sur
faced in the poststrike period.
The potential for friction can be illustrated by the "inversion" that
results when a returning striker with substantial seniority finds himself
working as a helper on a machine that he previously operated as the
first hand. It probably had taken him fifteen to twenty years to progress
through the various stations on the machine; by contrast, the replace
ment, now working as first hand, learned the ropes in less than a year
and might be twenty years his junior.
Special animosity was directed to the strikers who decided to cross
the picket line. They were referred to as "super scabs," in contrast to
the replacements who were labelled "scabs"; the strikers were called
"true blues."
Another development disconcerting to national leadership was the
strike's temporizing effect on subsequent negotiations within the sys
tem. Some locals, especially in southern locations, conceded the Sun
day premium as well as declining to engage in in-plant tactics such as
work to rule and refusal of overtime. In fact, to the dismay of UPIU
international officials, some of these plants actually proceeded to break
production records.
But the biggest setback by far occurred in July 1992 when the work
ers at Jay (mostly replacements) voted by a substantial margin to
decertify the UPIU and conduct their employment relations on a non
union basis. However, the saga continued as the company proceeded to
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meet its legal obligation to rehire former strikers as positions opened.
Thus, as openings developed, the workforce contained a growing per
centage of workers who supported the union. UPIU representatives
expressed hope that they would eventually be able to win a new orga
nizing campaign.

Analysis
When IP's forcing strategy around ambitious demands at Jay was
matched by the UPIU's own strong forcing efforts, institutional stakes
and intergroup hostility were escalated in a way that precluded any sig
nificant integrative bargaining and trust building during or after the
strike. Thus, the juxtaposition of the parties' strategic choices pushed
the labor-management relationship to the breaking point.
On the substantive side of the ledger, management prevailed in
negotiating the terms of employment it wanted and apparently
strengthened its own confidence and power for securing concessions at
its other mills. At the same time, management incurred costs: the loss
of profits during the strike, the loss of the skills of experienced paperworkers, and the results of increased tension as a growing number of
strikers returned to their jobs.
Management probably miscalculated the degree of union resistance.
One could also argue that the union decision makers underestimated
management's power and resolve. It is unclear whether either side saw
itself as having alternative strategies available to it going into the nego
tiations. Eventually, positive employee relations may emerge, but it
will take many years.
Elements of the Power Equation

The following chart summarizes the main factors that determined
the outcomes in the Jay case.
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Determining Factors—International Papef
Company
Prepared for unrestrained forcing by lining
up replacements and galvanizing
management
Used threats of replacement workers and
other power tactics in other locations to
undercut union solidarity across locations

Union
Mounted corporate campaign

Attempted (but failed) to create a large
pool of locals willing to engage in strike
action

Forcing Tactics and Related Negotiating Dynamics

The Jay negotiations illustrate the central role of hard bargaining in
a forcing strategy. Each side employed tactics designed to increase its
own power, regardless of their souring effects on the attitudes of the
participants in the negotiations. IP's resolve to follow through with its
pattern of demanding concessions in all of its mills despite the upswing
in the business cycle aroused the strong opposition of union leaders
and workers, not to mention their families. Its use of permanent
replacements severely threatened the members as employees and the
union as an institution. For its part, the union's corporate campaign, its
pooled bargaining tactics, and its public relations activities reinforced
IP management's antagonism toward the union as an institution.
The heightened mutual hostility in the Jay case illustrates how
unbridled confrontational tactics decrease the likelihood of integrative
solutions to work-rule issues and other operating problems. Similarly,
the Jay case illustrates how parties try to bolster their own distributive
bargaining positions by strengthening their own internal consensus and
weakening that of the other side. The union's corporate campaign, for
example, sought to publicly embarrass IP's directors, possibly to pre
cipitate their resignation from the board, or at least to provide them
with an incentive to urge management to resolve the dispute. At the
same time, it provided a rallying activity for Jay strikers.
According to our analysis, while the interpretive frames of the two
sides changed several times during this episode, they remained remark
ably symmetrical. Initially, management viewed the negotiations as an
economic contest over wages and other terms of employment, a contest
in which it had the upper hand and which would continue the momen
tum of significant gains in operating practices. The union also focused
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on the economic contest and saw its task as drawing the line after a
series of concessions elsewhere in the industry and in other IP mills.
Later, the parties interpreted their conflict as a mutual struggle for
institutional power, prestige, and survival, overlaid on both sides with
agendas of revenge. Two pivotal events shaped this reframing of the
negotiation, serving to escalate the immediate animosity and add to its
longevity. One event was the union's decision to strike the Jay mill
despite the union's earlier acceptance of similar management terms at
the Maine mills of two other competitors. The second event was man
agement's decision to operate the plant with permanent replacements
rather than either supervisors or temporary replacements. The choice to
use permanent replacements, followed eventually by the procedure of
bringing back striking employees only as job openings occurred, meant
that deeply antagonistic workers would be hired into the midst of
employees whom these returning strikers regarded as "scabs."
Still later, the negotiators' frames shifted again from their mutual
acceptance of the no-holds-barred conflict to a mutual desire to limit
the ongoing and future damage of the conflict. Mediator Malcolm Lovell played a key role in coordinating the reframing of the leaders'
views, ensuring that both sides wanted to end the strike before UPIU
President Glenn's upcoming campaign for reelection. The negotiations
that followed confirmed that the parties' representatives could reach a
compromise, but the membership's subsequent rejection of the pro
posed agreement suggests that at the local level the interpretive frame
had not changed and was at variance with that of their representatives
from union headquarters specifically, the national leaders who now
felt the necessity of nationwide damage control, while the Jay local
focused on IP's refusal to reinstate all striking workers.
Several critical events were required before the striking members
would grudgingly accept their leaders' sense of resignation and agree
to abandon the fight. Other IP plants with upcoming negotiations
rejected the idea of joining the pool, and there was the ominous rumor
that young workers might break ranks and return to work.
In retrospect, the question should be asked whether the relationship
could not have been salvaged before the local union lost everything.
There are a couple of options that, if pursued, might have made a dif
ference.
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Given the siege mentality within the local union, the international
union leadership could have insisted that the settlement worked out by
Lovell be endorsed by the local leadership. Stronger moves would have
involved placing the local under trusteeship (similar to the action taken
by a different international union in another celebrated confrontation
Hormel versus the Food and Commercial Workers at Austin, Minne
sota). Further, Lovell could have been asked to serve as an arbitrator,
thereby creating a forced solution and getting as many strikers back to
work as possible. The alternative of arbitration probably would have
been rejected by the company, since management believed it could dic
tate the terms of the settlement once it had demonstrated that it could
operate the plant in the face of a strike.
Also, a different response by the company at the deadline might
have helped the local union and workforce "come around" and be will
ing to accept some changes in cherished pay arrangements, especially
premium pay for Sunday. By bringing in strike replacements immedi
ately, the company shifted the negotiations from a discussion of appro
priate pay and work arrangements to a struggle for institutional
survival. With permanent replacements in the picture, an impossibleto-close negative range developed between the union's insistence that
replacements be terminated and the company's insistence that it was
honor bound to keep them because that was the pledge they had made
to induce these replacements to endure the pressure of crossing a
picket line and working inside a plant under a blockade.
Paper plants tend to be located in isolated communities, where a
type of resolute solidarity can develop rapidly. When (in addition) mil
itant and charismatic leaders like Ray Rogers are brought into the
arena, the chances of finding common ground diminish greatly. It is
possible that a delay in the use of replacement workers would have
allowed time for the power realities to more fully become apparent. For
example, Caterpillar, in a dispute with the UAW in 1992, followed a
strategy of delayed resort to replacements. This strategy succeeded at
least to the point of getting the workers back to their jobs. Of course,
the critics will point out that relationship and substantive issues "back
at the plant" in Peoria have been far from resolved.
This brings us to the fundamental question of whether a company
like IP sees any value in a collective bargaining relationship, and
whether it attempts to roll out its forcing strategy in a way that does not
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severely undermine this relationship. When companies like IP and
Guilford (the next case to be discussed) move quickly to hire perma
nent replacements, it is understandable why labor concludes that an
important objective guiding employer tactics must be escape from
union representation. Thus, the forcing strategy is revealed as a highly
volatile option in the present economic and legal context. Power tactics
prompt power responses that escalate an economic contest into a strug
gle for institutional and organizational survival.

The Guilford Story

The Guilford case represents the most celebrated example of unre
strained forcing to occur in the railroads during the 1980s. While it is
not clear whether the parties intended at the outset to engage in unre
strained forcing, the escalation quickly occurred after impasse was
reached in negotiations between the company and the Brotherhood of
Maintenance of Way Employees (BMWE). This dispute was settled by
intervention of the federal government; however, the company unveiled
other tactics, specifically, a series of reorganizations that allowed it to
drastically revise its contracts and union representation arrangements.
The company gained some important changes in work rules, although
working relations with labor were soured dramatically. Whether a heal
ing process will eventually take place and the parties will be able to
fashion constructive working relations is difficult to gauge as of the
mid-1990s.
Significant Features

The Guilford case provides important insights into the nature of
forcing in the highly regulated railroad context:
The parties placed dramatically different interpretations on the
same events, especially the strike by the BMWE to force the com
pany to improve its final offer.
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The government played a key role in ending an escalating labor
dispute.
Even with a partial return to the status quo ante, the parties found
themselves in a new relationship with the unions deeply resentful
over the employment of replacement workers and with the com
pany looking for every opportunity to seize the initiative.
Rivalries among competing craft unions were effectively exploited
by management in the context of a forcing strategy.
In many respects the Guilford case falls somewhere between the AP
Parts and Jay cases. The parties in this instance engaged in consider
able escalation of hostilities, but the intervention of the government
prevented the all-out battle of Jay. While Guilford has remained union
ized, the structure of representation has changed dramatically, with one
union covering all workers during an important phase of restructuring.
While the outcomes are not as dramatic as the decertification of the
union at Jay, they involved much more fundamental changes than
occurred at AP Parts.

The Story Line
The Guilford story is complex. We will summarize only highlights
and identify the key elements of the strategy as it unfolded. The Guil
ford saga can be divided into four phases:
1. Acquisition and anticipated expansion (1981-1985);
2. Strike by the BMWE (1986);
3. Springfield Terminal concept (1987); and
4. Work stoppage and its aftereffects (1987 and after).
Phase I—Quest for Viability Through Controlled Forcing

The first phase, covering the early 1980s, involved a program to
consolidate three railroads: one marginally profitable railroad (Maine
Central), one railroad that had been in bankruptcy since 1970 (Boston
and Maine), and a third railroad that was in de facto bankruptcy (Dela-
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ware and Hudson). The reorganization included restructuring of shops,
offices, and other facilities, as well as investment in labor-saving tech
nology, e.g., new track repair equipment.
In 1983, an agreement was reached with the BMWE reducing the
number of maintenance sections from 52 to 26. In exchange, the rail
road provided enhanced travel allowances. In October 1984, Guilford
reached a series of agreements with the clerk's union wherein the com
pany gained flexibility in transferring and consolidating clerical work.
In exchange, the carrier agreed to various severance payments for indi
viduals affected by these consolidations. Likewise, throughout 1985
and early 1986, Guilford attempted to negotiate a supplemental unem
ployment benefits (SUB) plan with the International Association of
Machinists in exchange for flexibility in executing transfer and consol
idation moves. In addition, numerous shop, office, and operational con
solidations were implemented under the labor protection conditions
imposed by the Interstate Commerce Commission in the Guilford con
solidation.
While these events were transpiring, the BMWE initiated negotia
tions under the procedures of the Railway Labor Act seeking, among
other things, lifetime protection of benefits for its members. For its
part, Guilford sought to place a cap on severance pay for workers who
would no longer be needed. In addition, the company sought to create
one seniority district for production work at its Maine Central division
rather than the then existing arrangement of four separate districts. For
example, under the existing contract, if additional crews were needed
outside of Portland, members of the statewide seniority district had to
be utilized, subject to overtime limits, before any of the Portland per
sonnel could be called out. Recognizing that such a composite senior
ity unit would reduce personnel, the company proposed a severance
program of $26,000 for individuals who would be made redundant.
Mediation was initiated in September 1984, and the parties were
released to "self help" by the National Mediation Board (NMB) in
September 1985. The company proposed, and the BMWE accepted, a
ninety-day moratorium on any unilateral action. During this ninety-day
moratorium period the parties continued negotiations. In addition to
the $26,000 per person protective arrangement, the company agreed to
match wage increases that would emerge from national negotiations.
The BMWE continued to press its demand for retroactive severance
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payments for employees already furloughed. When the company
refused to accede to this demand, the BMWE went on strike on March
3, 1986.
Phase II—The Shift to Unrestrained Forcing

As soon as the strike began, Guilford initiated actions to continue
operations, although at reduced levels. Specifically, the company hired
replacement workers to supplement managerial employees. Two weeks
into the strike, the BMWE approached Guilford about reaching an
agreement based on the carrier's prestrike offer. From the company's
point of view the onset of the strike had changed its decision-making
calculus, and it responded that it was not interested in returning to its
prestrike offer.
Soon thereafter (in May) the union set up picket lines at various
interline points throughout the northeast (and even at selected locations
as far away as the Midwest and the West Coast). Within two weeks the
dispute had escalated to the point that it threatened to affect most of the
operations of the nation's large freight carriers with the result that the
White House stepped in and appointed an emergency board under the
provisions of the Railway Labor Act. Subsequently, the emergency
board recommended a settlement along the lines of Guilford's last
offer. This recommendation was rejected by Guilford. Eventually the
strike was settled in September 1986 as a result of a cooling-off period
imposed by Congress and creation of an advisory board that followed
the terms of the emergency board report.
Phase III—Continuing the Strategy of Unrestrained Forcing

With the dispute finally settled, the labor-management relationship
continued in a direction very different from the one existing prior to the
strike. By fall 1986, Guilford was ready to unveil yet another piece of
its forcing strategy: transferring in stages its various operations to its
Springfield Terminal (ST) subsidiary.
Over the years, Guilford had maintained a small subsidiary line in
Springfield, Vermont, where it had a contract with one union, the
United Transportation Union (UTU), for the few workers associated
with the line. In a series of reorganizations, Guilford proceeded to
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transfer (on paper) the Maine Central, the Boston and Maine, and the
Delaware and Hudson to the jurisdiction of the Springfield Terminal. 6
Guilford maintained that as a result of these changes in organization,
the ST was free to apply to the transferred operations its existing UTU
agreement (that gave management substantial flexibility).
The parties to the ST agreement (management and UTU) did not
reach a new agreement for the transferred operations until February
1989. Included in the new agreement were wage increases, new admin
istrative procedures covering bidding, displacements and reductionsin-force, and most important, a mutually agreed-upon basis for dove
tailing the seniority of employees across the various railroads that had
been placed under the umbrella of ST. The agreement also contained a
moratorium on any changes through December 31, 1994.
Phase IV—Consolidation and Union Representation Struggles
The final phase began when the UTU went on strike in November
1987, with 1,200 workers claiming that safety was not being main
tained under the Springfield Terminal agreements. Again, Guilford
management responded by operating the system with supervisors and
replacements. The strike lasted until June 1988, when the NMB
ordered the parties into arbitration.
Without detailing all of the twists and turns of the legal journey that
was traveled in the aftermath of the ST reorganization, suffice it to say
that the ICC, the NMB, and various arbitrators grappled with a range
of issues that included seniority of transferred workers, appropriate pay
levels, and protection for furloughed workers.
As of 1994, these decisions could be summarized as follows:
Economic arrangements and work rules were restored to the terms
and conditions in effect before the ST reorganization (1986) for
workers then on the payroll, although wage increases that had been
negotiated by the UTU in 1989 were not applicable.
For workers employed after the ST reorganization, the revised
terms and conditions of the UTU contract applied.
Most of the craft unions ultimately regained representation rights.
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Analysis
An overall assessment of the Guilford strategy is still premature.
However, a number of observations can be made on both sides of the
ledger.
There were positive gains from management's point of view. The
break-even point for volume was reduced by approximately 30 percent.
In addition, compensation costs were reduced 20 percent as a result of
the implementation of contracts with lower wage scales and reduced
crew sizes. For example, the run from Albany, New York to southern
New Hampshire a trip that formerly required five four-person
crews was done with two two-person crews. Overall, 90 percent of
all trains operated with two-person crews as of 1994.
Management maintained that this dramatic reduction in labor costs
made it possible to schedule more frequent and shorter trains, thereby
providing better service to its customers. Previously, it had been forced
to collect traffic into longer trains to gain economies of scale a prac
tice that did not provide the best service to its customers.
On the other side of the ledger is the impact of the various arbitra
tion decisions, which eliminated a significant portion of the savings.
Moreover, some of the expected benefits from the new arrangements
were slow to materialize. While a major theme of the new labor agree
ment was flexibility and cross utilization of personnel (in fact, the
signed agreement with the UTU provided for salary enhancement as
workers learned other skills), little change took place, primarily
because middle management did not capitalize on the new opportuni
ties.
The bottom line for revenue and employment was also negative.
Tonnage did not recover to levels existing prior to the spring of 1986,
and while the railroad returned to profitability (1994), overall revenue
was 25 percent lower. Employment fell from approximately 5,500 to
slightly over 1,000 by 1994.
The relationship between management and the workers/unions also
continued to be very acrimonious and complex, especially in light of
the previously mentioned point that employees hired before the ST
reorganization were returned to their former pay arrangements while
new employees were held to the terms negotiated by the UTU. In addi-
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tion, individual workers filed complaints with different government
agencies alleging safety problems and harassment. Add to this the ten
sion created in work groups where replacement workers found them
selves alongside long-service union activists and the picture of a
contentious workplace was complete.
The Power Equation

Each side possessed certain advantages that included:
Determining Factors—Guilford
Unions
Company
Closely held company with a willingness The ability of the unions at Guilford to
of key managers to take risks
mobilize other unions into a secondary
boycott

In the power equation above (evenly balanced), the decisive factor in
determining the eventual outcome was the government's stepping in
and mandating a settlement. During the second round the government
again stepped in, but by this time the company had introduced simpli
fied work rules and bargaining structures that remained in place. In
effect, the function of government intervention was to get the railroad
functioning again and this role could have helped either side (depend
ing on the terms of the return-to-work agreement).
The Dynamics

The Guilford story represents a saga of "let's get even," with the
company encountering the BMWE strike, then "going for broke" with
the Springfield Terminal restructuring, followed by the unions striking,
and finally with the company seeking to sustain its advantage through
court and arbitration proceedings aimed at confirming the new operat
ing arrangements.
These moves and counter-moves can be summarized:
Company presents a proposal that it considers fair.
Union follows standard script: It assumes that by striking it will
sweeten the package.
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Rejection of "fair" proposal by union creates "agonizing reap
praisal" on management's part.
Company "declares war" and hires replacements.
Union is incensed by the action of the company in hiring perma
nent replacements and succeeds in escalating the dispute by enlist
ing support from other unions around the country.
Government intervenes and mandates a settlement.
Company uses a reorganization (Springfield Terminal) as a means
for revising labor-management contracts and recognizing the UTU
as sole bargaining unit for its operating employees.
Unions strike over issue of safety.
Craft unions other than UTU extremely resentful and form a craft
council.
Relations remain extremely tense.
Unrestrained forcing unleashes these dynamics wherein each side
adopts tactics that seek to redress a power disadvantage and/or to gain
a new advantage. This tit-for-tat is very characteristic of unrestrained
forcing.
Why did management at Guilford undertake such drastic restructur
ing via the ST concept? When the emergency board made its recom
mendations that the dispute with the BMWE be settled on the basis of
the company's last offer, "railroad buffs" would have expected that the
relationship would have returned to arm's-length, i.e., to businesslike
dealings that had existed for several decades. After all, the company
had gained the changes that it wanted, and the workers had received a
settlement matching industry levels of compensation. Why, then, was
the company proceeding with additional forcing tactics by using the
shell of the ST to rewrite existing labor agreements?
The campaign by Guilford to force, on a continuing basis, changes
in work practices and pay levels is explained by the low value that the
company placed on preserving the labor-management relationship. In
most instances of change, the formal labor-management relationship
remains intact, and a desire to prevent it from souring serves as some
degree of restraint on the behavior of the parties. In the case of Guil
ford, the labor-management relationship was, for the most part, frac-

Forcing

57

tured when management decided to proceed with its hard forcing
strategy of replacing striking BMWE workers. With nothing to lose,
since it had already been labeled the "bad guy" of the industry, Guilford pressed on with other tactics in this case, using the ST subsid
iary to revise all of its labor contracts. Of course, the company was
aided in its isolate behavior by the willingness of UTU, also an isolate
among railroad unions, to step forward as the bargaining agent for all
of the unionized workers on the railroad.
The Springfield Terminal move raises the interesting question about
the circumstances that delineate the line between restrained forcing
tactics and an all-out battle. In interviews, Guilford management
asserted that it did not enter the negotiations with BMWE with any
plan of confrontation in mind. The unions maintain otherwise. But
regardless of the company's original intent, when the union rejected
what the company negotiators thought was a fair package, top manage
ment shifted in their mindset.
Basically then, the strike by BMWE was evaluated from very differ
ent perspectives by the parties. For the unions it was the normal course
of action to go on strike whenever the Railway Labor Act procedures
were finally exhausted. For the company, the strike represented a piv
otal event or, in their language, "the last straw." The rejection by the
union of management's offer moved the relationship beyond the point
of no return.
How could something as "routine" as the BMWE going on strike
create such a shift on the part of Guilford management? The expecta
tion of the union was that management would make some small
changes in its offer, the strike would be called off, and the contract
signed; or, if management insisted on holding to its position, then an
emergency board would be appointed and a recommendation would
come forward that would "sweeten" management's last offer. By con
tinuing to operate, and especially by hiring replacements, management
charted a very new course. What explains this pivotal development?
When management decided to "go all out," it was giving release to
decades of pent-up frustration over not being able (from its point of
view) to deal adequately with the "labor problem." The additional dol
lars that would have been required to compensate workers already on
furlough were not large, but as is the case with the onset of most holy
wars, a limit had been reached. This choice to move from traditional
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distributive bargaining to a strategy of unrestrained forcing was heavily
influenced by the thinking of the CEO, Tim Mellon. The combination
of a privately held company, a small regional carrier operating prima
rily in New England, and a strong-willed leader all coalesced to
make the strategy both feasible and desirable for management.
The Guilford strategy, to a very large extent, was dictated by eco
nomics. The 1986 BMWE strike lasted from March 3 until late May.
The strike resulted in a serious loss of revenue and a permanent loss of
some traffic. These facts, combined with the long-term secular decline
in railroad traffic in New England, convinced Guilford management
that an immediate restructuring of labor costs was necessary via the ST
concept. Of primary importance was the changing of work rules (e.g.,
changing from five-man crews on the Maine Central and three-man
crews on the Boston and Maine to two-man crews under the ST agree
ment). There was a real sense in 1986 that Guilford could not wait for
the gradual restructuring of labor costs that may or may not have taken
place on the national level. In other words, there was a sense of
urgency that something had to be done in the short term.
Given this explanation it is hard to imagine ways that the parties
could have reached their objectives without experiencing this debacle.
One possibility would have been for the leaders on both sides to have
found ways to create some type of alignment across their divergent
perspectives. Such an idea sounds fine as a general proposition but
becomes very difficult to operationalize in the face of a long history of
arms-length dealings and the reality of bringing about changes in key
assumptions within organizations characterized by many levels and
factions. Nevertheless, like our speculation on the Jay case, if manage
ment at Guilford had delayed hiring replacements once the BMWE
went on strike, the chances of reaching and changing the outlook of the
rank and file might have increased.
Indeed, Guilford management engaged in very little direct commu
nication with their workers. Rather, the approach appeared to be to
catch the union leadership off balance by quickly hiring replacements
when the BMWE struck and subsequently pushing through reorganiza
tion moves. At no point did the company put the union and members
on notice that it would be forced to take action by a specific date if no
agreement could be reached on the proposed program for change. Such
as approach might not have worked, i.e., the company would still have
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been "forced to force" but a modicum of trust across the boundary
might have been preserved. As it turned out, when confronted by the
various moves of the company, the unions could only conclude that
they were in a fight for their survival.
The Future
In many ways 1994 stands as a key year in the history of the Guilford saga. With the recertification of the craft unions and with contracts
due to expire at the end of the year, the parties embarked upon contract
negotiations for the first time since the confrontations of the 1980s. All
parties were committed to remaining outside of national negotiations
(also scheduled to commence in late 1994).
While the company succeeded in changing key work rules as a
result of its forcing strategy, and while it looked for a while like its
local initiative might gain for it some advantage vis-a-vis the rest of the
industry, the irony is that similar flexibility had been achieved by oth
ers. Large freight carriers like Union Pacific and Norfolk Southern,
who had remained committed to national negotiations (termed
"national handling"), were operating with the same reduced crews and
flexibility as Guilford as a result of the 1991-92 industry settlement.
So with respect to outcomes, Guilford ended up even compared to
the rest of the industry on work rules. On the relationship side of the
equation, however, it had generated considerable resentment. Negotia
tions unfolding as this book was going to press presumably provided
an opportunity for the parties to strengthen working relationships and
to take advantage of a number of business opportunities in the New
England region, including alliances with Canadian regional railroads,
intermodal arrangements in Albany, and new warehousing at the
restructured Ft. Devens in Massachusetts.
In retrospect, it is easy to be critical of the strategy chosen by Guil
ford. When they embarked upon their program of change in the mid1980s, it did not appear that any substantial breakthroughs would be
forthcoming from national negotiations. Significantly, virtually all of
the small and medium-size railroads had found it necessary to deal
locally with their respective unions. And no doubt they will continue in
this vein, despite the gains realized by the National Railway Labor
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Conference (the employers association) in the 1991-92 industry settle
ment.
The next chapter of the Guilford story will be especially important
to monitor, since it will shed light on the question of whether mediumsize regional carriers (as well as small, short lines) can fashion strate
gies that improve their viability in ways more expeditious or compara
ble to the change avenues available to the large national freight carriers
as a result of industry-level negotiations.

OVERVIEW OF FORCING

Outcomes
In drawing up a balance sheet for our three cases of forcing, a num
ber of patterns are evident:
The unions involved never ended up winning. In two cases, some
or all unions lost representation rights (Jay and Guilford) and in
one case, they struggled to a stalemate (AP Parts).
The workers did not fare much better, either. Some of them lost
their jobs at Jay and Guilford, and in all of these cases workers suf
fered losses in pay during the strikes and were forced to return to
work under drastically altered contracts.
Management generally fared better. In every case they gained more
favorable labor contracts. However, in varying degrees and for
varying periods, the three companies experienced deteriorated
labor-management relationships. Even where the company suc
ceeded in escaping union representation, a legacy of bitterness
remained within the workforce.

Lessons Learned
In reviewing the three cases, we can identify a number of best prac
tices. They can be organized around the three time periods that often
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characterize a forcing effort, namely, formulation of the plan, actions at
the deadline, and relations in the aftermath of the forcing episode.
Formulating and Presenting the Demands

As discussed at several points, the forcing strategies might have
been executed more successfully if the companies had found ways to
make their objectives more credible. In the AP Parts case, where man
agement felt it needed to reduce compensation costs (rather than just
achieve productivity gains), the task of making its position plausible
became much more difficult.
Acceptance of the need for change by the union and its members at
AP Parts was made especially difficult by developments that had
occurred during the early 1980s. Management, in a prior negotiation,
had achieved a series of concessions, leading to the conclusion on the
part of many workers and union leaders that the competitive problem
had been fixed. Thus, as AP management approached the 1984 negoti
ations it faced an even higher hurdle in making a credible case for new
(and much larger) concessions.
In varying degrees, the unions felt that these companies were being
unreasonable in seeking changes that could be viewed as rolling back
the clock or breaking away from the patterns of the industry. Ulti
mately, there may not have been an elegant solution to a dilemma fac
ing these companies, namely, how to focus attention on changes that
they believed were required as a competitive necessity without being
seen as abrogating the historical understandings with their unions and
employees.
Thus, the best available solution in most circumstances may be for
management to make its case as best it can and to deal with the inevita
ble escalation as effectively as possible.
From the union side of the picture, the best stance could be a course
not followed by any of the unions in our forcing cases, namely, to ask
for involvement in management decisions previously reserved exclu
sively to management. In return for concessions, the union leadership
would be seeking involvement in matters essential to the competitive
survival of the firm. The type of quid pro quo we contemplate is best
illustrated by Packard Electric and Budd in the next chapter.
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Actions at the Deadline
As noted in the discussion of AP Parts, if management can continue
operations without resort to hiring replacements at the deadline, then
more options are preserved for sustaining the labor-management rela
tionship. Similarly, if the union avoids strike action and keeps discus
sions going, the chances are enhanced that some common ground can
be found.
But again there may not be any alternative short of a test of resolves
via a strike or lockout. Given the incompatible expectations that usu
ally accompany any discussion aimed at securing major concessions,
an outcome that all sides can live with may not emerge until the parties
experience the rising costs of conflict.

Reconstruction of Labor-Management Relations
Ultimately, the best opportunity for the exercise of leadership occurs
after the raw power aspects of the forcing episode have subsided. From
this perspective, the escalation that characterizes a forcing regime may
be inevitable, given the history of the relationship and the new direc
tion that one of the parties (usually management) wants to pursue.
The challenge for the parties, then, is to conduct the early phase of
the conflict so that the possibility for reconstruction is not precluded
and to handle the poststrike period with skill and imagination.
The Key Role of Leadership
The reconstruction of relationships after a forcing episode does not
happen all at once, but occurs over time as a result of a series of trustbuilding events. Associated with these pivotal events are critical
choices centering on management and union leadership styles. In the
case of AP Parts, an adherence to traditional adversarial management
styles (matched in parallel by the preference of union leaders to use
traditional tactics) meant that the relationship, when reestablished,
would be arm's length.
Once the hostilities associated with the strike subsided in these three
cases, the parties at AP Parts were able to restore relations, but at Guil-
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ford there was dramatic restructuring and at Jay the local union was
mortally wounded and eventually decertified. The exact course that
relationships take after the trauma of unrestrained forcing is somewhat
indeterminate, as illustrated by the different journeys of these cases.
Clearly, the skills and orientation of key leaders on both sides explain
in large part the tone and nature of the ongoing labor-management rela
tionships.
The Essential Nature of Forcing

These three cases vividly illustrate the dimensions that are inherent
in all instances of forcing especially the dynamics of confrontation
and escalation. Although it is not inevitable that every case of forcing
proceeds to the extreme stage, these three cases are representative of a
much larger set of celebrated cases of intense conflict that we summa
rized in the opening chapter.
Rapid Deterioration of Relations

When management in these cases departed from the norms of inter
action by making demands for significant concessions and hiring
replacements, a sequence of events unfolded that resulted in a major
deterioration of social relations. Underlying the collapse was the real
ity that each side perceived their own organizational or institutional
survival to be at stake.
A type of siege mentality often developed during the confrontations.
Management at AP Parts and Guilford, for example, believed so fer
vently in the lightness of their actions that they ended up isolated from
large segments of the business community.
Departing from familiar rules was a tactic seen by management as a
means of sending a signal of just how dire the situation had become.
For the most part the response, however, was for the unions to feel
institutionally threatened. What followed was a set of tit-for-tat interac
tions involving distributive bargaining, negative attitudinal structuring,
and intraorganizational initiatives that produced progressively lower
trust relations.7
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Third Parties and the Law

A related point is that third parties often found themselves being
pulled into the vortex of an escalating conflict. When the community
sought to intervene in the AP Parts strike, labor and management
entered into a contest for partners. Community suggestions were inter
preted as supporting or threatening one side or the other, and the poten
tial for mediation was eroded. In the case of Jay, the parties vied for
support from state officials, and at Guilford the federal government
found itself compelled to intervene.
The law is often intended to provide a check on destructive behavior
that is not adequately regulated by market forces. In the two cases that
fall under the jurisdiction of the NLRA, however, we found that the
limited scope of influence and action available to the NLRB meant that
the law had little impact on the escalating disputes. By contrast, the
escalating tensions in the one case involving the National Railway
Labor Act were moderated by the various procedures under the Act.
Prognosis

A large literature on labor-management cooperation identifies the
new beginnings that often emerge after strikes. The amendment that we
bring to this conventional wisdom is that the parties certainly learn
some lessons as a result of unrestrained forcing, and these can have a
tempering or therapeutic effect on relationships when those relation
ships survive the conflict. But poststrike relations can remain turbulent
for a long time, especially given the stark possibility that, for the
unions involved, their very existence may be undermined. In all, unre
strained forcing in the present era has the potential to generate dra
matic change, but much of the change is not necessarily what is antici
pated or desired by the forcing party.
NOTES
1. Valuable research assistance was provided by Pat McHugh in the preparation of this case.
2. As of the early 1990s, long after the tensions associated with the 1984 negotiations had sub
sided, it was difficult to determine what private plans (e.g., getting rid of the union) were guiding
management. All of the principals of management's side of the table were no longer associated
with AP Parts, and the new management officials indicated that they did not really know.
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3 Specifically, the union's filing with the NLRB stated that the employer had failed "to pro
vide the data necessary for intelligent collective bargaining"; refused "to alter, except in insignifi
cant ways, the terms of their initial proposal"; threatened to "discharge those workers who refused
to accept their proposal"; made a final offer "before bargaining could narrow the issues between
the parties"; "threatened and coerced its employees through the hiring of professional goons and
guard dogs"; unilaterally changed the wages, hours, and working conditions of its employees
without bargaining in good faith"; and engaged in "calculated mass discipline of over 300 workers
because they have chosen to refrain from striking."
4 Specifically, the regional director stated that the employer's tactics did not constitute unlaw
ful surface bargaining, that there was sufficient notice of changes in working conditions, that
information regarding the employer's entry into the original equipment manufacturing market was
irrelevant to the negotiations, that the employer's direct contacts with employees were lawful, and
that there was insufficient evidence of concerted discipline For their part, the union representa
tives cited the opinion of hearing examiners that the AP Parts negotiations featured some of the
worst violations of the National Labor Relations Act that they had even seen, and that the regional
director's decision reflected pressure from conservative members of the NLRB in Washington.
5 Valuable research assistance was provided by Kathleen Rudd Scharf in the preparation of
this case.
6 When analysts first hear the term "Springfield Terminal," they assume that the subsidiary
must be based in Springfield, Massachusetts. This is not correct. In fact, the subsidiary, which in
1987 employed virtually no workers, was located in Springfield, Vermont and had served as a
small switching railroad for the products of Jones and Lamson, a major machine tool company
that had fallen on hard times. When one of the authors visited the property, all that could be seen
was a roundhouse with rusty rails and uncut grass.
7. One illustrative feature of the resulting dynamic is important to note in a number of our
cases the managers rebuffed poststrike union offers to settle on some variation of management's
final offer. Essentially the union was told that once the strike began, the cost of settlement went
up. While this is not a new tactic, in the present era this tactic heightens the irreversibility of "holy
wars," when the decision to strike or lock out is made.

3
Fostering
Negotiating Commitment and Cooperation

Whereas a forcing strategy is intended to enable one party to prevail
over the other and relies upon coercive power, a fostering strategy
attempts to advance common or complementary interests through atti
tude change, persuasion, and problem solving.
This chapter examines how companies have attempted to foster new
relationships and new contracts with labor. Given its commitment to
foster change, how does management formulate its objectives and
choose its negotiating tactics? How does management deal with the
anxiety in its own organization created by its efforts to negotiate
employee commitment? How does the union discern the intentions of
management and deal with its own ambivalence about the changes
management seeks? How do employees shift from a mindset of com
pliance to one of commitment? We explore these and other issues via
cases from the paper, auto supply, and railroad industries.
The first case, Bidwell, illustrates our broad definition of labor nego
tiations (not just limited to collective bargaining), and it highlights the
negotiated aspects of the Quality of Worklife (QWL) genre of change
efforts.
The second case, CSX, chronicles an ambitious effort by a major
freight railroad to fashion a breakthrough agreement with its operating
unions in advance of industrywide negotiations. The case also illus
trates the complexity of pursuing a fostering strategy where there are
multiple internal constituencies (represented by different unions) on
the labor side.
The third case involves a small, skilled trades setting Anderson
Pattern and a craft union, the Pattern Makers Association. Distinctive
issues emerged around new technology, with the parties proceeding in
steps toward a productive and positive relationship.
These three cases highlight several ways of traveling down the fos
tering path. At the level of union-management relations, we examine
the establishment of permanent labor-management steering commit-
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tees, temporary (issue-specific) labor-management task forces, union
involvement in business planning activities, and the utilization of prob
lem-solving approaches in collective bargaining. At the individual level
of employee relations, we trace employee involvement initiatives, qual
ity control innovations, semi-autonomous work groups; and increased
direct ties between individual employees and customers. Also, we
examine issues that cut across these levels, such as information-shar
ing, training, and the introduction of new technologies.
Some of the fostering efforts are focused on changing attitudes
building a sense of teamwork and cooperation; others are focused more
on behaviors improving work operations and enhancing productivity
through contractual changes (McKersie and Hunter 1973). For exam
ple, we will see in the Bidwell QWL effort a strong emphasis on atti
tude change, whereas in the case of CSX the parties focused on
revising the contract (specifying changes in behavior). In the case of
Anderson, both attitudinal and behavioral change processes were
employed in a closely coordinated fashion.
Key Aspects of Cases Featuring Fostering
Focus of efforts
Mechanism

CSX
Bidwell
Change of attitudes New contract
language
Early negotiations
QWL

Level of the activity Local union officials
and rank and file
4
Number of unions
involved
Scope of potential Department by
department
change
Minimal
Substantive
changes
Relationship with Deteriorated
somewhat
union
Relationship with Little change
workers

Company-union
representatives
10
Systemwide

Anderson
Both attitudes and
behavior
A series of joint
activities and
innovative
negotiations
All levels
1
Plantwide

None as a result of Large
these negotiations
Improved somewhat Improved
Little change

Improved
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Against the historical backdrop, these examples of fostering are
similar to the many examples of labor-management cooperation that
have been fashioned throughout this century.' The agenda or the partic
ular format may be different but the attitudinal and problem-solving
elements are similar.
Although all three cases involve fostering, they differ from one
another in many ways.

AN ABORTIVE BID TO FOSTER COOPERATION
Bidwell Mill, 1981-1984
The Bidwell case is about the initiation, development, and decline of
a QWL program in a paper mill between September 1981 and early
1984.2 It is a case of essentially pure fostering. 3
At management's initiative, mill managers and officials of three of
the four local unions negotiated an agreement to jointly sponsor a
QWL program. The fourth local opposed the program but allowed
QWL activities to go forward elsewhere in the mill. Participative activ
ities took root firmly among employees and their supervisors in some
parts of the mill, allowing them to renegotiate their daily work roles
and responsibilities. Thus, labor and management took steps that on
their face could have led to cooperative labor relationships at both the
union-management and employee/shop-floor levels. However, the
apparent agreement between management and the unions unraveled;
and, in the absence of institutional support, employee participation
activities on the mill floor declined.
The Bidwell case represents a form of fostering highly typical of the
late 1970s and 1980s one centered on employee participation. It also
illustrates many typical barriers encountered by such initiatives
(including changes in leadership and ownership, as well as incomplete
attention to the interests of key stakeholders) and several other barriers
(such as division among multiple unions) that are more characteristic
of some industries than others. We will highlight many process ele
ments in such a story. These include negotiations over the nature of the
fostering, internal negotiations within labor and management, and
negotiations (as well as a lack of negotiations) over various implemen-

70 Fostering

tation decisions. Stated more succinctly, we will analyze negotiations
over the timing, structure, and priority of the QWL program, as well as
its eventual demise.

Significant Features
The case that follows contains a number of significant elements.
Those include the following:
Initial off-site meetings provided headway (after initial skepticism)
for union and management decisions to co-sponsor QWL.
Three of the four unions agreed to goals and a joint structure for
QWL.
The high-status hold-out union was not easily influenced, but
agreed to stand aside so long as no QWL activity occurred with its
members.
Management's own underlying limited interest and/or ambivalence
about more cooperative relations and more commitment was a
major factor in explaining why it did not follow through.
Eventually the hold-out union attacked management and other
union officials for QWL activities.
The use of a third-party facilitator both assisted and complicated
the decision-making process.
The process ultimately collapsed as a result of various unsuccess
ful negotiations within labor and management, as well as between
labor and management.

Getting Underway With QWL
The Bidwell mill, started in the 1960s, employed 500 people in
1981. In a pattern typical of this industry, mill management received
relatively detailed direction from corporate headquarters. Corporate
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staff, for example, scheduled production for the mill and negotiated
local contracts.
Corporate management also provided the impetus for the QWL pro
gram at Bidwell. Executives had visited Japan and several QWL sites
in the United States, including General Motors, and concluded that the
company should develop a new approach to management that included
QWL activities.
Several Bidwell managers attended a three day workshop sponsored
by corporate staff to "encourage" mills to embark on QWL change
efforts. Although Bidwell managers had little enthusiasm for the idea,
they felt they had no real choice but to agree to start a QWL effort.
In September 1981, the Bidwell mill manager hired an external con
sultant recommended by corporate staff and began a series of meetings
with local management. These early meetings surfaced the historic dis
trust toward "corporate folks," their doubts about the merits of the
QWL effort, and their expectations that it would fail. Increasingly,
these meetings and other meetings they spawned were devoted to the
development of internal cohesion and consensus within management.
The consultant, who facilitated team development and planning ses
sions of the mill manager's staff, noted that they agreed to proceed on
QWL "with a cool, dispassionate resolution," without enthusiasm and
without any real commitment.
Management scheduled three major activities involving salaried
employees: first, all salaried employees attended a one-day QWL ori
entation session; second, managers participated in a series of two-day
supervisory skills training sessions; and third, management staff were
surveyed and feedback sessions were held on a unit-by-unit basis.
Commenting on this internal management phase, the consultant
observed, "this staff was approaching the process as 'taking their
foul-tasting medicine' a lot of complaining, and yet overt compliance
to the plans they, as a team, developed" (Mohrman 1987).
Negotiating Union Support and Employee Involvement

The second phase was marked by the onset of joint union-manage
ment activities. The mill manager had kept the four local union presi
dents informed of the company's interest in QWL, the preparatory
work within the management organization, and his plan to approach
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them formally about establishing a QWL steering committee. The
union presidents reacted with a mixture of interest and skepticism.
In the spring of 1982 the mill manager decided to have preliminary
discussions with the unions before summer, with the prospect of estab
lishing a steering committee in September. On the one hand, he was
feeling pressure to proceed from the consultant and from the fact that
sister mills already had their unions "on board." On the other hand, he
was also aware that vacation schedules in the summer made it a diffi
cult time to hold meetings. His own staff was divided on the timing
issue. Some were prepared to form the steering committee soon, others
felt September was the earliest practical date.
In the preliminary meeting, the union officials asked for the same
orientation workshops that managers had already attended. Manage
ment agreed and a workshop was conducted by the consultant and
attended only by union officers, who again raised questions about the
seriousness of management's interest in QWL and about its intentions.
At the conclusion of the workshop, officers from three of the four
unions were interested and decided to proceed. Officers of the fourth
union were negative, but after failing to convince their union col
leagues not to proceed, they decided to participate in another meeting
with management.
In this next meeting, managers and union officials agreed to estab
lish a mill steering committee to manage a joint QWL process and to
begin three-day joint training sessions. They also set up substeering
committees in the three parts of the plant represented by the three inter
ested unions. While the officers of the fourth union agreed to be on the
mill committee, they did not plan any activities in their area of the mill.
Significantly, the uninvolved union represented the paper machine
operators, the most skilled and prestigious workers in the mill.
The decision to proceed during the summer came about at the
unions' urging. Managers expressed their preference for a September
start, but then agreed to go along earlier. They later expressed resent
ment because they felt the consultant had tilted the discussion toward
the unions' preference. For her part, the consultant felt managers' inhi
bitions about expressing their limited support reflected the need for
more management team development.
The QWL activities got off to a good start that summer (1982). The
mill steering committee discussed issues in the mill and agreed to a
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statement of philosophy to guide the QWL process. Participants
responded well to the training, and by fall problem-solving teams were
active in two of the four areas of the mill. Teams tackled, among other
issues, scrap rates, maintenance backlogs, and clean-up procedures.
These activities produced cooperative relationships in specific depart
ments and in some cases were self-sustaining, i.e., requiring no ongo
ing oversight by top mill management or local union leaders.
Internal Divisions Undermine Cooperative Work

Two factors broke the momentum of the summer's change process.
First, the Bidwell mill and its sister paper mills in the company were
put up for sale twice within a short period of time, deflecting manage
ment's attention and creating uncertainty about the commitment of
future managements. In this context, individual managers and supervi
sors who had felt all along that QWL was either unwise or getting too
much priority began to express their doubts more publicly. Second,
officers of the paper machine operators' union withdrew from the mill
steering committee and charged that the other unions' officers were
being brainwashed and that QWL would undermine the unions.
Although some officers of the other unions defended their involvement
in QWL, the leaders of the papermakers union succeeded in raising
doubts within the ranks of the other unions. These leaders also attacked
management for not keeping the unions fully informed about the pro
spective sale and for discrepancies between its QWL rhetoric and its
actions or inaction in the case of a labor proposal to eliminate time
clocks.
The QWL change effort underwent another setback in the fall when
Bidwell was sold and the new corporate owners installed a new mill
manager. The new executives expressed support for QWL, and the new
mill manager claimed to have a natural inclination to manage participatively. However, when he realized that his own staff was internally
divided on many issues, he decided that the most pressing concern was
management development.
The new mill manager soon discovered that the divisions among his
staff extended to their views of QWL. In February 1983, mill manage
ment staff met to review the status of QWL. The substantive reports of
activities indicated that some areas were doing well but others had
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bogged down. In the latter areas, union members had asked for visible
signs of management commitment to cooperation, such as the removal
of time clocks cited earlier. The reports soon gave way to an expression
of concerns: top management appeared to be preoccupied with QWL,
and it was creating stress for supervisors and managers by asking for
dramatic changes in behavior; too much time was spent in meetings;
the unions were pressing for faster progress; and union employees
were becoming increasingly emboldened to the point of criticizing
supervisors.
The new mill manager's response was to redouble his attention to
team development within his own staff. In the meantime, the papermakers union also stepped up its efforts to halt the QWL effort. In the
spring of 1983, two of the other three unions withdrew from the QWL
effort, citing management's failure to change its ways and to support
whole heartedly QWL. One union went further and said that corporate
pressure was leading managers to attempt covert "work-rule changes."
In these two unions only a few of the officers who were originally
involved in establishing QWL were still in office; most had either lost
elections or opted not to run, feeling burned out by the QWL effort and
discouraged by the results. Only one local union continued the cooper
ative efforts in its area of the mill.
The participative processes on the mill floor had not completely
ceased, but the effort by management and labor to renew their institu
tional relationship and to restructure the work environment of the mill
was effectively dead.

Analysis
The ultimate impact of the QWL program at Bidwell is difficult to
gauge. Given the limited objectives for the program, its demise proba
bly did not have serious consequences for the parties. However, any set
back, even small, can act as a deterrent to the initiation of other change
efforts.
It is instructive to explore why, after getting off to a good start, the
program came apart. Several explanations are possible. First, Bidwell
mill management was not driven by a conviction about the need for
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either substantive changes or a change in the labor-management rela
tionship. Rather, it was presented with a corporate mandate to engage
in a particular change effort, i.e., QWL.
Underlying the QWL approach, which had become fashionable
among progressive managers in many American industries by the
1980s, was an implicit assumption of the desirability of creating coop
erative relations with labor. However, the original motivation of Bidwell management to foster change was not based on a clear desire to
produce commitment and cooperation as much as a perceived need to
conform to a corporate mandate. Because its labor relations were not
marked by strong adversarialism, management assumed it would be
feasible to engage the unions in the fostering process.
Another key requirement for effective problem solving and attitude
change was not sustained during this QWL initiative internal consen
sus within both management and labor in the mill. In fact the absence
of consensus and coherence within both the management and the labor
communities contributed to the failure of the parties to negotiate robust
change in their relationship.
Although less significant, the parties also failed to recognize the
need for distributive bargaining structures and processes. For example,
when labor and management appeared to have different preferences for
the timing of the start of QWL activities, they failed to caucus (or con
firm in some other way their interparty differences) and decide how to
resolve them. The unaddressed differences exerted a deleterious effect
on the relationship and the process.
Labor responded to management's stated bid for new relationships
with workers and with their representatives by making a number of
requests. Management acceded to some of labor's requests, such as the
accelerated start of QWL activities, but not others, such as removing
time clocks and acting to correct behavior of supervisors out of tune
with the QWL philosophy. These failures by management to negotiate
acceptable terms for labor's commitment and cooperation probably
also reflected management's own ambivalence and disunity. The omis
sions also underscored the need for both parties to have understood
more explicitly that fostering efforts such as this QWL program were
indeed a negotiation process, one in which they had to be capable of
resolving contentious issues as well as engaging in problem solving.
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Further, it had to be a process responsive to substantive interorganizational issues, as well as interparty attitude change.
A related limitation, often inherent in a QWL initiative, is the stan
dard ground rule that these programs be kept separate from collective
bargaining. The often-used guideline that subjects relating to contract
negotiations will not be discussed within the participation process may
be necessary to gain support from union leaders, but unless the foster
ing efforts deal with fundamental work issues (governed by the con
tract), then the change program is likely to diminish in importance
(Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Kochan, and Verma 1991).
This necessary juxtaposition of collaboration and other negotiation
activities creates many dilemmas. When the joint activities only deal
with attitudes and the tenor of the relationship, they are dismissed
(especially by bottom-line-oriented management) as "touchy-feely"
activities that are long on rhetoric and short on results. A further issue
has to do with the deep ambivalence of unions about all attitude change
efforts. Most union leaders feel very uneasy about a process of attitude
change that may align interests of employees much more directly with
the company, thereby making it more difficult for the leaders to main
tain their independent political standing.
In the case of Bidwell, one union attempted to hedge by maintaining
an adversarial stance. Such ambivalence can pose obvious difficulties
for the effective functioning of the new process. Subsequently, when
the leaders of two unions withdrew cooperation from the process after
concluding that they could not simultaneously be involved in a cooper
ative process and an adversarial process, the QWL effort quickly
unraveled.
Pivotal Events

Understanding "what went wrong" also involves an analysis of sev
eral critical events that influenced the course of the ongoing negotia
tions. The first pivotal event in the Bidwell case was the alreadymentioned perfunctory decision by mill management to undertake the
QWL effort. The follow-on steps of internal management education
and initial discussions with the union leaders were taken on the basis of
only cursory consideration of the magnitude of the changes they
implied. They were made in the absence of informed leadership com-
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mitment to the change. As a consequence, management was commit
ting the members of its organization to processes and outcomes for
which it was unprepared emotionally.
A second pivotal event in the Bid well case was the decision to move
ahead on the QWL program during the summer. Managers, who
resented both the outcome and the way the decision was made, were
less committed to the joint effort than if they had directly and con
sciously negotiated their differences with the union leaders. The mean
ing for union leaders was different they had successfully influenced
the program and gained more sense of ownership of it than before
when its terms had been shaped and initiated by management. The
event also tarnished the consultant's image of neutrality in the eyes of
managers.
Another pivotal event in the Bidwell case was the decision of the
leaders of the union representing the paper machine operators not only
to stand aside from any involvement in the QWL effort but also to
actively discourage other unions from participating in the effort. This
not only deepened the divisions within the local union structure, but
aroused greater controversy in the mill, thereby helping to arrest the
diffusion of new practices throughout the mill.
It is also important to remember that much of the fostering period
was influenced by the uncertainties and changes of leadership that
attended the sale of the entire mill. At the least, management and union
opponents of change were handed a rational justification for their posi
tion, and key managers had to shift time and attention to sale transac
tions and integration of new management organization.
Revisiting the Critical Choices
If the parties had the opportunity to relive this story, what alterations
in their choices might have made a significant difference in overall out
comes?
First, the arrival of new ownership and management could have
been used to galvanize attention to ways of improving the performance
of the mill and the role of QWL in the process. Rather than signalling
uncertainty, the new leadership could have used the occasion for a
renewal of commitment to the existing change program.
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Second, any change program requires a certain tenacity and willing
ness to stick it out through the middle period of limited results. Typi
cally, these types of programs pass through a phase of initial euphoria,
waning enthusiasm, and finally (but not always) acknowledged suc
cess. Management at Bidwell may have given up too quickly.
Often in cases like Bidwell, a plateau effect develops when exagger
ated expectations are not met. Specifically, management tends to view
these programs as "magic bullets" that will instantly increase produc
tivity and lower operating costs. For their part, union leaders see the
projects as insuring that business and jobs will expand. When these
high expectations are not met, disillusionment naturally occurs.
Third, insufficient attention was paid to creating the internal align
ment within management that was required for QWL to expand and to
succeed. We will see in the case of DeRidder (chapter 4) how critical it
is to develop consensus and enthusiasm within management for a
change program. Top management at Bidwell could not bring this
about. Nor was the consultant able to help management develop the
critical level of internal consensus. What was probably called for, given
the fact that many managers had different interests, was a mild form of
distributive bargaining. From this perspective it would have been
appropriate for either management or the consultant to have allowed
managers to caucus and sort out what they were prepared to endorse
and then to have insisted that all managers support the concept and
timetable for implementation of QWL.
In many ways, the Bidwell case may not seem very remarkable. The
North American landscape is full of abandoned QWL and quality cir
cle initiatives. However, it is important for this very reason. A close
look at the case reveals a number of junctures where key issues of con
cern to labor or management were not engaged. The initiative was
treated as a program, rather than as an ongoing process of negotiation
over issues of cooperation, commitment, decision making, and leader
ship.
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CSX: AN AMBITIOUS ATTEMPT TO REACH A
BREAKTHROUGH WITH ITS UNIONS
The CSX case is a dramatic example of fostering via integrative bar
gaining.4 This joint planning project undertaken by CSX and its unions
during the late 1980s stands out over the past two decades as one of the
most ambitious change efforts in railroads. In this case a major carrier
sought to engage in a change process with all of its operating and nonoperating crafts to design a comprehensive package of new work rules,
employment protection, and gainsharing.
CSX decided at the end of the 1984 negotiations to explore with its
major operating unions the feasibility of joint exploration of a compre
hensive change program. While management gave some attention to
attitudinal change, the company moved rather expeditiously to place a
proposal for substantive change in front of the unions. While this inte
grative bargaining effort did not produce an agreement acceptable to all
of the unions, it did create a substantially improved climate and a much
greater understanding of the financial realities facing the parties.

Significant Features
Among the distinctive features of the CSX case are the following:
Management took the initiative to develop a "win-win" proposal.
The company was willing to share considerable financial informa
tion, and the parties expended considerable effort to develop trust
and to create openness.
Within the context of an individual carrier attempting to realize a
breakthrough agreement, it was important for the parties to involve
all levels in the design of the new arrangements.
A complex structure of many craft unions and many levels within
the unions presented immense challenges in gaining acceptance for
a negotiated plan (in fact, in an industrial relations system as inte
grated as railroads, opposition in just a few regions of one union
stopped this change effort).
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Despite the positive attitudes engendered by the company's bold
initiative, when the exercise had to be abandoned, the company
was not able to capitalize effectively on the reservoir of goodwill,
i.e., CSX faced the same resistance and difficulties in implement
ing change at the local level as other carriers.

The CSX Story
As the 1984 round of national negotiations ended in 1987, key offi
cials from CSX asked top union leaders whether they would be inter
ested in embarking upon a different approach to the resolution of many
long-standing issues. The premise advanced by the company was that
if the parties could start a planning/negotiation process before the com
mencement of the next round of national negotiations, then it might be
possible for the parties to achieve substantial breakthroughs for the
benefit of all concerned.
The concept originated with top leadership of CSX, specifically
John Snow, the president who had joined the company after service
with the Federal Railroad Administration and John Sweeney, vicepresident of industrial relations, who had worked for Conrail during its
critical period of revitalization. These two executives were convinced
that a better way could be found than the arm's-length atmosphere of
national negotiations and the drawn out procedures of the National
Mediation Board.
The key unions responded affirmatively, and thus began a very
intense and complex undertaking that spanned eighteen months and
involved many, many meetings at various levels of the system. The ini
tial meeting took place at Greenbriar, West Virginia, with the unions
represented by their presidents except for the United Transportation
Union (UTU), which sent a vice-president.
At this meeting, the company reviewed its financial situation and its
intention to concentrate on railroading. The extent of overstaffing
(from the company's perspective) was highlighted. With respect to
potential solutions, the company indicated that it had several thoughts,
ranging from gainsharing to some forms of employee ownership. Sub
stantial time was allowed for the unions to ask questions of the various
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management representatives who were present, including those repre
senting finance and operations, as well as labor relations.
Shortly thereafter, the executive board of the Railway Labor Execu
tives Association (RLEA) held a meeting and invited CSX representa
tives to make a follow-up presentation. The president of the UTU
attended this session. As an outcome of this meeting, RLEA estab
lished a task force to examine the CSX ideas that were starting to crys
tallize into specific proposals. RLEA hired a consultant, Brian
Freeman, to represent the interests of the different railroads; and for the
next several months, various meetings took place between CSX offi
cials and Freeman, accompanied by various union representatives. It
was during this period that the idea of worker ownership was dropped
in favor of crystallizing a gainsharing proposal.
Finalization of the Plan

In February 1988, at a meeting of all interested parties in Florida,
the company presented an expanded proposal, and the unions were
asked whether they wanted to consider the proposition in a formal
manner. This decision was left to each union to make on a separate
basis, but the company indicated it needed participation from unions
representing at least 80 percent of the workers before it could proceed
with a final proposal.
The plan represented a sweeping approach to work and institutional
arrangements between CSX and its unions. The deal contemplated the
reduction of the CSX workforce by approximately 10,000 workers out
of a base employment of 42,000, with separation pay ranging from
$30,000 to $50,000 per individual. Savings from the reduction of per
sonnel would be shared with the workers remaining in employment on
a 50-50 basis after separation costs had been amortized. In most
instances crew sizes would be reduced to two persons per train, and
there would be substantial intercraft flexibility in the repair shops. The
application of these principles would be fleshed out on a union-byunion basis.

82

Fostering

Union Responses

The first union to step forward was the Brotherhood of Maintenance
of Way Employees (BMWE). And in the discussions that took place,
considerable progress was made in refining the proposal. A potential
win-win arrangement involved a proposal to reduce the seasonality of
work gangs specifically, the development of additional employment
opportunities within the maintenance shops during winter months.
However, the draft was rejected by the UTU general chairmen (each
from a different region) toward the end of March. The meeting
included a presentation by Brian Freeman, as well as by representa
tives from CSX. The general chairmen said, in effect: "This is the first
time we have heard about this plan, and we are not convinced that it is
a good deal." This response proved fatal for the plan.
Shortly after the negative vote of the UTU general chairmen, the
company decided to explain the features of the proposal in a letter sent
to all employees to their homes. Some local UTU leaders criticized the
company for not sharing more information sooner, and others labeled
the communication as an "end-run."
Basically, the opposition to the plan from the leaders of the UTU
centered around the fact that almost 4,000 of the 10,000 workers who
would be severed would come from the ranks of the UTU. However,
the savings would be shared equally across all remaining union mem
bers. Given its proportion of the total workforce, the share going to
UTU members would approximate 25 percent (compared to the 40 per
cent that they would comprise of the separated workers).
Another explanation for the rejection was more institutional. CSX
management remarked in interviews: "If we could only have made
resources available to the unions to compensate for a reduction in dues
paying members, we would have been able to get over the rough
spots." In essence, the parties found the task of designing a scheme to
provide financial assistance to a union in decline insurmountable. By
contrast, in a number of manufacturing industries, the creation of joint
training and career development funds had made it possible for
resources to be provided for union staff who were needed for coopera
tive activities. Such an approach had not emerged in railroads.
Still, it is noteworthy that the process undertaken by CSX and its
unions produced tentative agreement on the part of several crafts and
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the development of a very innovative plan for dealing with many of the
central problems of the railroad industry. A high degree of trust
emerged among many key officials. Several union leaders praised man
agement at CSX for openness and constructive efforts to deal with
worker and union interests. Richard Kilroy, then chairman of the
RLEA, commented that CSX made available complete financial infor
mation so that the unions could judge the "facts of the current and
long-term picture." He noted that one of the striking aspects of CSX's
proposal was that the company claimed no current financial crisis.
Rather, the company emphasized that while it was in the black, profit
levels ($400 million in 1985) were not good enough for the long term.
Kilroy concluded by saying: "The first ingredient of a project of this
magnitude is trust. I know there will be employment declines, whether
I sit at the table or not".
The Aftermath
Subsequent to the shelving of the gainsharing proposal (as it came
to be called), the company sought to reach agreements with local gen
eral chairmen on voluntary plans for reductions in staffing (in distinc
tion to the tabled proposal that would have required junior workers to
accept separation if not enough volunteers could be found). However,
little if any progress was made at the local level in reaching agreement
on new staffing levels despite the fact that the workers would have
retained their special pay rules (usually these "arbitraries" add at least
40 percent to base compensation) and the company would not have had
to share ongoing savings realized from reduced crew sizes.
Since CSX was not covered for its UTU workers by the 1991-92
national agreement, it sought in local negotiations to reach agreement
on revised crew sizes. Ironically, these agreements were less favorable
to the company than the arrangements that the other railroads realized
as a result of national bargaining.
Yet some indication of cooperation can be cited. In 1990 the parties
inaugurated an employee involvement program in the Florida region.
Also, in opening a new computer subsidiary, CSX agreed to recognize
the clerical union (TCU) and to train surplus workers from the other
crafts for this new information center.
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In general, considerable disappointment was voiced, and in some
quarters there was a feeling of failure that a significant program
designed by the management and union architects had not gone for
ward. Some of the animosity was directed at the UTU, which did not
ratify the agreement and thereby forced the overall package to be put
aside. The possibility that other unions interested in the proposal would
put pressure on the UTU to reconsider did not materialize. In fact, the
UTU distanced itself from other craft unions by stating its intention of
becoming the "industry union" of railroads.

Analysis
The rejection of the package proposal illustrates a basic dynamic in
large-scale fostering initiatives. From the viewpoint of CSX, it seemed
logical to fashion a program to reduce the workforce rapidly, to gain
more flexibility in the deployment of personnel and to share the
savings with the workers who remained. But a number of key union
leaders felt that it was "crass" for a union to "sell jobs" and allow those
who remained (as a result of possessing sufficient seniority) to benefit
handsomely from the deal. When this perceived inequity was com
bined with the reality that the size of the unions (especially the UTU)
would be shrunk rapidly (with a corresponding diminution in dues
income), then a profound difference in perspectives existed. Interest
ingly, if the financial crisis had been severe enough (as in the case of
Conrail) and the challenge before the parties had been one of survival,
then these misgivings about exchanging money for employment reduc
tions might have been less dominant.
CSX was able to convince most of the top leadership of the unions
regarding the need for change, but this conviction was not extended in
the ratification process to the lower levels of the organization, espe
cially within the UTU. This top-down approach almost worked, but in
the end key leaders were not able to produce attitudinal change deep
and broad enough to convince members and their respective
representatives about the wisdom of accepting a dramatically different
approach to industrial relations.
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The CSX story also clearly underscores the difficulties in achieving
internal consensus, especially on the union side. At CSX, employees
were represented by thirteen different unions, with approximately 140
different general chairmen. The task of achieving majority support
within each separate union, and in the case of the large unions, major
ity support within each region, posed a formidable challenge. Add to
this the historic rivalries among the craft unions (for example, com
pany officials were not successful in bringing representatives from sev
eral of the key unions together in the same room) and it is clear why
leading negotiators were not able to use "group pressure" to ameliorate
differences in outlook. In fact, after several preliminary meetings, most
of the negotiations took place with subsets of the unions; and in the
case of meetings with UTU representatives, other unions were not
present for these critical discussions. Several strategic alternatives
were available to the parties in this complex situation.
Testing the Possibilities of a More Deliberate Approach
Some union leaders criticized CSX management for moving ahead too
fast and not utilizing a multiunion task force that might have achieved
more buy-in both across and within the unions. In choosing its
approach, the company opted for dispatch and concreteness, i.e., crys
tallizing a plan rather early as a way of focusing the negotiations. Sig
nificantly, it chose to meet separately with the major unions.
While the approach of a multiunion working party might have
increased the chances of success, company officials point out that it
was important to learn "sooner rather than later" whether its program
was feasible. Basically, management wanted to determine whether an
innovative package could be formulated away from the procedures of
national negotiations. Key executives reasoned that they would not be
worse off if discussions failed, and they might create a better set of
shared understandings for proceeding with change on a more decen
tralized basis.
The Use of an Agent by the Craft Unions
Once the negotiations got into high gear, a professional consultant
was used by the unions to represent them in discussions with the com-
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pany. This choice was based on the fact that the negotiations involved
fairly technical decisions about the possibility of employee ownership
plans and gainsharing formulas. This arrangement did have some
drawbacks, however. Specifically, it meant that there was less interac
tion between key company officials and key union leaders. Also, it
meant that most of the interactions were happening at the top, leaving
lower levels of union leadership outside the process.
The package eventually was turned down by the general chairmen
from UTU, who were not involved in the process. The chances of suc
cessful ratification of the package might have been enhanced by direct
involvement of such key local leaders.
Company Versus Industry Negotiations

The most important strategic choice to revisit is whether in retro
spect it was better for CSX to have attempted to work out a carrierlevel agreement with its unions (and failed) or whether CSX would
have been better served to have remained in national handling and
worked for the culmination of the 1988 round of industry bargaining.
Given the fact that several other major carriers (such as Union Pacific
and Norfolk Southern) chose to seek changes in work rules via national
negotiations and as a result of the 1991-92 negotiations and related
emergency board recommendations have fared very well (in fact better
than CSX) in terms of their progress toward two-person crew sizes, the
quick judgment might be that CSX gambled and lost.
However, the appraisal must be more reasoned and needs to con
sider other factors. First, the effort undertaken by CSX in 1988 pre
empted the attention of the entire industry. National negotiations that
were due to commence that year were delayed until the outcome of the
CSX deliberations was clear. For one reason, national-level union offi
cials could not handle two sets of major negotiations. More important,
many carriers wanted to see whether an individual company could
achieve a breakthrough. If CSX had been successful, no doubt it would
have created a pattern for other carrier-level negotiations.
Second, the effort by CSX, while it failed, did create considerable
discussion and attention to schemes for achieving reduced crew sizes.
In this sense, CSX must be given considerable credit for the concepts
that finally were embedded in the 1991-92 national agreements.
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It is not surprising that the same local resistance that prevented the
gainsharing package from being approved also slowed the implementa
tion of the 1991-92 national pattern at CSX. Only time will tell
whether the improved relations that developed with several unions as a
result of the gainsharing discussions can be translated into commensu
rate substantive gains.

Lessons Learned
The CSX case teaches a number of important lessons about largescale systems change. First, and most important, we see that the com
plex network of relationships with many craft unions at both national
and local levels cannot be ignored. In this case the system not only
included labor-management relationships, but also cross-union rela
tionships and dynamics within unions. Second, we see the value of an
initial negotiations text (generated in this case by management) in
focusing the dialogue among representatives in such a complex system.
Inevitably, there is a tension between the first two lessons building
full consensus across a complex system of relationships can be an end
less task, yet in this case moving ahead quickly with a concrete pro
posal can preempt the development of supportive relationships.
Hindsight is always 20/20. During the early and mid-1980s when it
looked like the rate of change in work rules and staffing would remain
slow, the effort by various carriers to work out company-level plans
with their unions seemed like a winning strategy. The fact that during
the early 1990s the big gains came as a result of industry level-negotia
tions could mean that the potential of change at this level has now been
fully exploited and the future will see greater emphasis on accommo
dation and change at the carrier and local levels.
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CUMULATIVE EFFECTS OF SUCCESSFUL
FOSTERING INITIATIVES
Anderson Pattern and the Pattern Makers Association
of Muskegon
The essence of the Anderson story is that the parties proceeded in a
step-by-step fashion to implement a fostering strategy, starting with
limited initiatives and eventually evolving into a broad agenda that
mixed both integrative bargaining and relationship changes that bene
fited the company, the workers, and the union. 5
Key factors associated with the successful sequence were the style
of the CEO, who had been a pattern maker, the business decision to
move away from serving original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) as
a primary market and an effective linkage of technological change,
revised work rules, and employment security.

Significant Features
The Anderson case represents the clearest success story in our sam
ple of fostering strategies. In this regard it will be important to identify
some of the factors that contributed to positive outcomes. Key factors
include:
In a small company situation, the style and initiative of top man
agement had a profound impact on the process of change.
Certain joint activities, which by themselves might seem inconse
quential (e.g., a joint delegation visiting a trade show), turned out
to be significant turning points for the relationship.
Imaginative problem solving resulted in a series of packages that
met the key interests of the parties.
Innovative agreements between this employer and the union weak
ened areawide bargaining (involving multiple employers dealing
with the same union).
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Engaging workers and the union at every step of the process of
introducing new technology generated strong commitment,
thereby ensuring a successful introduction of the new equipment.
While initial pilot experiments (with new technology in this case)
depended on goodwill and trust, subsequent large scale diffusion
depended on substantive changes (such as language minimizing
the risk of job loss).
Despite a multiyear history of successful fostering, distributive
confrontations continued to occur sometimes even as a direct
result of earlier fostering successes (such as disagreements over
the use of newly acquired training skills).
While there are unique aspects to the Anderson Pattern case, such as
its predominantly skilled trades workforce, there are many features of
the case that are characteristic of small firms. These include the key
role of the entrepreneur/owner, the informal nature of interactions, and
the capacity for dramatic substantive change once a moderate degree of
attitudinal change has occurred. In this regard, the case teaches lessons
relevant to a large number of North American firms.

Background
Originally founded in 1931, Anderson Pattern is a leading North
American firm in what it calls the "shape" industry, which includes the
manufacture of permanent molds, dies, patterns and related design and
machining operations. The firm's specialties include wheel molds,
engine castings, and other design-and-build work for the automobile
industry. This is a small firm with 110 employees and annual sales of
$12 million, though it is the flagship plant for a company that includes
two pattern-making operations in Michigan and one each in Ohio, Ari
zona, and Ontario. The larger company has a total of 200 employees
and sales of $20 million. It also has international production arrange
ments with shops in Mexico.
The president and chief executive officer of Anderson Pattern, John
Mclntyre, was at one time a journeyman pattern maker. He came to
Anderson Pattern as general manager in 1980 and purchased the firm
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in 1982 along with a partner, Thomas Lerowx, the current vice-presi
dent. In this small-firm context, Mclntyre's values and personality have
played a critical role in negotiations over fundamental changes. His
commitment to implementing the best practices has built on his vora
cious appetite for popular business literature. Hence, Mclntyre sought
to make this an "excellent" firm, orientated towards total quality, and
he has coined the following motto or overall goal for the firm: "We will
be leaders, innovators and masters of the shape industry . . . competi
tive worldwide."
At the time of this study, about 85 employees were highly skilled
and members of the Pattern Makers Association of Muskegon, an affil
iate of the Pattern Makers League of North America. The balance of
the employees were supervisors, managers, and sales and office staff.
Pattern makers, once they achieve journeyman status, were paid the
same wage (in the early 1990s, just over $20 per hour).
Historically, the pattern-making industry was entirely unionized,
with uniform wages across all shops. Workers were highly mobile,
often leaving one shop for another to get more overtime or more inter
esting work. However, by the early 1990s, workers tended to stay with
the same employer for longer periods of time due to the rise of non
union operations. For example, in Muskegon, only half of the pattern
making industry shops (four out of eight) remained unionized. As one
pattern maker who was working as a supervisor expressed it:
Pattern makers are kind of independent. It was always: "If I don't
like it here, I can go down the street." There is less moving now
because there is less down the street.

Jim Howard, the business manager of the Pattern Makers Associa
tion of Muskegon, also worked at Anderson Pattern. The workforce at
the other three unionized operations in Muskegon also belonged to the
Association, with collective bargaining traditionally negotiated on an
areawide basis. Given that certain aspects of employment relations
were governed on an areawide basis (such as wage levels and benefits
administration), a key challenge to the union was the desire by Ander
son Pattern for increasingly distinctive contract provisions.
Our focus will be on fundamental changes that occurred with
respect to several substantive outcomes, specifically the addition of
profit sharing to the compensation package, increased flexibility in the
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utilization of new technology, increased job security, expanded worker
training, and greater worker autonomy on the shop floor.

A Managerial Initiative to Offer Profit Sharing
In 1984, approximately two years after Mclntyre became co-owner
of Anderson Pattern, the collective bargaining agreement expired
between Anderson Pattern, the three other unionized pattern-making
firms, and the Pattern Makers Association of Muskegon. Although
most of the negotiations were conducted on an areawide basis, a pro
posal to establish a profit-sharing plan, raised by John Mclntyre, was
of no interest to the other employers. As a result, discussions pro
ceeded bilaterally between the union and Anderson Pattern.
The union's initial response to the proposal was negative for two
reasons. First, the union had higher priorities and did not see this sub
ject as highly valued by its members. Second, the union was concerned
about breaking from the single areawide compensation package. How
ever, Mclntyre felt that a profit-sharing plan would more tightly align
the interests of the employees with those of the firm. As a result, he
indicated that he was prepared to "give" the union profit sharing with
out seeking anything in return. In this case, the union saw little reason
to say no. As the union's then business manager and lead negotiator put
it:
At the time, we told John Mclntyre that the people didn't give a
damn about profit sharing. He insisted. There was nothing to lose,
so we took it.

By including the profit-sharing provision in the contract, the parties
departed from traditional practices in a number of aspects. First, it was
unusual for management to raise such an issue. Second, this was not a
case of traditional hard bargaining. Instead, as a most simple form of
fostering, management gave the employees the chance to earn addi
tional income via profit sharing without asking for anything in return.
Third, this was a decentralization of bargaining over compensation,
which was previously handled on a centralized multiemployer basis.
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Finally, the provision represented an explicit attempt by management
to move toward a social contract based on employee commitment.
Over the first five years, the profit-sharing plan paid out $260,000 in
benefits. The annual distribution of a profit-sharing check took place at
a special dinner in August, for which printed invitations were sent to all
employees and their spouses. Featured speakers were invited. For
example, the speaker in 1989 was Martin Devries of Grand Valley State
University, who discussed: "Can the U.S. Sustain its World Economic
Position?" In addition, door prizes were awarded and the two owners
distributed the year's profit-sharing checks. Over 120 employees and
spouses attended the 1989 dinner.
Profit sharing posed dilemmas and opportunities for both parties.
One minor issue was that some employees would have preferred larger
checks to having a ceremonial dinner, while others enjoyed the event.
A larger issue was illustrated by the following union member's com
ment: "I have become a believer. The concept has merit, though there
are still some problems with the way it is designed and administered."
As the statement suggested, the profit-sharing plan posed continual
administrative challenges for management if it was to serve as a moti
vator. For the union, it posed a deeper challenge should the union
take on a more active role in this aspect of compensation (e.g., sharing
credit for its successes and blame for any shortfalls)?

Bargaining Over the Introduction of New Technology
Approximately one year after the profit-sharing language was nego
tiated, a second major managerial initiative unfolded this time in the
area of new technology. Historically, Anderson Pattern had regularly
upgraded equipment, for example, replacing lathes and drill presses
and adding computer numerical controls (CNC). Machine tolerances
and consistency improved, but the organization of work did not funda
mentally change. In 1985, however, the president of Anderson Pattern
approached the union with a unique proposal.
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A Proposed Quid Pro Quo
Mclntyre indicated that he would be willing to spend a few million
dollars to purchase a state-of-the-art center containing a coordinate
measuring machine. He noted as a quid pro quo, however, that
increased flexibility would be required in order to run the equipment
with fewer workers (and with each worker running multiple opera
tions).
At issue was a restrictive contract provision (Article XIX) that only
allowed operators to run more than one "automatic" machine if no
workers were laid off and, even then, only for certain combinations of
machines.6 Under this arrangement, the firm was constrained in bid
ding on certain contracts since the only safe assumption in making a
bid was to plan on one operator for each machine. The importance of
the contract language to the union was evidenced by a two-year strike
against another firm in the Muskegon area over "one man running
more than one machine." This strike ultimately ended in the decertifi
cation of the union at that location creating an object lesson of forc
ing and escape for the parties at Anderson Pattern.
Management's approach to the subject of new technology was a
departure from the traditional modes of interaction in a number of
respects. First, the proposal was made outside of the areawide bargain
ing structure. Second, it was made on an informal basis, while the
existing collective bargaining agreement was still in force. Third, the
proposal asked for a sharp departure from the highly specific provi
sions in the existing collective bargaining agreement. Finally, manage
ment wanted dialogue with the union regarding capital resource
allocations usually a carefully protected strategic right of manage
ment. The proposal was pivotal both with respect to the process (repre
senting a potential shift toward decentralized and more informal
interactions) and the substance (as a potential change in the contract
regarding machine operations and management rights).
A series of meetings followed. The subject was hotly debated
among all employees. The second pivotal event involved a form of attitudinal structuring directly aimed at resolving the internal differences
within the workforce. The president of Anderson Pattern offered to
make arrangements for any interested employees to travel to Chicago
to see the proposed equipment at a trade show that was then under way.
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Although only twenty-five machine shop employees would be directly
affected by this new technology, almost the entire workforce chose to
go to the trade show. According the union's business manager, the
workers returned with a vivid understanding of how computer-con
trolled equipment could operate feasibly with fewer workers. More
over, he reported that most workers were persuaded that the equipment
could "make us competitive enough to increase volume so that we
wouldn't have to eliminate people."
Management's initial overture embodied a fostering approach it
was a proposal, not a demand. The decision to subsidize the education
of the entire workforce on the issue (via the trip to Chicago) served to
reinforce the initial fostering strategy. Still, the union was concerned
just how far to depart from existing practice.
In retrospect, the negotiations were distinguished as a special case in
two ways. First, management did not push for the complete elimination
of the contract language on machine operation it only asked for an
exception for the two proposed pieces of equipment. Second, the pro
posed exception was only to be in effect until the expiration of the
existing collective bargaining agreement. An additional issue of impor
tance to the union concerned the new work associated with program
ming and maintaining the equipment, which it wanted to keep in the
bargaining unit. Management agreed to this proposal.
This fostering approach proved successful. On May 10, 1985, the
parties signed two letters of understanding: one for a programmable
coordinate measuring machine and one for a vertical CNC milling
machine. The wording of the letters was similar, with each waiving the
"one employee, one machine" rule and guaranteeing that programming
and other such work would remain in the bargaining unit. For example,
the text of the CNC milling machine letter was as follows:
Agreement
It is herein agreed that until May 31, 1987, the following letter is
in addition to the current contract between Anderson Pattern and
the Pattern MakersAssociation of Muskegon and vicinity.
Anderson Pattern, Inc. will purchase a Mazak V-20 Vertical CNC
milling machine with toolcharger and a pallet system. This
machine will have functions allowing it to run unattended.
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This machine will have an assigned operator at all times who,
under the guidelines of safety and common sense, may be
assigned to operate another machine at any time it is feasible to
allow the Mazak V-20 to run unattended.
All work done on this machine will be considered bargaining unit
work.
The one man/one machine provision of the Article XIX does not
apply to this machine.
All programming for this machine will be done by bargaining unit
employees, except a program provided by the customer may be
used or it may be translated into the V-20's language from an outsource.

The agreement itself marked a third pivotal event, taking the parties
a step further down a fostering path. They had agreed to conduct a twoyear experiment that represented a fundamental departure from estab
lished machine operation procedures.
In reflecting on the agreement, the union's then business manager
(who negotiated the agreement) commented:
Until recently, pattern making was 99 percent unionized. Restric
tive work rules didn't matter because we all worked under the
same rules. That changed in the 1980s. Now an employer will
only spend a half-million dollars on a new machine if that
machine can be fully used. What do we gain if, instead, that
investment goes to a nonunion shop? The best thing to do was to
negotiate training arrangements so that our people learn the latest
technology.

It is important to note that the parties did not depart fully from a tra
ditional frame of reference emphasizing contractual specificity. Even
in allowing for increased flexibility, they were very precise about the
scope (two machines), the time frame (two years), and the additional
conditions (programming being done by bargaining unit employees).
Thus, while the substance of the contract had been dramatically altered
and the parties had departed from the areawide bargaining structure,
some key norms governing the labor-management relationship had not
changed.
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Making Flexibility the Rule, Rather than the Exception

In 1987, the collective bargaining agreement expired, along with the
letters of understanding regarding the new equipment. This set the
stage for a fourth pivotal event. The parties were faced with the ques
tion of whether to abandon or continue to expand their experiment.
Management again took the lead. It proposed the elimination of the
entire contract provision on machine operations (Article XIX). Further,
management proposed establishing a new form of work organization
around work cells where the work of each operator would be defined
relative to multiple machines.
Management's proposals were highly controversial within the
union. Although the union membership had been correct in their
assessment that the two new pieces of equipment as a special case
would generate a sufficient increase in volume to maintain the existing
workforce, it was much harder to assess the potential impact of com
pletely eliminating the contact language. It was very possible that the
increased flexibility would contribute to increased business, but it was
also possible that severe consequences would be triggered by a sharp
downturn. Further heightening this concern was the fact that within the
pattern-making profession layoffs had not been made on the basis of
seniority, but rather on the basis of work requirements and worker
skills. As a result, management's proposal provoked deep job security
concerns among the entire workforce.
As a small auto supply firm, job security was a difficult issue to
address. The industry had been cyclical and small firms generally did
not have the slack resources nor alternative work that was available in
large firms. Nevertheless, the union took a strong bargaining stance
and indicated that unless management addressed job security, it would
not agree to the work cells or to the elimination of Article XIX.
While Anderson Pattern could not provide a blanket no-layoff
pledge, the parties found a way to ensure that no individuals would dis
proportionately suffer the consequences of the increased flexibility.
Specifically, in the event of a downturn, the parties agreed that a
worker could not be laid off for longer than two months, unless 75 per
cent of the workers in that work area had been laid off for more than
two months. Management also requested the elimination of the union's
midterm right to strike under the contract.
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The midterm right to strike, historically an emotional issue, was less
important to the members given the outcomes of strikes they observed
in other area firms. At the same time, the promised new investment in
the business and the language on job security were viewed as important
gains. The workers thus agreed to eliminate Article XIX. Summing up
the union's justification in eliminating the contract language on
machine use, the current union business manager stated:
Do we want to protect jobs and skills that are becoming noncompetitive or do we want to provide the opportunity for our members
to learn new and more competitive skills?
He also noted that highly skilled pattern makers "would go nuts if their
only job was to program a machine and watch it operate."
In eliminating Article XIX and the midterm right to strike, while
introducing job security language and a promise of new investment, the
parties were not only making significant substantive changes, but they
were also moving away from the traditional regulatory approach to
issues. Stated differently, they were moving away from positional bar
gaining (how many machines could one person operate) and toward
more of a problem-solving approach centered on underlying interests
(flexibility and job security). It is important to note, however, that man
agement's fostering overtures on flexibility occurred in a context where
the union had lost the ability to keep work rules out of contention, and
where forcing and escape were realistic alternatives. Equally, the union
had to take a distributive stance on job security to establish this interest
as a legitimate part of the discussion.

Further Pivotal Events in Training and Health Care
The training programs at Anderson Pattern illustrate the evolving
nature of the relationship following the introduction of new technology
and the expansion of job security. The first pivotal event occurred when
training was expanded to the entire existing workforce, once the agree
ments were reached on new technology. The initial actions on training
occurred on a unilateral basis by the employer. Management created
educational opportunities for all employees by forging partnerships
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with external institutions (a local community college and a four-year
college). First, a series of training courses were established with the
community college that were just focused on the new technology.
Then, additional courses were added so that employees could earn a
two-year degree. Ultimately, an arrangement was established with a
local four-year college that would accept the two-year coursework
towards a four-year degree all paid for by the company.
Initially, the expanding educational options played a pivotal role by
reinforcing the fostering between the employer and the employees. The
course offerings propelled employee-employer relations in a direction
that emphasized increased commitment, as evidenced by the high num
ber of employees that chose to pursue the additional training. The edu
cational choices, however, did not involve the union and hence did not
reinforce the growing focus on labor-management cooperation.
A subsequent pivotal event did involve the union. This was associ
ated with the emerging equity issues around utilizing the new skills. As
the union business manager described the situation:
The training program is popular. Many members have taken
advantage of it. But, it has caused some hard feelings for people
who have taken classes and who are not able to now use the skills.
Realistically, it isn't practical to have everyone run every machine.
It would be great to allow people to run the center for a length of
time, but there are still only 4-6 CNC positions and 25 guys who
have now been trained to operate the equipment.

Issues such as these could inevitably undermine management rela
tions with individual workers and union leadership simply because
employee commitment might be reduced for those who cannot use the
new skills, and union-management cooperation might be weakened
since the union would be saddled with the task of managing complex
internal differences. It remains to be seen how these issues will be
resolved, but it is clear that there is more at stake than merely the inter
ests of a few workers being able to use their skills more fully.
A separate set of pivotal events also took place with respect to health
care, involving the union, Anderson Pattern, and other area patternmaking shops. In 1984, the union had pressed the employers to move
from a set contribution for health care to a situation where the
employer bore the full cost a pivotal shift in the structure of the sys-
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tern. When the employers responded by focusing on cutting costs, the
union came back in the 1987 negotiations to request a return to the old
situation, which the employers rejected a second pivotal event. Then,
by 1990 the continued escalation in health care costs led the employers
to indicate that they would indeed be willing to return to making a set,
defined contribution rather then covering the full cost of health care.
This time, the union rejected the idea a third pivotal event.
This sequence of events teaches important lessons about strategic
negotiations. Under the original arrangement, there were both common
and competing interests between the union and the employers, but the
structure emphasized the common interests. When the structure shifted
to total costs, the parties interests diverged. Subsequently, events that
led one or the other party to want to return to the original arrangement
did not produce the desired change. While maintaining the original
structure would not have eliminated the inevitable tensions associated
with rising health care costs, the parties would have at least faced this
challenge from the vantage point of a cooperative structure for joint
governance rather than in the context of an already contested set of
relations on this issue. Changing the "rules of the game" is a powerful
tool, but it can produce unwanted as well as beneficial outcomes.

Analysis
The Anderson Pattern case represents a long-term unfolding story
with numerous fostering initiatives.
On the substantive side, the main accomplishments were the imple
mentation of profit sharing and the introduction of advanced technol
ogy, with more flexible staffing patterns. In summarizing their
experience with new technology at the 1989 Michigan Governor's
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Conference on Labor-Management Relations, the union business man
ager identified the following positive results from a union perspective:
The workers who are involved in operating these machines feel a
sense of accomplishment in both their ability to master the
machine and also the type of work they can produce from this
equipment. They are glad they can go on to something else while
the machine is operating in the automatic mode.
The machines allowed us to be competitive in types of work that
are nontraditional for pattern shops.
No one lost his or her job because of the changes.
Among the significant outcomes were the following:
Significant Outcomes—Anderson Pattern
Substantive
outcomes
Investment in new
technology

Managementemployee relations
Increased worker
autonomy

Managementunion relations
Increased informal
dialogue and
midterm
negotiations

Other outcomes
Increasing
departure from area
pattern bargaining
structure

Flexible work rules Increased
information sharing
Profit sharing
with employees
Management
Dramatic business
investment a subject growth
Limitations on
Frustrations over
of negotiations
layoffs
use of new CAM
New institutional
Gradual movement arrangements with a
Health care formula skills
toward cooperation, community college
restructured
Gradual movement but with few formal and a four-year
toward high
Elimination of
institutions
college
commitment,
midterm right to
building on the base
strike
of a highly skilled
workforce
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The union business manager also noted the following negative con
sequences from a union perspective, which focus on equity issues:
Because of the high utilization of the machines, men in the tradi
tional machining area are at the bottom of the overtime list and at
the top of the list for layoffs. They also feel left out because they
have not had the opportunity to be trained on the new equipment.

At the same panel session, the president of Anderson Pattern pointed
to five years of new technology investment totaling over $3 million,
which had been possible as a result of the agreements with the union.
During the same period, sales tripled to over $11 million (including
$1.5 million in exports).
On balance, the relationship between Anderson Pattern and the
union shifted from arm's length toward cooperation. As well, the rela
tions between management and employees shifted from one of moder
ate control toward one increasingly characterized by employee
commitment.
However, unresolved issues still remained. For example, the initial
profit-sharing plan strengthened ties between the employer and the
employees, but created a new area of ambiguity for the union. The
accord linking new technology with job security served to reinforce
relations between the company and the union as well as between the
company and its employees. Yet, unresolved issues remained regarding
training for the new technology.
To explain the successes at Anderson Pattern it is important to look
at both internal and external factors. Internally, the values and back
ground of the primary owner/entrepreneur (including his ability to
speak the workers' language and his commitment to sharing informa
tion) were critical. Equally critical was the union's willingness to break
from traditional areawide collective bargaining and to engage in midcontract negotiations. The tradition of autonomy among skilled trades
workers was also important, including a desire to return to "the way
things used to be" regarding self-directed work. In the larger context,
the small size of the firm was a key factor. For example, it was feasible
to educate the entire workforce about proposed changes in technology.
A backdrop of escape and forcing in the broader community and area
industry was also a key factor management did not have to articulate
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forcing threats since the forcing alternative was readily apparent to all
parties involved.
Taken together, the experiences of Anderson Pattern and the Pattern
Makers Association of Muskegon illustrate the iterative process by
which a cooperative labor-management arrangement was constructed.
At the time of our study, the parties were fashioning, on a piecemeal
basis, elements of what appeared to be a very different labor-manage
ment relationship. It remains to be seen whether they will choose to
explicitly discuss the nature of the social contracts that the major stake
holders (management, the union, and the employees) would prefer.
One thing is certain, however as a small firm the process is
informal and highly pragmatic. As the union business manager com
mented: "There is no formal setting to work out problems, we just tell
each other our problems and we work them out." The president of
Anderson Pattern expressed the same point even more bluntly: "With
about 100 people you can eliminate the B.S. factor and deal with reality."

OVERVIEW OF THE FOSTERING CASES
Our three fostering cases fall across a wide spectrum in terms of
results. One case, Bidwell, barely got started with a QWL program
only to have it abandoned. A second case, CSX, embarked upon an
ambitious integrative bargaining exercise that did not come to fruition.
The third, Anderson, succeeded admirably in a multiyear iterative pro
cess of negotiating dramatic substantive and relationship changes.
Like all strategies, fostering contains risks not just that the goals
might fail to be realized. There is a deeper risk that relationships might
be worsened as a result of the venture down a path of change. Bidwell,
for example, ended up without a QWL program, with increased dis
cord within management, and with slightly increased distrust between
labor and management. Even though CSX did not end up worse off
when the gainsharing approach had to be shelved, the setback affected
the overall momentum for change.
At Anderson Pattern, we saw that the small size of the firm, leader
ship, risk-taking on both sides, a skilled trades workforce, and a back
drop involving forcing and escape were all keys to success. By
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contrast, at Bidwell and CSX, where multiple unions were present, the
complexity of the change process increased considerably, and the par
ties were not able to solve issues of internal consensus. Bidwell illus
trates that this task is often as difficult on the management side as on
the union side of the equation.
In terms of the important choice of starting with attitude change ver
sus substantive integrative bargaining, clearly an emphasis on both
dimensions was ultimately necessary. Anderson Pattern illustrated the
need to deal with both the relationship and substance.
It is helpful to abstract several themes in terms of best practice for
executing a fostering strategy. First is the development of initial levels
of trust. Some of this occurs as a result of the time spent together in
joint activities by key players who previously may have interacted only
in an adversarial atmosphere. Credibility and good faith are particu
larly important ingredients. Often the process starts out slowly because
one party, usually the worker/union side, is skeptical of whether the
other (management) really wants to conduct its affairs with input from
other stakeholders. Thus, some token or symbolic action is required
early on in the process to convince all concerned that management is
serious and open minded. This requirement can be realized when man
agement moves quickly to handle worker/union concerns, e.g., dealing
with long-standing safety problems.
A second feature of the process is what theorists have referred to as
an unfreezing event and the creation of a superordinate goal that pro
vides a rallying point to bring parties together on a common basis. In
some cases, threatened bankruptcy of the firm has produced the crisis.
As well, improving quality of service or products has become a similar
catalyst in a number of attitude change programs. Increased business
opportunities (and hence jobs) can be another catalyst.
A third ingredient of a successful process is the ultimate "bottom
line" that there be concrete benefits for all parties. For management,
concrete benefits may include demonstrated gains on cost, quality, and
delivery outcomes, as well as increased flexibility in operations and
fewer daily hassles in managing operations. For union leaders and
members the benefits may come in terms of job security, increased
skills, the sharing of financial gains, greater institutional stability for
the union, and also fewer daily hassles on the job. In other words, out
comes must be present that meet the respective interests of workers,
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union representatives, and management in order to reinforce and
extend fostering strategies.
If these guidelines had been employed at Bidwell and CSX, would
they have helped move these two cases into the success column? We
have already made some comments along these lines respectively in
the analysis at the end of these two cases. Clearly there was unrealized
potential for increased joint gains in both cases. But fostering, by itself,
usually is not a sufficient strategy. It must be well executed in a context
where there is sufficient time for the unfolding sequence of relation
ship building and substantive change. In the absence of these circum
stances, some forcing may also be required as the next two chapters
demonstrate.
NOTES
1. This history dates back at least to the turn of the century, when joint labor-management
committees were established to address safety issues in the mining industry. It includes a variety
of labor-management committees established during the 1920s and 1930s in the railroad and tex
tile industries, as well as over 5,000 such committees established to improve production during
the second world war. During the 1950s, the Armour Automation Committee, the Modernization
and Mechanization Agreement in the West Coast longshoring industry, cooperative efforts in the
steel industry, and numerous early experiments with gainsharing were well known. The joint initi
atives described in this chapter are part of this larger historical story.
2. Valuable research assistance was provided by Kathleen Rudd Scharf in the preparation of
this case.
3. This account is based on Mohrman (1987).
4. In addition to field interviews with key participants, we have benefitted from the availability
of a report by Goldberg (1990).
5. Valuable research assistance was provided by Pat McHugh in the preparation of this case.
6. Specifically, the language in the 1984 contract reads as follows:
Article XIX Machine Operations
Section 19.1 Machines must be attended at all times, but this is coupled with the understand
ing that there be a limit of (2) machines assigned to a man, the first be an automatic stylus
machine designed for duplicating. That machine shall not have more than (2) operating heads in
use while being used as a second machine. The operator, when he attends an automatic machine,
does not leave the other machine cutting stock. When the machine department is regularly sched
uled for a reduced number of hours, then the automatic machines will run for the same reduced
number of hours. Any employee laid off in the machine department will trigger one employee,
one machine.

4
Managing the Dynamics
Sequences Of Forcing And Fostering
Even though there are many complexities that arise in the imple
mentation of either forcing or fostering strategies, the challenges are
even greater when forcing and fostering strategies are employed in
sequence. Of the two possible sequences, the most common is forcing
followed by fostering. All three of the cases in this chapter feature this
sequence.
The cases begin with periods of sustained forcing around substan
tive concessions and, in two instances, with strikes during the forcing
periods. Subsequently, all three cases feature repaired relations and
substantial fostering initiatives centering, in two cases, on joint labormanagement committees. A third case features fostering primarily
aimed at individual employee involvement. The parties in all three
cases were faced with the challenge of being effective during the forc
ing initiative, while mindful of the subsequent need to foster. During
the subsequent fostering it was necessary to move past the anger and
mistrust built up during the forcing period.
Of course, a reverse sequence is also possible. In the AP Parts case
presented in chapter 2, for example, there were some limited coopera
tive efforts around employee involvement that preceded the forcing ini
tiative. Similarly, in a case covered in the next chapter the Pensacola
case we will examine forcing that follows a period of sustained fos
tering. When the sequence is reversed, with forcing following foster
ing, the challenges center on the degree to which trust built up during
the fostering period will be undercut by the subsequent forcing.
There are few historical parallels to these sequences of sustained
forcing and sustained fostering observed during the 1980s and 1990s.
One notable case occurred in 1960 in the West Coast longshoring
industry, where Harry Bridges departed from a highly adversarial
approach and agreed to the Mechanization and Modernization Agree
ment. 1 For the most part, however, the historical cases of hard forcing
have been followed by the complete collapse of relations or by the
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resumption of arm's length relations. Similarly, most historical cases of
far-reaching fostering are built on histories of relatively positive rela
tions. Thus, this look at several instances of forcing and fostering
sequences involves the exploration of new territory.
It is the purpose of this chapter to better understand how the parties
have been able to combine the best elements of the distinct forcing and
fostering strategies into a coherent program for change. We present
three cases that cover a wide range of experience on this path of
sequential change.
The first case involves sequences of negotiations occurring during
the period from 1983 to 1990 in the Boise Cascade Mill at DeRidder,
Louisiana. This story begins with a bitter strike over work rules and
management's imposition of greater flexibility in assignments. Follow
ing the strike, management rebuilt relations with the workforce in
order to effectively implement the new work system.
Adrian Fabricators, our second case, is a small auto parts company
that moved through several phases, characterized by the introduction of
an ESOP as a response to bankruptcy, then a bitter strike arising out of
unmet expectations on the part of the workforce. This conflict was fol
lowed by mutual efforts to repair relations and finally a period of
intense fostering on issues that ranged from daily safety matters to the
overall business strategy.
The Conrail story is our third case. It also involves a struggle back
from bankruptcy. In this case, the hard forcing occurred while the com
pany was under the protection of the federal government. After its
return to stock ownership, the parties continued a relationship marked
by some contention but also by a range of joint activities.
Before presenting the separate stories, it is useful to profile some of
the key attributes of these three examples of sequential forcing and fos
tering.
As the table indicates, the forcing in all three cases occurred in the
context of contractual negotiations, while the fostering primarily
occurred during the subsequent period of contract administration. The
cases focus on the immediate periods following the forcing, through
the fostering initiatives persisted in all three cases through subsequent
rounds of collective bargaining.
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Key Aspects of Cases Featuring Sequences of Forcing and Fostering
Background
factors
Locus of
negotiations
Time frame for
forcing
Time frame for
fostering
Pivotal events

Substantive
outcomes

Relationship
outcomes

Adrian
DeRidder
Cumbersome work Bankruptcy and
creation of ESOP
rules and low
productivity
Plant
Plant
Contract
negotiations

Contract
negotiations

Contract
administration
Strike, union
abandoned and
reestablished; new
CEO
Reduced job
ESOP with
employee majority
classifications
Elimination of most ownership
Wage and benefit
work rules
concessions
Elimination of
Flexible work
Sunday premium
practices
pay
New direction in
Substantial wage
increases
business strategy
Increased job
security
Improved plant
safety,
maintenance, and
training practices
Increased worker
Increased worker
commitment
commitment
After a long delay High levels of
initial steps toward union-management
communications and
improved uniontrust
management
relations
Contract
administration
Strike; new
management team

Conrail
Bankruptcy and
federal government
intervention
Company
Governmentimposed reopening
of contracts
Contract
administration
Stock privatization

Major changes in
work rules and
staffing levels
Reinvestment in the
business

Some increase in
worker commitment
Increased levels of
union-management
communications

During the rounds of forcing in all three cases there were important
substantive changes made in collective bargaining agreements. During
the subsequent periods of fostering, important improvements in rela
tionships occurred. Thus, the cases featured in this chapter are notable
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in that they all feature major changes along both substantive and rela
tionship dimensions.

MANAGEMENT SUCCESS IN FORCING
FOLLOWED BY FOSTERING
Boise Cascade (Deridder), 1983 to 1990
Boise Cascade Corporation succeeded in forcing major change in
the way its workforce functioned in its DeRidder, Louisiana, mill dur
ing 1983 and 1984, and then succeeded in fostering related changes
over the rest of the decade.2
Management won a two and one-half-month strike that targeted
work-rule changes, but not economic concessions. Management's sub
sequent fostering achieved an impressive move toward mutual commit
ment with workers, but did not involve any revision in unionmanagement relations over the next six years. Then, in late 1990, Boise
Cascade management initiated an effort to build a new cooperative
relationship with the international union and the locals at the mill level.
The union responded positively to the overture.
By 1990, the DeRidder mill had risen from one of Boise Cascade's
poorest to one of its top performers. The workers had become the high
est-paid papermill workers in America, according to the company.

Significant Features
The DeRidder case represents a management success story, first on
the forcing side of the ledger and then on the fostering side as well. The
following are significant dimensions of this case:
Management conducted a forcing campaign in contract negotia
tions with the union leadership and then made the transition to a
fostering strategy aimed at rank-and-file employees.
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The company shaped the agenda by focusing on productivity
improvements (new work rules and management rights) and in
return offered higher pay and enhanced job security.
The company prepared for a strike but refrained from using
replacements (that had been trained and were standing by).
After the strike, management took direct responsibility for getting
workers on the same wave length by an elaborate program of com
munications and related actions.
After the strike, the new mill management made a concerted effort
to listen to employee concerns (especially those regarding safety,
maintenance, and training) and then took action on these issues.
Pay increased to the best in the industry (by combining and mov
ing people "upward" into a reduced number of job classifications),
and people-oriented policies and practices were emphasized.
Mill managers used selective rewards and punishments to get man
agers on board with the new program.
Management avoided antagonizing union officials, but at the same
time did not offer them additional power, status, or information.
Eventually the parties entered into early negotiations, and this mill
became the first in the company to take Sunday premium pay out
of the contract.
International union representatives and local leaders eventually
were favorably impressed with the people policies espoused and
practiced by management.
Within the labor movement this type of case is, of course, contro
versial. In the pure forcing cases such as the International Paper
negotiations at Jay, Maine the battle lines are clearly drawn. Here,
the sequential strategies made this case much more challenging to
union leaders. Management was in the driver's seat and able to achieve
many of its long-sought goals (such as simplified work rules, reduced
job classifications, and elimination of Sunday premium pay), while
concurrently paying workers well and responding promptly to many of
the issues they raised. In fact, high levels of worker commitment to the
firm were evident at the time of our study. As a result, the union faced
the complex task of redefining its role in a new work system.
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If the union succeeds in redefining its role and a union-management
partnership unfolds, then this case will represent a complete transfor
mation of an industrial relations system. As of the mid-1990s, it
already stands as a clear example of a hard forcing strategy executed in
such a way as to facilitate subsequent fostering meeting manage
ment's dual objectives of rapid, far reaching substantive change along
with high levels of employee commitment.

The Forcing Campaign
The forcing phase of this change effort began during preparations
for (and the subsequent collapse of) the 1983 negotiations, intensified
during a bitter two and one-half-month strike, and continued into the
first year of the new contract.
Management had become progressively dissatisfied with the perfor
mance of the DeRidder mill. Built in 1969, it was the company's new
est and largest mill, but it had generally failed to meet management's
performance expectations. As an index of the mill's poor performance,
hourly employment increased steadily between 1976 and 1980, rising
from 385 in January 1976 to 490 in January 1980, without commensu
rate increases in productivity; in fact, during this period DeRidder's
return on total capital employed declined both absolutely and relative
to other comparable Boise Cascade mills. The addition of a new paper
machine at DeRidder in 1980 helped improve the mill's overall returns,
but the size of the increase itself was disappointing.
The performance of the DeRidder mill also fared poorly when
judged against three other indicators: its accident rate was among
Boise Cascade's highest, its grievance rate was high compared to other
company mills, and its management turnover rate was also high there
had been seven mill managers in the previous fourteen years.
Management attributed the mill's poor efficiency and disappointing
returns to adverse labor relations and the increasingly restrictive rules
governing work assignments negotiated during the 1970s. The work
rules constrained operational flexibility, DeRidder managers felt, and
generated an endless stream of disputes that absorbed time and energy
and helped to sustain an adversarial climate.

Managing the Dynamics

111

The mill had been organized by the UPIU shortly after it opened.
Employees were represented by two locals, one for maintenance work
ers and the other for production workers. Contract negotiations in 1971
and 1974 produced bitter strikes of over two months' duration. In 1977
and 1980, management avoided strikes, but in the process accepted
what it came to regard as an increasingly unmanageable labor contract.
The restrictive aspects were contained not only in contract provisions,
but also in a proliferation of work practices recorded in memoranda of
understanding between supervisors and workers.
Ichniowski (1986a) analyzed the relationship between grievance
activity and productivity in Boise Cascade's eleven mills and found
that grievance rates had a significant inverse relationship with mill pro
ductivity. For example, the mills experiencing grievance rates at the
average were more than 10 percent more productive than the two mills
with the highest grievance rates and DeRidder was one of these two
mills.
In 1982, Boise Cascade management reflected on how labor matters
had come to their current state at DeRidder. It identified factors that
went beyond the union's relative power advantage in the 1977 and
1980 contract negotiations just cited. The union's daily pursuit of these
protective work rules was both systematic and effective, and upperlevel mill management provided little oversight. As a result, depart
ment foremen and supervisors had wide latitude in making agreements
with employees and union representatives on the mill floor agreeing
to local practices that were inconsistent with each other. The union also
kept better records of agreements than did management, and their
officers generally had longer tenure than management.
Introduction of the Team Concept

Management decided to force change during 1983 contract negotia
tions to eliminate the system of rules it found restrictive and to install
what it called the "team concept." In particular, it sought to eliminate
all side-bar agreements, to establish greater management discretion
over work assignments, and to win contractual authority to make deci
sions based on business needs. Boise Cascade also sought a contain
ment of health care costs, but chose not to seek wage concessions.
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Management's interest in the new team concept was based on the
reportedly favorable experiences at IP and Crown-Zellerbach mills.
Because management anticipated strong union and employee resis
tance to these changes, it planned carefully for negotiations, a possible
strike, and unilateral implementation of the new contract.
To enhance the company's bargaining power, a management group
arranged for continuation of the inflow of raw materials and outflow of
finished products with the following contingencies: staffing the mill
during a strike with managers from other Boise mills, training of man
agers in skills not readily available, provision of temporary housing,
and the development of an extensive security plan. The group also con
structed a new access road to the plant and, in doing so, bypassed the
union hall which was located on the regular access road. Another man
agement group planned for communications within management, to
the workforce, and to the community.
DeRidder managers apparently had relatively little contact with
UPIU Local and International officers ahead of the formal contract
talks. Once negotiating agendas were exchanged, the union's reaction
to management proposals was so negative that the union committee
never really engaged management negotiators over the proposed
changes. Neither side was prepared to make significant concessions to
the other. A strike began in September of 1983 and only ended two and
one-half-months later in November, when the union agreed to call off
the strike and accept the already implemented conditions. During the
strike, the mill operated at about two-thirds capacity, using manage
ment personnel and temporary contracted workers. While management
had threatened to hire permanent replacements for the striking work
ers, it never did so. The lost production resulted in significant reduc
tions in profits for 1983 and 1984.
New Contract Language

Returning workers found themselves facing a company-imple
mented contract containing the changes management originally had
proposed. Annual wage increases (that had not been at issue) consist
ing of 6 percent, 6 percent, and 5 percent were implemented in line
with other industry settlements that year. The important changes were
the introduction of team concept and the insertion of a "zipper clause"
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explicitly overturning all previous side agreements. The 1983 contract
also included a ground-breaking employment security provision.
The zipper clause represented a thorough elimination of the agree
ments and practices DeRidder managers believed had hampered their
ability to manage successfully:
The elements of team concept supersede all conflicting limitations
on management rights provided in the labor agreement, and all
preexisting rules, commitments, understandings, work practices,
past practices, grievance settlements, arbitrations, or side agree
ments written or unwritten.

The intent of the Team Concept language was straightforwardly intro
duced in the new contract as well:
Team concept simply means the company has flexibility in how it
assigns employees.

The ninety-four separate job classifications and the progressions that
applied contained in the 1980 contract were telescoped into a small
number of "clusters," i.e., groups of related jobs to be performed inter
changeably. For example, in the paper machine area, workers formerly
known as fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh hands, paper tester, refiner
hand, and utility hand were now all included in the "C Operator" clus
ter. Significantly, workers received the rate of pay for the highestranked jobs in the clusters. As a result, DeRidder's hourly employees
received increases in base rates in addition to the 6 percent acrossthe-board adjustment.
The contract expanded management's right to contract work out and
to decide whether and how temporary vacancies would be filled.
Within-shift seniority replaced across-shift seniority in determining
bumping rights in layoffs of less than thirty days. The contract also
provided for a new performance evaluation system, the results of
which would be taken into account in filling permanent vacancies. This
tilted the balance between merit and seniority clearly toward merit.
The contract also offered an employment security provision that for
1983 was unusual in the paper industry:
No current employee will lose his employment or suffer a reduc
tion in wage rate due to the implementation of team concept or as
a result of the company's contracting out work.
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Distributive bargaining, which had dominated the 1983 contract
negotiations, continued to be a major factor during the first year of
implementing the team concept. For example, top management made
sure that the organization complied with the overall plan, specifically
that the new job structures and appraisal systems were developed and
introduced, that supervisors were trained to play their roles in negotiat
ing the day-to-day operation of the system with workers, and that a
monitoring system was developed to help ensure that units were fol
lowing the provisions of the new work system and to measure the
advantages of flexibility.

A Phased Transition to Fostering
For represented employees, the first day back on the job in Novem
ber of 1983 consisted of an eight-hour orientation session that included
three hours of safety instruction and five hours on team concept con
tract language and "new rules of order and discipline" to be imple
mented.
Managers had already attended extensive contract implementation
training during the strike, and management training continued. This
training and the fact that the union had not been in a position to make
its usual request for hundreds of pocket-size copies of the new contract
for its members put managers in clear command of the contract and
its interpretation. As a manager later described the average DeRidder
supervisor's new position, "He could just eat a shop steward alive." Top
management's determination to exercise the supervisory discretion
spelled out in the new contract was made clear in many ways.
New Mill Management

Soon after workers returned, a new mill manager was appointed.
Although this individual had filled several managerial positions in the
mill in earlier years, he had been away from DeRidder for a time and
so was not associated with the events of the strike. He arrived prepared
to be firm in implementing the 1983 contract, but also to change man-
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agement practices that hurt employee morale. Shortly before his
arrival, a new human resources manager was hired, as well.
The new mill manager acted quickly to demonstrate attention to
quality and productivity, safety, and hourly workers' concerns. He
recalled later:
I started right away emphasizing safety, quality, productivity, and
management on the people side. Then we just tried to sell it. [The
mill human resources manager] and I had meetings with all the
natural work groups and their supervision, and they really
unloaded on us. ... Our whole thrust has been that the people are
going to make the difference. . . . We put our whole emphasis on
people. They had the feeling we would sacrifice one of them for a
ton of paper [in the past], and sometimes they were right.

The meetings with work groups, known locally as "listening sessions,"
were a key part of direct negotiations with the rank and file. Meetings
were scheduled so that all shifts in all departments eventually met with
the mill manager and human resource manager. Without any formal
union involvement, DeRidder employees had an opportunity to express
their feelings, perceptions, and complaints. Mill managers either
addressed the problems brought up in the listening session or explained
any delays to the departmental groups.
The new mill manager also used other tools to foster and force
change in the management organization. He established a Manage
ment-By-Objectives system in which safety performance was a genu
ine criterion, along with the more usual productivity and quality goals.
Supervisors who used poor judgement in safety matters were disci
plined, to the point of "severance arrangements" in some extreme
cases. Management merit increases, essentially automatic in previous
years, were now reduced by poor safety performance. The human
resources manager said later:
The safety issue was a thing they could grasp. People knew safety
was bad there, and a lot of supervisors would just say, "It's dan
gerous making paper." Supervisors would say that all accidents
arose from "unsafe acts."

The plant and human resource managers understood that the actions
they took toward supervisory staff would at once affect two negotiation
subprocesses. First, they would promote managerial consensus around
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changed priorities. Second, the emphasis on safety would help
unfreeze the negative and skeptical outlook of the workforce.
Several other actions were taken:
An Employee Assistance Program was set up, with the assistance
of a specialist from the UPIU's national headquarters, but without
formal local union participation.
The Bridge Committee, a peer contact point for referral for sub
stance abuse and other problems, was launched.
Hourly employees were asked to join in customer visits, which
provided independent evidence of quality issues and market fac
tors.
Significant and visible expenditures on maintenance to address
productivity, safety, and quality of worklife issues were instituted.
By the time top managers made a second circuit of the mill for depart
ment listening sessions, the tenor of these meetings had changed. The
initial wave of anger and frustration had begun to recede, and some
promised changes could be seen.
DeRidder managers realized also that training would be critical to
their efforts to implement the team concept. Although there was some
objection from upper levels of management during a period of
depressed profits, the new manager built a training center once again
seeing it both as a practical site for necessary activity and as a symbol
of management commitment to training and to change. Training was
also visibly supported when fifteen additional operators were hired in
1985 so fifteen others could rotate off the floor to analyze training
needs and to develop training materials. This was part of a large and
ongoing effort to involve hourly employees in codifying operating
practice and writing standard procedures, training materials, and skills
tests.
By the end of the new manager's first year, many supervisors had
left the mill, reportedly in reaction to reduced merit raises and new per
formance demands. They were largely replaced from within DeRidder.
Again, these appointments moved the composition of the managerial
corps in directions supportive of change, rewarded supervisory flexibil
ity, and demonstrated the depth of top management's commitment to
change. During this period hourly turnover was negligible.

Managing the Dynamics

117

Union-Management Relationship

The change effort at DeRidder was targeted on managers' relation
ships with hourly employees. For the first two years of the new con
tract, the officers of the two UPIU locals refused to sit on joint
committees, and mill managers did not extend any public gestures of
support or rapport for union leadership. By the end of 1984, there had
been a complete change of union leadership. One manager said later:
It was a reaction against the strike. They were saying, "We were as
misled by the union as we were ever mistreated by the company."

As of the early 1990s, the maintenance local president first elected in
1984 had remained in office, but the production local was on its third
president. Mill managers explained this in terms of the union's chang
ing posture and significance at DeRidder, since the old mechanisms of
grievances, arbitrations, contract demands, and strikes looked far less
central to employee well-being, but at the same time the union had not
taken on any new modes of interaction with management. The human
resources manager left his door open to the union officers, and he grad
ually built personal relationships with them, but he continued to
emphasize direct contacts with employees:
Throughout this entire period my group and I have dealt with the
union officers on anything they want to deal about. We've negoti
ated a third extension [of the 1983 contract, with, few changes]
until 1995. By the time they come to me I've usually heard every
thing at the listening sessions.

Even contract negotiations became very different events from the
earlier patterns. The company firmly declined to renegotiate issues
other than wages and benefits, and negotiations were conducted in an
integrative rather than distributive mode.
The first contract extension, negotiated in 1985, embodied an impor
tant change in team concept language and practices. It had been diffi
cult under the 1983 language to persuade workers to move into
positions in higher paid clusters because increased pay came only with
permanent promotion, and managers were not required to fill vacan
cies. The 1985 contract changed this, providing pay at the higher clus
ter's rate for fully qualified workers if a vacancy had been declared,
even if they had not been permanently promoted into the new cluster.
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This agreement reportedly was worked out during informal discussions
between union officers and the human resources manager in response
to complaints raised during the listening sessions.
Team Concept Effects

Ichniowski (1986b) analyzed various indexes of performance under
the new contract to determine whether the team concept was actually
making a difference. He compared average monthly performance for
three periods:
January-June 1983, which he called "1983" or "prestrike";
April 1984-March 1985, called "1984" or "year 1" of team con
cept; and
April 1985-March 1986, called "1985" or "year 2" of team con
cept.
His analysis confirmed that by early 1986 management was achiev
ing the advantages it desired from the changes. Management had con
tracted out much of a large backlog of maintenance projects during
1984. Controllable overtime hours for production workers were cut
from 7.2 percent of all hours worked in 1983 to 3.5 percent during
1984 and 1985, reflecting the fact that management had exercised its
new contractual right to leave vacancies unfilled and to transfer work
ers temporarily across departments. Maintenance overtime hours also
had declined. However, total straight-time pay for both production and
maintenance employees had increased substantially in both 1984 and
1985 as a result of the general increases of 6 percent and 5 percent plus
pay-for-knowledge increases.
Total employment remained stable. The agreement's employment
security assurance to "current employees" and the low rate of turnover
in the mill precluded significant workforce reductions. Moreover, the
major amount of cross-training required to make the team concept
work required a buffer of extra employees.
Given a stable level of employment, productivity increases, if any,
would be reflected in increased production volumes, due mainly to an
avoidance of disruptions to the continuous flow process of paper manu
facturing. Productivity did not increase in year 1 of team concept but
did increase in year 2. The average tons per day in 1983, 1984, and
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1985 were 1744, 1703, and 1830, respectfully. The increase of 86 tons
per day from 1983 to 1985 generated an increase in monthly revenue of
about $800,000, which more than offset the increase in total monthly
labor costs of about $500,000.
By early 1990, DeRidder's managers were able to report further
changes in performance and labor relations indicators:
Tons per person-hour had risen steadily, from .44 in 1983 to .54 in
1990; this reflected some technical improvements but no additions
of capacity. Most of the 24 percent productivity increase was
attributed to improved working practices.
Significant improvements in yield resulted from closer attention to
the usage of materials.
Grievance filings had declined still further and were now almost
completely limited to disciplinary matters,
The mill which had been one of the most dangerous in the com
pany received an industry association safety award in 1989.
The labor agreement had been extended again, this time until 1995,
without Sunday premium pay. DeRidder thus became the first
Boise Cascade mill to eliminate entirely the Sunday premium,
since the contract did not entail a gradual phase-out.
In 1990, DeRidder managers reported that their workers averaged the
highest straight-time pay in the paper industry, due to annual increases
and the effects of clustered pay. While labor costs had continued to
rise, productivity had continued to more than match this rise. DeRidder
made a $98 million profit for 1989, on 800,000 tons of production.
DeRidder and Boise Cascade

As of the early 1990s, developments at DeRidder had exerted lim
ited influence on the overall Boise Cascade/UPIU relationship. Boise
Cascade continued to be thought of as "the scoundrels of the South" by
UPIU activists as a result of strikes in the DeRidder and Rumford,
Maine mills and because of the company's reputation for aggressive
ness. Nevertheless, the UPIU International officers had begun to soften
their stance, based on reports of the "people-oriented" management at
the DeRidder mill. While the UPIU representative for the southern
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Boise mills had not become deeply involved, neither had he been
openly critical of the DeRidder change process.

Analysis
Several factors help explain the ability of DeRidder management to
first force substantive change and then foster new relations. It is partic
ularly instructive to contrast DeRidder with Jay, our pure forcing
example from the paper industry.
The ambitiousness of demands: DeRidder focused just on workrule changes, whereas Jay included both economic and work-rule
concessions.
Power tactics: the use of temporary but not permanent replace
ments at DeRidder avoided the ultimate threat to institutional and
job survival. Permanent replacements were used at Jay, which led
to both job loss and the decertification of the union.
Power perceptions: DeRidder management clearly appeared to
have the advantage and therefore the ability to prevail; labor did
not have any tactical advantages at their disposal. By contrast, the
coordinated bargaining at IP and the use of the corporate campaign
seemed to offer labor a chance to defeat IP.
Regional attitudes: DeRidder is located in the South and Jay in the
North consequently, cultural differences in these regions proba
bly explained much of the contrast regarding resolve and power
perceptions.
Time frame: DeRidder's proposals were made at a different point
in time from Jay 1983 versus 1987. UPIU had been forced to
accept several contracts it saw as concessionary in the intervening
period, and by 1987 it had decided to draw the line. Several IP/
UPIU contracts came up during a short period, presenting the
union with an opportunity to "pool" several mills in order to
increase its bargaining power an opportunity it did not posses in
1983 at DeRidder.
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In addition, DeRidder's managers invested in communication mech
anisms (including a daily newspaper and team meetings) designed to
support the messages conveyed symbolically by maintenance expendi
tures, management behavior, training, and customer visits. Manage
ment essentially bypassed a problematic relationship with the UPIU by
dealing directly with employees in permissible ways. In so doing, they
avoided the intraorganizational consensus problems they perceived
within the union, and they kept local officers from having to confront
the possibility of a disjunction between the desires of some local offi
cials for open cooperation with management and the more anticooperation and generally anti-Boise Cascade stance of the national as well as
many local officials of the UPIU.
Could the union have played a more central role in the change pro
gram at DeRidder? Clearly, the union decided it was wise to neither
support nor oppose DeRidder management's initiatives aimed at its
members. While the union officials were concerned about what man
agement was doing, they perceived the mill manager to be gaining so
much support from workers that they feared a test of wills over the new
program. One practical reason for the stance: it was not invited to be a
party. A crucial question is whether the local union leadership could
have insisted on some type of partner role in fostering the new regime,
thereby deriving some credit for the improvements that emerged. The
answer to this question is at the heart of the dilemma faced by all union
leaders in today's economic environment: If they remain aloof to avoid
being co-opted (and in so doing ensure their independence), they run
the risk of being marginalized. On the other hand, if they seek to play a
leadership role in the new initiatives, they may encounter opposition
from management, as well as from a vocal minority within their mem
bership.
As of the early 1990s, it looks like local union leadership at DeRid
der had made the right choice. The company's program was viewed
favorably by most members and as such was generating positive eco
nomic returns. And DeRidder management had started the process of
involving local union leadership in decisions regarding the team con
cept. However, the success of their strategy depended on two factors
that are not always present. First, it depended on management choos
ing not to press its power advantage and undercut the union. Second, it
depended on management being effective on its own in implementing
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the team-based work system and then being willing to bring the union
back in as a partner. Since these circumstances are not always present,
the DeRidder story may not be a model for union leaders confronted
with a fostering initiative on the heels of a period of sustained forcing.

RECONCILING FRAMES OF REFERENCE
The Case of Adrian Fabricators and UAW Local 963
The starting point for the Adrian story began with an ownership
transition the conversion of a private stock company to a majority
employee stock ownership plan (ESOP). 3 This transition modified
employee assumptions about the existing employment relationship.
Labor saw itself as new owners and held high participatory and mone
tary expectations. In contrast, management adhered to a traditional
view of employee-employer relations and pursued an autocratic style
of management.
In the midst of this set of incongruent frames, management
responded to competitive pressures by adopting a forcing change strat
egy that ultimately provoked a strike an unusual event since the
employees were literally striking against themselves. The resolution of
tensions occurred with a change in top-level management, an expanded
role for the union, and the emergence of a fostering strategy more con
sistent with the employee ownership structure.

Significant Features
Adrian Fabricators is an independent manufacturer of wire mesh
industrial containers used in warehouse operations of manufacturing
facilities. Located in Adrian, Michigan, the company serves many
automotive production facilities. With total employment of 141 in
1989, it has been a relatively small supplier.
The Adrian Fabricators case is unique in many respects, including
the following:
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The ESOP emerged out of a common commitment to avoid a plant
closing, but with relatively little attention to the structure and
meaning of the plan, thereby creating the potential for future con
flict.
The employees abandoned their union as unnecessary following
the establishment of the ESOP, only to reestablish it as a vehicle
for collective voice.
Initial wage and benefit concessions were made in the spirit of the
ESOP, but subsequent demands for further concessions by man
agement were seen by workers as negating their standing as own
ers.
Despite violence on the picket line, the parties settled the strike (in
part because some worker-owners continued to operate the plant,
and management did not hire replacements for striking workerowners).
After the strike, the relationship shifted rather quickly to robust
cooperation with help from state government; with a new CEO
opening the books, sending letters to homes, and initiating an open
door policy; with symbolic union gestures (such as replacing bro
ken windows in the factory); with the parties renegotiating the
profit-sharing formula; and with the establishment of a labor-man
agement committee.
The Adrian Fabricators case teaches many lessons about the specific
challenges of an ESOP structure, but the case also has broader applica
bility. In particular, it illustrates the important roles of leaders in man
aging the shift from a forcing period to the implementation of a
fostering strategy.
The case is notable in that the sequencing of forcing and fostering
was not part of a larger intentional strategy (which was the case in
DeRidder). The forcing occurred in the context of an unexpected esca
lating dispute. The subsequent fostering reflected a desire on the part of
all parties to build a constructive relationship. Thus, the case illustrates
the way sequences of strategies (as well as particular strategies) can
emerge in a relationship.
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Employee Ownership Within a Traditional Frame of Reference
The history of Adrian Fabricators began in 1966 when the Adrian
facility started fabricating operations under the ownership and opera
tion of the Tri-State Engineering Corporation. The facility was orga
nized that same year by the UAW. For the next twenty-five years, the
success of the company was tied to the cyclical movements of the auto
mobile industry, since well over 80 percent of its business came from
the automotive industry. Collective bargaining arrangements mirrored
those throughout the automotive sector. During this period, the estab
lished pattern of bad times followed by prosperous periods contributed
to complacency on the part of management when faced with a down
turn in business. Thus, management was not well prepared for the deep
financial exigencies that emerged in the early 1980s especially with
a backdrop of near-record sales of $26 million in 1979.
Management's inadequate financial foresight in terms of cash flow
planning and capital planning, coupled with the recession of the early
1980s (which was especially severe in the automotive sector) led to
sales levels falling to $6 million by 1982. During this downturn, inter
mittent layoffs left only the most senior employees in the workforce.
At one point, the collective bargaining agreement was virtually dis
carded as several employees voluntarily worked without pay in the
hopes of keeping the operation afloat. By February 1983, the company
had filed for bankruptcy.
The ESOP Plan

At the request of several senior employees, a team of state govern
ment agencies and private consultants helped formulate an employee
stock ownership plan. By the fall of 1983, Adrian Fabricators was
reconstituted as a majority employee-owned company. With the cre
ation of the ESOP, the workforce chose to discontinue its relationship
with the UAW. This decision was difficult for the international repre
sentative to accept since he had led the initial organizing effort of TriState in 1966 and had been a strong proponent of the ESOP revival
effort. The employees' desire to disassociate from the union exempli
fied a shift in the frame of reference of the workforce. In essence, the
workers believed that employee-owners did not require representation.
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As one worker put it: "Management will be by committee ... there will
be no foremen here."
Ultimately, the "employee ownership" expectations of the work
force conflicted with the principles and assumptions about the employ
ment relationship held by management. For example, the first president
of the company after reorganization was described by some members
of the firm as a "benevolent dictator" with a nonparticipative manage
ment style.
Tensions arising from contradictory assumptions about the character
of employment relations were heightened by the day-to-day reality of
trying to salvage an underfinanced operation. Specifically, manage
ment announced that financial constraints would make wage increases
difficult. Many workers found this hard to accept, not just because they
needed wage adjustments, but because they had envisioned that stock
ownership would mean a less arduous work pace and eventual wealth.
By 1985, the tensions had precipitated a reorganizing drive by the
UAW within the facility. Management's subsequent approach toward
the resurrected union was characterized by a member of the union's
bargaining committee as "a resistance to recognize, never mind bargain
with, the union." Managers felt that the union would only intensify the
financial problems faced by the company because the leadership of the
union would make "irrational demands." This attitudinal orientation
(with overtones of escape) further polarized management and labor.
Workers Striking Against Themselves

On February 5, 1986, after management fired the chair of the bar
gaining committee for leaving work early to attend a union meeting,
over half the workforce walked off the job with the statement that, "If
you fire him, then you have fired all of us." Consistent with their
escape/forcing strategy, management attempted to continue operations
during the strike using employees a minority of the workforce who
were willing to cross the picket line. The worker-owners who did not
cross the picket lines were, in effect, striking against their own firm.
Sometimes brothers or relatives were split, with one working and the
other on the picket line. As one worker who chose to cross the picket
lines commented:
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I crossed because of the ESOP. I felt like it was our plant and that
we would lose our jobs and everything we had worked so hard for.

In terms of the negotiations themselves, one member of the bargain
ing committee stated:
It was pure hell. They brought in some lawyer and he presented us
with a dinosaur contract. It was an old-style contract that those at
the international level hadn't seen in twenty-five years.

After three months of extremely tense negotiations, punctuated by
occasionally violent confrontations between striking and nonstriking
employees, management and the union finally reached agreement in
May 1986 on a three-year package that included a one and one-half
year freeze on wages, recognition of union stewards, creation of a
union shop, implementation of a grievance procedure, and a seniority
system. Labor and management agreed that economic pressure felt by
both parties provided impetus for the accord.

Construction of a New Frame of Reference
Following the strike, labor-management relations remained tense.
The union helped soften some of the tension by assuming the cost of
repairing windows and other property broken during the strike. Still, it
was a traditional, arm's-length set of relations between labor and man
agement. The precarious financial situation served as a continuing
source of tension.
A Change in Management

In the fall of 1987, the president of the company left for another job
and, on his recommendation, the chief financial officer of the company
became president. With this change in top leadership, labor-manage
ment relations slowly began to change. Although the new president
was at first skeptical of the value the union would have for the plant,
his management style was more participatory than his predecessor.
Over time, he concluded:
The union gives more benefits than costs, by providing a more
acceptable voice to employees ... the union has been the method
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that they have chosen to voice their concerns. Having union repre
sentation is a very stabilizing factor.

Thus, a major shift began to take place as management came to recog
nize the legitimacy of the union and the full range of employee con
cerns. This change in management was a pivotal event though its
pivotal nature only became clear over time.
Establishing a Labor-Management Committee

Coinciding with the managerial transition at Adrian Fabricators,
state officials from the Michigan Governor's Office for Job Training
provided consultation assistance to both labor and management and
recommended the initiation of a joint labor-management problem-solv
ing committee a second key pivotal event following the strike. Both
parties signed a letter of understanding acknowledging commitment to
the creation of the committee where:
The purpose of the committee is to enhance communication and
understanding between and among labor and management.
Through formal participation in this decision-making process, it is
the intent that labor will gain a greater appreciation for the neces
sity of the profit motive, and management will gain insights that
may promote this motive.

This committee addressed substantive issues, such as the absenteeism
policy, production problems, and safety concerns. Subsequently, the
parties also agreed to use the committee as an additional step in the
grievance procedure, indicating that the labor-management committee
was seen by the parties as a valuable forum and marking a movement
away from the formal arm's-length model of labor-management rela
tions.
Revision of the Profit-Sharing Formula

The next major development involved a revision of the profit-shar
ing component of the ESOP plan. Under the original plan, the first year
payment of profit-sharing checks was perceived by the workforce as
substantially more favorable to the managers in the firm. In fact, work
ers received payments earlier as part of their wage package, but the dif
ferential in the checks surfaced deep equity issues arising from the
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workers-as-owners frame of reference. The resolution of this situation
involved agreement on uniform profit-sharing payments. In this situa
tion, the ESOP arrangement served as a vehicle by which the workers
were able to force equity (or the perception of equity) an example of
union forcing within a fostering context.
Additional Developments

Several developments emerged, not from internal forces, but from
external prompts. In 1989, state MIOSHA inspectors cited the plant for
a number of safety violations. In response, the president of the firm met
with the union leadership, and the parties each appointed representa
tives to a joint safety committee, established outside of the formal
structure of collective bargaining.
A subsequent development, also outside of the formal collective
bargaining process, involved the establishment of what the parties
termed the "equipment committee." This was established at the initia
tion of the firm's president, after consultation with the union. The
equipment committee oversees the installation and training needs for
major capital investments projected to eventually increase productivity
by at least 300 percent.
Although this case began with harsh forcing, the increasing use of
joint committees created a form of governance consistent with a foster
ing approach to change. A further step in the fostering direction likely
to have implications for the daily work experiences of all workers was
the exploration of the team concept.
The shift in frames of reference can be seen in the startling contrast
between the two negotiations. In the 1986 negotiations, management
would not recognize the legitimacy of the union, whereas in the 1989
negotiations the company's books were open. As the president of
Adrian Fabricators put it, "We wanted to have as much mutual trust as
possible, so we invited the UAW economists to look at our books." In
essence, a dramatic change took place in the assumptions underlying
the employment relationship.
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Economic Stability and a New Social Contract

Clearly, the financial success that the company began to experience
in the fall of 1988 had been a necessary condition for the widespread
changes in trust that occurred. After the strike, the value of shares
increased 247 percent, employment rose 145 percent, and in 1989
profit sharing became a reality. For the hourly workforce, financial suc
cess was best seen in the fact that wages increased by over 25 percent.
While causality is always hard to attribute, most managers and union
officials gave the improved labor-management relationship significant
credit for the improved economic performance.
The parties viewed the emerging social contract as vital to corporate
strategy. First, financial success was not just seen as an end in itself,
but as a foundation for building trust between labor and management.
Second, small auto supply firms such as Adrian Fabricators needed to
"guarantee" creditors and customers that "there would be no prob
lems" in terms of labor-management relations.
In addition to moving toward a fostering strategy in labor-manage
ment relations, management at Adrian Fabricators worked jointly with
the union in developing a business strategy that would insulate the
company from the cyclical automotive supply industry. One aspect of
this strategy included efforts by the company to garner long-term con
tracts with large customers. Adrian Fabricators was somewhat success
ful with this approach. While the company was locked in on prices, one
management representative noted: "if there is a downturn, we will have
some security with our foot in the door with a huge company." A sec
ond and more important component of Adrian's strategy was to remove
the company from the auto supply industry by actively seeking to
diversify its mix of customers. For example, in 1986 over 75 percent of
the company's business was with customers in the automotive industry,
whereas by 1990 that figure had fallen to below 15 percent.
In short, there was a conscious strategy to remove the labor-manage
ment relationship from the volatile context associated with the automo
tive supply industry. It is significant that this case began as an example
of forcing within the auto supply industry and it continued as a case of
fostering that took the parties increasingly outside of the industry.
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Analysis
The Adrian Fabricators story features a series of shifts in the labormanagement relationship that occurred over a period of hard forcing,
followed by a period of sustained fostering. The multifaceted nature of
the outcomes that characterized the Adrian story can be summarized in
chart form:
Significant Outcomes—Adrian Fabricators
Substantive
outcomes
Early economic
concessions
Contingent
compensation
Work-rule
flexibility
Employee stock
ownership

Managementemployee
Management-union
relationship
relationship
Movement from
Movement from
control
adversarial
to
to
expectations of
a form of escape
mutuality
(since employees no
longer saw the union
to
disillusion and strike as necessary)
to
to
sustained movement arm's-length
toward commitment involving a strike
to
sustained movement
toward cooperation

Other outcomes
Major performance
improvements
Mutually costly
strike
Strategic business
plan to seek business
outside the auto
supply industry

The Adrian Fabricators story contains many elements of the classic
sequence wherein a severe crisis occurred, the parties reached for a
quick solution (ESOP), matters become more complicated, and only
after a second crisis was the situation ripe for a breakthrough. In this
case a new CEO and a skilled international union representative pro
vided the leadership necessary for the parties to move into a construc
tive relationship.
At the time of the first crisis, several divergent interests were at
work. Most members of management and some employees saw the
ESOP as a means for emphasizing the employee qua owner status and
de-emphasizing the role of the union and collective bargaining in mat
ters of governance.
When management came on strong and took a very traditional
approach to the next negotiations, any semblance of cooperation that
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had been engendered by the ESOP was shattered. With matters wors
ening, new leadership (both the CEO and government officials), cou
pled with a series of constructive, fostering steps, moved the
relationship decisively in the cooperative direction.
Several questions can be asked about critical junctures in this story.
Was a second crisis necessary i.e., would it have been possible for the
parties in the throes of bankruptcy to have moved directly to a positive
relationship in a manner similar to Conrail (a case soon to be consid
ered)? The answer has to be yes. But such a changeover would have
required a thorough reorientation of all stakeholders regarding the
opportunities and limitations of an ESOP. It also would have been nec
essary for the parties to have initiated earlier the cluster of fostering
activities that eventually were implemented after the strike.
If, on the other hand, management had wanted to escape from the
union, what steps could have been taken to this end? (This is a question
not normally asked by industrial relations researchers, and it surfaces
some uncomfortable issues, but it is important for both union and man
agement leaders to consider.) A skillful management, intent on escape,
would have shared power, used the ESOP as a communication channel,
and strengthened the axis of management to employee communica
tion all at the expense of the union. Moreover, at the next negotiation,
management would not have come on strong but would have laid out
the problems to the employee-owners, with the possibility that atten
tive supervision could have successfully marginalized the union leader
ship. Eventually, the union might have been decertified not as a result
of confrontation but as a result of the workers asking: "What is the
need for a union?"
The lesson in all of this is that a crisis prompts management to take
the initiative. If done properly and in a way that creates credibility, then
what starts out as forcing can be transformed into a fostering regime.
However, if the crisis induces management to act precipitously or
induces the workers to lock on a solution on the basis of unrealistic
expectations, then matters become more complicated. Eventually,
management, the union, and the workforce at Adrian arrived at a con
structive stage, but only after several painful episodes.
The case illustrates the degree to which a structural change such as
the establishment of an ESOP did not guarantee success for a firm and
its workforce. The new ESOP structure merely provided a platform for
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negotiations, which brought both new opportunities and new dilem
mas. Initially, the interactions were dominated by the dilemmas, such
as inflated employee expectations, an ambiguous role for the union,
and the persistence of autocratic management styles. In time, and after
the painful episodes, the opportunities became more apparent, includ
ing high levels of employee motivation, complete information sharing,
and extensive union-management dialogue.
Three factors are most important in accounting for the successful
realization of the opportunities. These same factors, in their absence,
account for the initial difficulties. First, leadership on both sides was
key initially it was absent or contradictory with the ESOP concept
and a key factor later on. Second, employee knowledge and expecta
tions were critical when they were out of line, relations suffered and
when there was alignment, motivation was high. Third, government
officials played a key role as a source of training and third-party facili
tation, which was not present initially, but was subsequently very help
ful. Thus we see that the same forces that, in their absence, drive an
escalating forcing contest, can also serve, by virtue of their presence, to
support a robust fostering initiative.

FOSTERING AT THE SYSTEM LEVEL
The Conrail Story

The experience of Conrail illustrates a unique combination of forc
ing and fostering. Dire economic circumstances created a need for
forcing, while the skill and values of management established the ratio
nale and feasibility for fostering.
Conrail faced bankruptcy. As a result, the federal government
stepped in with a revival program. The carrier dropped out of national
bargaining and renegotiated its labor agreements. Extensive communi
cation occurred with employees and with the various unions. With the
return to profitability, Conrail rejoined national handling, and the par
ties implemented a series of joint activities.
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Significant Features
The Conrail story features the most active role of government across
our cases and has the following distinctive features:
Management prepared the rescue plan in conjunction with federal
agencies and in consultation with the unions.
The CEO and top management dealt with all parties in an open
fashion.
Considerable information was made available to all unions and
rank-and-file employees.
The government provided a powerful and face-saving framework
for initial forcing on substantive issues.
Reinvestment in the business concurrent with the concessionary
requests reduced opposition to changes in work rules.
Subsequent fostering produced positive economic gains and less
ened the extent of catastrophic job loss.
There are many features of the Conrail story that are unique to regu
lated industries in general and to the railroad industry in particular. It is
instructive to see how intervention by government can exert such a
positive influence on labor-management relations and economic per
formance.

Highlights
Conrail was formed as a result of the Regional Rail Reorganization
Act of 1973 (3R), combining railroads formerly known as the Penn
Central, Erie Lackawanna, Central Railroad of New Jersey, and several
other smaller lines. The new organization did not begin operating until
early 1976.
The next several years saw big losses, and by 1981, with Conrail
still losing money, management moved to develop a plan to place the
railroad back on a profitable basis. After substantial analysis, a plan
that management felt was realistic was brought forward and, at com-
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pensation levels then existing, a gap of $200 million remained. To deal
with this gap the concept of a wage freeze emerged that would defer
national wage increases up to 12.5 percent.
At about the same time, management also developed a plan for
reducing crew size on trains from the customary complement of five
(engineer, fireman, conductor, and two brakemen) to three (dropping
the fireman and one brakeman). This plan called for a separation pay
ment of $25,000 per individual and required federal funding.
A number of structural changes also were implemented. As part of
the continuing consolidation, many duplicate facilities were elimi
nated. For example, the number of maintenance shops for diesel loco
motives was reduced from fifty to nine. The remaining shops went to
three-shift operations in order to better use the plant and equipment.
As a result of the Northeast Rail Service Act of 1981 that transferred
ownership to the federal sector, Conrail was able to expedite proce
dures for abandoning unprofitable lines. In addition, the number of
local labor agreements was reduced, and virtually all of the arbitraries
(special payment provisions) were eliminated. For example, when
Conrail commenced operations in 1976, there were 285 separate agree
ments; by the early 1980s, the number had been reduced to 23.

Results
Due to these changes, Conrail gradually returned to profitability and
was spun out from under government ownership and placed in the pri
vate sector in 1987. In the process, staffing levels had dropped from
90,000 to approximately 25,000 by the early 1990s. With the reduction
in crew size, most trains were able to operate with three-person
crews 93 percent for through freight, 84 percent for local, and 96 per
cent for yard operations. By 1994, labor costs stood at 36 percent of
total costs compared to 62 percent prior to restructuring. While com
pensation increases had been deferred for several years, eventually
these wage deferrals were restored in lump-sum payments, averaging
approximately $6,000 per employee. Most workers who remained with
Conrail more than recouped their losses, taking into account that they
received stock when Conrail went public.
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Analysis
Conrail succeeded in reducing crew size and realizing other changes
in work rules almost a decade ahead of other carriers, and it achieved
these major improvements while maintaining positive relations with
most of its unions. In fact, labor leaders place Conrail at the top of the
"good guy" list for the railroad industry. What explains these favorable
outcomes?
In terms of our framework, the Conrail story possesses certain ele
ments of forcing, but with special characteristics. The key driver, of
course, was the economic crisis: Conrail was losing large amounts of
money and it was clear that the federal government would be forced to
do something drastic (like selling pieces of the system to other carriers)
if the corporation were not returned to profitability in the early 1980s.
A second significant factor was the role of legislation and adminis
trative directives establishing procedures that enabled management to
reduce the size of the workforce rather directly something that other
railroads have not been able to do as easily. Specifically, when workers
who had been hired after 1969 were offered a $25,000 buyout (and
large numbers of them accepted), the company was able to shrink
employment by eliminating these positions unlike other railroads
who (until the mid-1990s) had been required to bring back furloughed
workers, i.e., allowing them to exercise seniority rights to fill vacated
positions.
A third factor (and in some ways pivotal) was the federal bailout;
Uncle Sam "footed the bill." Summing up the various pieces of the
overall program, namely, the massive physical rehabilitation of the sys
tem and the labor protection costs and financial settlements with the
various predecessors of Conrail, the total price tag for the federal gov
ernment came to over $8 billion (unadjusted for inflation). Labor pro
tection (primarily the buyouts) alone amounted to $630 million in
direct federal grants.
Unlike other carriers that attempted (unsuccessfully) to convince
their union leaders and workers that change was necessary to improve
profitability, management at Conrail did not have to engage in such
rhetoric. The situation spoke for itself: Agree to changes or face the
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uncertainty associated with splitting up and reorganizing the Conrail
system.
When the compulsion for change comes from objective circum
stances rather than a one-sided initiative (often coupled with a contract
expiration), it is easier for the parties to maintain and even improve
their social relations. Thus, in the case of Conrail, management empha
sized the importance of developing strong rapport with key union lead
ers and handling the change process in an open and participative
manner. These elements of fostering were facilitated by the values and
style of the CEO and other key executives.
Extensive communication programs also were instituted to inform
all employees about the challenges being faced and the progress being
made during the early 1980s. Wherever possible, management looked
for ways to continue the employment of workers who were no longer
needed. For example, when a shortage developed of skilled signal per
sonnel to staff a range of new electronic technologies, Conrail
recruited approximately 300 individuals from other crafts and insti
tuted both classroom and on-the-job training in keeping with the com
pany's policy of affording employment opportunities to employees
who had been furloughed from other lines of work.
The fostering process also benefitted from the services of facilita
tors such as William Usery, former Secretary of Labor, who played a
key role during the 1980s in bringing about consensus on the major
pieces of the labor relations program involving severance payments,
reduction in crew sizes, and consolidation of local agreements, as well
as encouraging the parties to approach change in a constructive man
ner.
Significantly, the industrial relations function was a part of the top
management team within Conrail. The vice-president for labor rela
tions played a key role in the formulation of business strategy, and top
management placed the highest priority on achieving constructive
labor-management relations.
The best term to describe the tenor of labor-management relations
would be "accommodation." The CEO met regularly with top union
leaders, and a number of them sat on what is referred to as the Conrail
Subcommittee that was made up of top executives and presidents of
most of the major railroad brotherhoods. However, the approach was
not one of jointness. Management's objective was to keep the unions
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informed, but not to bring them into co-management. In the example of
retraining craft workers to become signal operators, Conrail initiated
the training and only notified the union as a matter of information.
The main conclusion of the Conrail story is that by taking an ailing
railroad and placing it under the shelter of government support, the
parties were able to restructure operations and to streamline the work
force to the end that economic viability was restored. In effect, man
agement took advantage of the federal clout to force through the
necessary changes, but at the same time strove to maintain positive
relationships with its employees and unions.
The question needs to be asked whether the working accommoda
tion forged in the throes of bankruptcy would continue. Several pieces
of evidence suggest an affirmative answer. During the late 1980s and
early 1990s, the parties instituted a joint labor-management safety pro
gram, and a labor-management cooperation program was expanded
substantially. The chairs of the various subcommittees alternated each
year between management and labor representatives. These programs
were guided by an overall Joint Labor-Management Committee. Sig
nificantly, union representatives on this latter committee were full-time
Conrail employees.
Frequently, these joint labor-management teams worked with cus
tomers in designing procedures for better service. For example, a
cross-functional team from Conrail interfaced with a team from Beth
lehem Steel to reduce billing errors from 14 percent to 3 percent, with
an eventual target of zero defects.
Compelling circumstances and a well-managed process combined to
produce the favorable outcomes at Conrail. We have seen in other cases
that neither a compelling context nor an effective process alone is suffi
cient. Adrian Fabricators, for example, experienced the focusing effect
of bankruptcy, but the parties did not emerge from bankruptcy with a
jointly understood and viable plan for recovery so economic crisis
alone was not sufficient. In the CSX case, the parties handled the pro
cess reasonably well, but the absence of a crisis allowed the local
chairmen of the United Transportation Union (UTU) to opt for the sta
tus quo indicating that a collaborative process alone was not suffi
cient.
By dropping out of national handling and by focusing the attention
of union leaders and workers on the tough realities facing the company,
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management was able to gain acceptance for fundamental changes that
would not have been possible within the traditional structure of multiemployer, multiunion, collective bargaining. The fact that ownership
was (for an important period) in the hands of the federal government
also lent credibility to the need for fundamental restructuring.
This case teaches, therefore, that the use of compelling economic
arguments is most effective when accompanied by a positive relation
ship between labor and management. Conrail found itself in a situation
where the economic situation (impending bankruptcy) created consid
erable credibility for change. However, even with these objective cir
cumstances, the union leaders and rank and file could have easily
concluded that they were being coerced by circumstances or that man
agement was using bankruptcy to extract undue concessions.
The challenge is the following: How does management present an
accurate picture without the union reacting in a negative fashion
thereby setting in motion an escalation towards unrestrained forcing. In
the case of Conrail, the strong positive relationship that had developed
between top officials (building on the commitment of top management
to proceed in an open way) made it possible for the forcing elements
that were present to be viewed in a constructive fashion. In essence,
labor had no other choice than to accept major concessions, and full
information sharing made the concessions more attractive than the
alternative scenarios (such as the collapse and breakup of the entire
railroad).
In certain circumstances the role of third parties, especially the gov
ernment, can be crucially important for the change process. In the
instance of Conrail, the federal government brought resources and its
good offices all of which provided considerable impetus to the fash
ioning and implementing of a recovery plan. By contrast, in the case of
AP Parts, the role of governmental officials remained limited they
were local (lacking the authority of .federal agencies) and, most impor
tant, they lacked resources to bring to the table. Indeed, from this per
spective, some analysts criticized the Conrail rescue as an overly
generous bailout that cost the taxpayers dearly.
Holding aside the taxpayer issue, another lesson that then emerges is
that union concessions are more palatable when they are accompanied
by reinvestment in the business. From this point of view, sufficient
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resources make it possible to overcome a good deal of what would
have been resistance to the large-scale change.
Significantly, Conrail did not revert to the typical arm's-length rela
tionship (characteristic of railroads) when it was spun out from under
governmental ownership. Basically, the explanation is that once a posi
tive relationship had developed and the parties had realized benefits as
a result of this relationship, it was unlikely, short of major changes in
personnel or the environment, that the strategic approach being fol
lowed by the parties would be modified. Thus, like the DeRidder case,
key choices made during the initial period (with heavy elements of
forcing) laid the foundation for a subsequent period of constructive
fostering.

COORDINATING STRATEGIES
Strengths and Challenges
Ultimately, all three of the cases featuring a sequence of forcing and
fostering strategies met with success of course, in varying degrees
and after different journeys.
In two cases (Adrian Fabricators and Conrail) bankruptcy provided
the forcing impetus; however, in the case of Adrian, a second crisis was
required before the parties turned the corner and embraced a robust
fostering strategy. In any event, in both of these instances the positive
results were realized relatively quickly. In the DeRidder case, the crisis
was not externally imposed, and the reconstruction of relations took
longer. In that case, however, the sustained fostering initiatives ulti
mately transformed the mill into one of the company's most produc
tive, safest, and best-paying paper mills.
The significant difference between these three cases, on the one
hand, and the cases discussed in the preceding two chapters, on the
other, is that here the parties avoided the destabilizing tendencies
inherent in an exclusive reliance on either of the two distinct strategies.
The parties engaged in such integrative arrangements as extensive
information sharing, problem solving, and consensus decision making,
yet they found ways to surface and to handle serious conflicts.
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All of the cases were characterized by the emergence of a new set of
norms governing relations on an ongoing basis. Significantly, the exer
cise of power became more subtle and certain distributive tactics were
foreclosed. Basically, the new norms were integrative in nature.
On the other side of the ledger, when the parties engaged in forcing,
they did so without letting it escalate into an out-of-control confronta
tion. Management at DeRidder picked its issues carefully focusing
on work rules rather than the economic package. Similarly, Conrail
sought major contractual concessions, but demonstrated continuing
commitment to the business (made possible by the federal bailout
funds).

Lessons Learned
The experience of these three cases suggests a number of important
lessons regarding the effective sequencing of forcing and fostering
strategies.
The important role of key leaders cannot be overstated. DeRidder,
Adrian, and Conrail all were eventually characterized by a consultative
style of top management and illustrate the dominant influence of key
individuals on the process. Management leaders in the DeRidder and
Conrail cases ensured that the forcing remained restrained, and in all
three cases management ensured that the fostering proceeded in a
focused fashion. Union leaders in the Adrian and Conrail cases played
key reciprocal roles in the reconstruction of relations after the forcing.
Objective standards were critical as justifications for forcing and for
moving past the forcing. The speed with which Adrian and Conrail
tackled their problems was in large part due to the credibility of the
stories presented by management.
The importance of persistence and a steady approach is also under
scored by these cases. In these three success stories the parties kept
their eye on realizing both substantive gains and improved relations. In
several cases these results were slow to materialize, but the parties kept
their attention on the long run and did not veer towards escape, unre
strained forcing, or "soft" fostering.
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The ability of the parties to learn was key as they proceeded to
grapple with the many challenges. In all of these cases organizational
learning occurred as crises were addressed and solutions developed
often generating new problems. For example, it took the stakeholders
at Adrian some time to sort out the complex interrelationships between
management initiative, employee ownership, gainsharing, and collec
tive bargaining. Similarly, at DeRidder management first focused on
building employee commitment and ignored the union. Eventually cor
porate management revised its approach arid decided to build positive
union-management relations. The DeRidder mill management joined
in the new corporate policy.
Taken together, the sequence of forcing followed by fostering has
the potential to address the key limitations of strategies that are exclu
sively oriented around one or the other pure strategy. An exclusive
focus on forcing may yield fast change, but the benefits may prove elu
sive due to soured relations, while an exclusive focus on fostering may
improve relations, but may not yield substantive change quickly
enough. Properly sequencing the strategies both tempers the forcing
and creates sufficient change to create a strong economic foundation
for fostering initiatives. The appeal for management of such sequenc
ing should be clear. The sequence is much more problematic for
unions, which face a double loss they may lose the forcing battle, and
then they may also lose again in the fostering period if a program of
employee commitment weakens the union. Thus, the sequenced
approach depends on management's power and skill during both the
forcing and fostering phases. Where labor is strong or the tactical
moves poorly executed, a different combination of forcing and foster
ing may be required which is the focus of the next chapter.
NOTES
1. Signed in 1960 for the West Coast longshoring industry, the Mechanization and Moderniza
tion Agreement established a $5 million productivity fund, wage and employment guarantees and
incentives for early retirement in return for the union giving up work rules that required multiple
people to handle goods, extra workers to be employed and that facilitated containerization facilita
tion (see Kochan 1980, pp. 351 ff for a discussion of this and other early instances of far-reaching
fostering preceded by some degree of forcing).
2. We rely heavily on published and unpublished materials from Casey Ichniowski (1986a,
1986b) for a description of DeRidder change processes and analysis of selected performance
results through 1985. Our own discussions with mill and corporate managers provided us with
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additional details of the period before 1985, as well as with the data to construct our account of
subsequent events. Valuable research assistance was provided by Kathleen Rudd Scharf in the
preparation of this case.
3.Valuable research assistance was provided by Pat McHugh in the preparation of this case.

5
Combined Strategies
The Interweaving of Forcing and Fostering

Negotiation strategies can become quite complex. We have already
seen that travel down the forcing or fostering paths is complicated in
itself and even more complicated when the pathways are traveled in
sequence. Most complex of all, however, is the simultaneous travel
down both forcing and fostering paths or multiple sequences of forcing
and fostering strategies. When skillfully executed, elements of the two
strategies that would normally be at cross purposes instead can lead to
positive synergies.
Two of the cases presented in this chapter, Budd and Packard Elec
tric, feature periods of simultaneous forcing and fostering, followed by
extended fostering periods (each also featuring some distributive con
frontations). The other case, Pensacola, involved a sequence of forcing,
followed by fostering, followed by a combined period involving both
forcing and fostering.
There are no obvious historical parallels for these complex strate
gies. In part, this reflects management's ascendancy in power. In the
past, labor was primarily setting the tone in negotiations, and its strate
gies relied primarily on forcing in combination with periods of arm'slength accommodation. This reflected labor's dual desire for increased
economic gains combined with the stability of equitable and welldefined work rules. Now, with management primarily setting the tone,
complex combinations of forcing and fostering reflect management's
dual desire in many cases for rapid change and for high levels of
worker commitment.
Interestingly, only one of the cases, Pensacola, features a period in
which forcing and fostering were intentionally combined in order to
achieve certain benefits associated with each. This occurred in the con
text of a collective bargaining negotiation that was designed to roll
back certain economic benefits while still sustaining existing fostering
initiatives. In the other two cases, the combined periods reflected
simultaneous but independent management initiatives. Both at Budd
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and at Packard Electric, the combined periods featured forcing around
the relocation of work into lower wage locations that occurred at the
same time that quality of worklife efforts focused on shop-floor
employee involvement were being implemented. Even though these
forcing and fostering initiatives were not tightly coupled, each had
important implications for the other.
The following chart features salient elements of all three cases. The
complexity of these cases is evident in the time frames for forcing, fos
tering, and combined strategies. In all of these cases, the various strate
gies were executed both during the contractual negotiations and (in
between) during contract administration.
Key Aspects of Cases Featuring Concurrent Forcing and Fostering
Background
factors

Locus of
negotiations
Time frame
for forcing
Time frame
for fostering
Time frame
for combined
strategy
Pivotal events
Substantive
outcomes

Relationship
outcomes

Pensacola
Declining market for
primary product; sale
of the mill to a new
owner

Budd
Fierce competition in
industry; new
capacity in southern
nonunion plants

Plant

Company and plant

Packard Electric
Fierce competition in
industry; new
capacity in southern
nonunion plants and
Mexican operations
Company and plant

Contract negotiations Contract negotiations
and administration
Contract
Contract
administration
administration
Contract negotiations Contract negotiations
and administration

Contract negotiations
and administration
Contract negotiations
and administration
Contract negotiations
and administration

Arrival of new owners Massive layoffs in
early 1980s
Work-rule flexibility Wage and benefit
concessions
Team-based work
system
Special issue joint
task forces at national
(health care) and plant
(die transition) levels
Increased worker
Some increase in
commitment
worker commitment
Strong working
Strong working
relationship between relationship between
union and
union and
management
management

Threatened loss of
work to Mexico
Lifetime job secutiry
Multitier wage system
Flexible work
practices
Increased worker
commitment
Strong working
relationship between
union and
management

Combined Strategies

145

As we saw with the three sequential cases, strong substantive and
relationship outcomes occurred in all three of the combined cases. The
relationship gains were particularly strong between management and
the union in these cases, reflecting extensive joint problem solving on
many issues. While the stories also featured increases in worker com
mitment, this was tempered by strong feelings around the concurrent
forcing.

ALTERNATING AND COMBINED EPISODES
OF FORCING AND FOSTERING
Pensacola Mill, 1985-1990
By the end of the 1980s, many companies in the paper industry had
concluded that to stay competitive they must be prepared to bargain
forcefully for substantive changes and also employee commitment and
union cooperation. 1 The efforts of management at the Pensacola mill of
Champion Paper Company over the period 1985 to 1990 provide us
with a rich illustration of this combination of objectives.
Specifically, management at the Pensacola mill forced major
changes during the 1985 contract negotiations. It then developed and
fostered high levels of employee commitment and union-management
cooperation over the next several years. Management returned to the
1988 negotiations, however, with a major wage provision objective it
knew it could not sell by persuasion and would need to force.
Pensacola management forced concessions in contract negotiations
in 1985 (as well as in 1988) without precipitating a strike. In 1985, it
took advantage of the vulnerability labor felt about the future of the
mill and employment at the mill and exploited this power factor to
rewrite the contract in its favor. It was not constrained in 1985 by con
cerns about souring employee or union relations.
In 1988, the situation at Pensacola was different. Management was
in a bind. Corporate management insisted upon the elimination of Sun
day premium pay, a demand strongly resisted by the workforce. But
mill management wanted a contract and a negotiation process that
would not disrupt worker commitment and union-management cooper
ation generated during the preceding three years.
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Accordingly, Pensacola management moderated its demands and its
tactics in an effort to put the best possible face on its position. The fact
that relationships had become more constructive during the preceding
three years helped the parties through this difficult negotiation without
a breakdown in their relationship. While the corporate agenda to elimi
nate premium pay for Sunday throughout all plants required company
negotiations to force this bitter pill on labor, management sweetened
the overall settlement with an unrequested 40IK plan and employed
tactics that were as nonprovocative as possible.

Significant Features
This is a complex case with many dimensions, including the follow
ing:
In the 1985 negotiations, management assessed its business needs
and used the opportunity presented by its new ownership to engage
in fairly aggressive forcing.
During the time period between contracts, management engaged in
an intensive program of education, involving off-site conferences
attended by both management and union officials, visits to a non
union mill, and considerable attention to the reorientation of the
workforce.
During this same period management initiated a series of
fostering tactics that: (1) used sociotechnical system (STS) tech
niques to redesign work; (2) introduced the team concept and other
forms of participation; (3) used pilots where units were ready; (4)
worked on jointness, e.g., a trip to an Ecology of Work conference
where joint union-management teams shared experiences and best
practice; and (5) shared both power and responsibility with work
ers and union leaders, e.g., the creation of a millwide stakeholders'
committee.
Management approached the 1988 contract negotiations with the
necessity of securing some significant changes in contractual lan
guage, especially the elimination of Sunday premium pay, while at
the same time holding the objective of preserving the good work-
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ing relations that had developed during the preceding period of
contract administration.
Management achieved these seemingly incompatible bargaining
objectives by: (1) placing the blame for the elimination of Sunday
premium pay on the corporation; (2) not attempting to justify its
Sunday premium pay demand as reasonable from the union's point
of view; (3) minimizing the influence of the UPIU national bar
gaining council; (4) urging that both sides communicate their posi
tions as widely as possible; (5) agreeing that language about
participation and cooperation be treated as a quid pro quo to assist
internal alignment within the union; and (6) facilitating the elimi
nation of a Sunday premium pay with a 40IK plan.
The initial periods of forcing and fostering in the Pensacola case
parallel the three cases presented in the previous chapter. That is, the
exercise of restraint during the initial forcing period set the stage for
subsequent, far-reaching fostering. Implementing these bargaining
strategies required all of the care and subtlety we noted in our discus
sion of sequential strategies. This case became even more complex,
however, when management was faced with the prospect of having to
seek a controversial give-back after three years of joint fostering.

Background

Although the Pensacola mill was established in the 1940s, it became
a part of Champion through a merger with St. Regis Paper in 1984.
After a long career as St. Regis' most profitable mill, Pensacola had
begun to decline as shifts in the supply and demand for kraft paper
products made them less profitable in the 1970s.
In 1979, St. Regis began a $250 million capital project at Pensacola
whose centerpiece was P5, a huge new kraft machine designed to pro
duce a 350" wide web at the rate of 750 tons of paper per day. In the
ensuing years, management bargained several major human resource
developments related to P5. First, St. Regis managers hand-selected the
new P5 crew from among the crews working on other paper
machines a procedure agreed to by the affected unions only under
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threat of wholesale outside hiring. This episode created an isolated,
elite crew for P5 and angered machine tenders who were not chosen.
Second, St. Regis and the four union locals three from UPIU and
one IBEW signed a memorandum of agreement in 1979 to explore
"team maintenance" for the huge new computerized machine. The par
ties agreed it would require new and more efficient procedures so that
machine operators, for example, would not have to wait for a mainte
nance crew to repair their machine. The union saw an opportunity to
obtain labor rates established elsewhere in the South for multicraft
positions, and management was willing to reverse several years of
resistance to higher rates in exchange for more efficient use of person
nel and of its large capital investment in P5.
Third, the terms of a further subsequent agreement also created
smaller maintenance crews and fewer classifications for the P5
machine. While premium pay for operating extra pieces of equipment
was eliminated, maintenance workers gained a 10 percent wage
increase. Then in 1981 the "crew concept" was negotiated for produc
tion workers in departmental side agreements deliberately discussed
long enough before the 1982 negotiations to insulate it from the con
tentiousness surrounding formal contract negotiations.
Both team maintenance and crew concept experienced unplanned
and uneven implementation, ranging from little to extensive accep
tance in various parts of the mill. At the very least, "crew" and "team"
language was familiar terminology to Pensacola employees by 1981,
as it had permitted managers to streamline certain lines of progression,
albeit with compensating wage rates.
Machine shutdowns and personnel layoffs occurred at an accelerat
ing rate, however, as one pulp mill and three paper machines were shut
down and one paper machine was converted to bleached kraft during
the 1981-1985 period. By 1984, St. Regis' sinking return on invest
ment was attracting unwelcome suitors. After some narrow escapes,
the company agreed in 1984 to be acquired by the "white knight"
Champion, a smaller paper company also invested in related forest
products.
The Pensacola mill was clearly a money-losing proposition in its
1984 condition, a place of silent, outmoded machinery, peeling paint,
and a new, high-tech behemoth reeling out a product whose time
apparently had passed. The P5 was by now a great technical success,
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but a strategic blunder. By the time P5 was running at full capacity, the
market could not absorb its enormous output of a superior grade of
high-strength kraft paper aimed at multiwall bag manufacturers.
Even before the merger was financially complete, officers of the two
corporations began stock-taking and planning efforts with many conse
quences for the mill. Champion already had embarked on a program of
acquisitions and sales that emphasized the growing white paper market
and had all but withdrawn from low-profit kraft manufacturing and
converting operations.
Early in 1985, another of Pensacola's kraft machines and the entire
paper bag plant were closed down. Many at Pensacola had understood
Champion to be a company without interest in kraft operations, and
these shutdowns reinforced that belief. In mid-1985, Champion began
to assemble a team to explore the feasibility of converting P5 to
uncoated white paper. Many engineers and managers came from other
Champion mills, to join this team and to replace other Pensacola mill
personnel.
With the three-year labor agreement (negotiated by the previous
owner, St. Regis, in 1982) due to expire, Champion mill and corporate
management met periodically early in 1985 to analyze the effect of the
existing contract on the staffing flexibility and economies they deemed
necessary to achieve profitable mill operations. The company saw
these negotiations as a unique opportunity to regain control over staff
ing patterns and work rules, capitalizing on local fears regarding the
fate of the entire mill. The final company agenda reflected both local
management's desire for far greater flexibility and control over labor
relations, and a corporate focus on containment of medical care costs,
the elimination of cold (shutdown) holidays, and elimination of a large
accumulation of restrictive work rules and side agreements. The corpo
ration was also prepared to insist on a "zipper clause" explicitly over
turning all previous side agreements and past practices.
In addition to Pensacola's own unique history, general labor rela
tions patterns in the paper industry also conditioned the unfolding pic
ture in the mill. Traditionally, little contact had occurred between
company and unions at the industry or company tiers. There had never
been an industrywide contract, although many companies had followed
the lead of International Paper. And on the union side, the national
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offices of the UPIU had begun to convene councils of representatives
from all of its locals at a particular company.

1985 Negotiations—Hard Bargaining
While the 1985 negotiations, the first under Pensacola's new own
ers, were traditional in both structure and process, the company's pro
posals violated union expectations. Champion was prepared to press
the advantages inherent in the mill's sense of having been snatched
from the jaws of death, whereas the union was still accustomed to
annual wage increases. Management surprised the union committee
with its forty-nine-item agenda, which was longer than any company
agenda in the history either of the Pensacola mill or, for that matter,
Champion. The union agenda was a far shorter and less formalized
"wish list," and this disparity coupled with the general sense that the
corporation had the fate of the mill in its hands permitted the company
team to dominate the negotiations. One company participant recalls:
We knew going in that this was going to be a flabbergasting expe
rience for the union they were frustrated, irritated, and felt we
were taking advantage of them. Correctly, I might add.

The company argued that the substantial investment that would be
needed to return the mill to profitability required significant union con
cessions in return. For its part, the union committee argued that lan
guage such as the management rights clause was unnecessary in view
of a local tradition of accommodative labor relations, that the staffing
flexibility envisioned by management would lead to the very kinds of
abuse that unions and work rules were in place to prevent, and that the
long company agenda represented an attempt to do too much too soon.
As the negotiations progressed, the union negotiators avoided dis
cussion of flexibility language while the company repeatedly insisted
upon discussing the subject. The UPIU International representative
expressed philosophical agreement with flexible staffing and participa
tive management, but opined that some of the Pensacola managers with
whom he had worked would be incapable of adhering either to the
spirit or the letter of the company's new language. The union team con-
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tinued to refuse either to embrace flexible staffing or to propose lan
guage modifications or substitutions. In the face of this resistance, the
company negotiators insisted that flexible staffing language be
included in the proposed contract to be presented to union members so
that it would be voted up or down with the rest of the contract provi
sions.
Finally, in September of 1985, after twenty-seven days of bargain
ing, the union committee "nonrecommended" a contract embodying
nearly all of the company's agenda items, including both economic
concessions and work-rule changes. Not surprisingly, it was rejected
by the locals. The parties returned to the table, a federal mediator was
called in, and further discussions yielded a few minor economic gains
for the union, but no substantive changes in language on flexible staff
ing or in other noneconomic areas. In November, the only slightly
changed contract was recommended by the union committee and rati
fied by the membership.
The atmosphere at the final negotiating session, traditionally reflec
tive of a mutual desire to move from the adversarial posturings of the
bargaining table to the more congenial relationships characteristic of
contract administration, was in this instance clouded by the union
team's sense that the company had taken advantage of the mill's eco
nomic crisis in order to take an unexpected and aggressive step toward
gaining substantial control over labor deployment in the mill. While
company negotiators expected that employees' elation over the large
capital investment that Champion had made at Pensacola would over
shadow negative union reactions to the strategy of forcing change in
contract negotiations, the union team felt that it had been required
without notice to play an old game by new rules. A member of the
company negotiating team recalls:
They felt really used at that time. I can recall the final session that
they had. ... it was a very depressing situation. Typically, final
sessions there's handshakes, congratulations on a job well done.
This one was very tense, cloudy, you could cut the air with a
knife. Union people made comments to me to the effect that we
just raped them. ... It was pretty bitter, that we had in essence
shoved it down their throats.
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Company negotiators had written provision for a joint union-man
agement steering committee into the new contract, but fear of the
potential for vocal opposition in such a forum led managers to exclude
union representatives from early discussions about implementation of
the new agreement.
Meanwhile, in December of 1985, a corporate decision was made to
move the Pensacola mill toward a "participative" or "commitment"
model of management practices, in addition to the other contract
implementation efforts already in motion. Consultants and corporate
officers reasoned that the time had come to move their mills away from
traditional tight supervisory control over hourly workers and their
work and toward a more participative model that would encourage
workers' commitment to productivity, quality, full utilization of work
ers' time and knowledge, and the success of the corporation. Corporate
officials reasoned that Pensacola presented them with an excellent
opportunity to pioneer these changes with the hope that they would
spread to the corporation's other unionized mills.

New Cooperative Initiatives
During 1986, a tension developed between the contract provisions
designed to increase line supervisors' flexibility and control in utilizing
labor resources (later called "Team Concept" or "Operations Efficiency
Language" in some Champion mills) and "Participative Management,"
a management initiative aimed at the gradual development of a com
mitted, involved, and innovative workforce. The contradictions inher
ent in the hard bargaining required to introduce new management
controls, the subsequent unilateral promulgation of the participation
program, and the company's desire to roll these two initiatives into a
single process were quickly perceived by many employees.
There was also some difference of approach to new work systems
and philosophies among unionists. Although the international union's
stance toward such innovations at the time was generally negative, the
International Representative for the region had experienced similar
changes in other paper mills and found himself in philosophical agree-
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ment with many of its features, as long as traditional union-protected
safeguards against managerial abuse were maintained.
Contract implementation efforts were headed by the assistant man
ager of human resources, who had been part of the company negotiat
ing team. This provided some continuity between formal negotiations
and the many informal negotiations entailed in implementing a con
tract with many new provisions.
Management also decided that the new system had to be driven by
line management to be successful, and that Sociotechnical Systems
(STS) analysis introduced to promote participative management could
also be used to implement the goals of team concept in an intelligible
way, particularly in a context of rapid technological change. Several
meetings were held early in 1986 to explain the new contract to super
visors, to enlist the support of line management for fewer rules and
more participation, and to assist department managers in presenting
relevant information to their own departments.
During this period, consensus and integration of interests within the
respective union and management organizations were achieved by
management trips to mills with strong participation programs (includ
ing a new Champion nonunion greenfield mill) as well as by atten
dance by joint union-management teams at a series of labor
management conferences. One conference that brought union officers
from Pensacola and another Champion mill together under company
sponsorship was unprecedented. (Indeed, the company previously had
carefully avoided bringing leaders from different mill locals together
with company personnel.) This conference featured the international
union president, Wayne Glenn, as one of the presenters. The four union
presidents from Pensacola returned to the mill enthusiastic about the
prospects of labor-management cooperation. One local president (who
eventually opposed company efforts to implement new contract lan
guage and cooperative programs) remarked at the time that union-man
agement cooperation sounded good "as long as it wasn't an excuse for
the company to screw the people."
The meeting that most mill managers at Pensacola regard as the start
of the fundamental reorientation was held off-site in March of 1986.
While many leaders in the mill already understood the nature of partic
ipative management because of numerous in-mill explanatory and
planning meetings, this meeting reflected a recognition of the need to
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enlist the support of key managers at all organizational levels. The
gathering convened forty Pensacola managers and supervisors. The
lead corporate negotiator from the 1985 contract round and other per
sonnel from headquarters were invited in recognition of the need for
corporate support for such efforts. Discussions explained the concept
of participative management and attempted to enlist the enthusiasm
and informed support of the mill's managerial corps. Those attending
received reading material contrasting traditional "control" manage
ment with the desired "participative" style, as well as reading and dis
cussing case descriptions of participative programs at other companies.
The attendees were encouraged to keep their discussions centered
on specific plans for the Pensacola mill. At one point, the conferees
broke into department groups to discuss action plans. The two manag
ers from the converting, finishing and shipping, and technical depart
ments immediately saw an opportunity to achieve reorganization along
lines they each had long contemplated. At the same time, other depart
ments favored a more limited application of the new philosophy. The
papermill managers, for example, already in the throes of wholesale
technical change, decided to postpone the initiation of participative
management, although they agreed in principle with the long-term
objectives.
A consultant who was present suggested that some managers might
volunteer their own departments to be "pioneer departments" by rede
signing their departments and encouraging all members to contribute
more of their knowledge and experience. Six departments convert
ing, finishing and shipping, technical, the power house, accounting,
and production control volunteered, and a group was formed to write
a "Pensacola philosophy" consistent with the newly articulated goals
for the mill as a whole. Managers from other departments apparently
decided that they were already overburdened with the enormous tech
nical demands of the conversion. Those present also resolved that the
next major meeting on participative management should include union
officials if the effort was to succeed. In retrospect, the philosophical
demands for wholehearted participation weighed more heavily than the
mill's need for successful leaders, and the "pioneer department" desig
nation merely represented their managers' desire to move ahead with
STS redesigns and other participative mechanisms.
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The need to take a concrete step toward a new union-management
relationship also was addressed. Management and union officials, with
consultants in attendance, met (again off-site) in April of 1986. The
agenda was similar to the off-site management meeting, adjusted to
include a bid for union support. Significantly, the UPIU International
representative spoke in support of participative management. Other
union officials in attendance also expressed support for the plan to
gradually move toward participative management.
The Emergence of New Structures and Process Norms

Once the joint steering committees and department-level redesign
teams were instituted, many aspects of Pensacola's traditional indus
trial relations system formal, bilateral, periodic, power-bargained
contract negotiations followed by informal, bilateral, continuous, more
accommodative mid-contract problem solving no longer seemed
appropriate. The management and joint union-management off-site
meetings had been designed to bridge the traditional gaps between
contract language and daily operations, between formal and informal
negotiations, between industrial relations professionals and line man
agers, between union local committees and managers, and between
corporate and mill managers.
Process norms needed to change as well, and the off-site meetings
modeled these changes. Facilitators urged participants at both meetings
to adopt a problem-solving orientation as they worked on mutual goals
and shared plans.
Of the six departments that had volunteered as pioneer departments,
three were directly involved in the technical changes to the mill associ
ated with the conversion of P5 to white paper. The technical depart
ment was in the throes of gearing up to test the new white paper
processes and products. The finishing and shipping department needed
to be substantially reorganized to deal with new products and to oper
ate new automated equipment, and converting was an entirely new
department whose hourly force had yet to be hired. Mill managers
decided to postpone organizational redesign work in accounting, tech
nical control, and the powerhouse.
In each of the pioneer departments, joint union-management design
teams were formed utilizing the STS approach to redesign work and
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the associated compensation systems. The greatest successes were
achieved where job tasks happened to be discrete, departmental culture
was cohesive and positive, managers and union representatives genu
inely desired a more participative and logical work system, and factors
bearing on task assignment and pay were treated in a timely and sensi
tive manner. In general, outcomes were mixed, however, because of
several factors only visible with hindsight. Team selection processes
were not standardized; some managers exerted excessive control;
hourly workers in some cases floundered in their efforts, and major
sources of anxiety, such as job-skill certification processes, remained
unresolved. Preexisting disputes over jurisdictional and seniority issues
were only magnified by the pressures and scrutiny inherent in the STS
design process.
Many at Pensacola later observed that departments should not have
been allowed to self-select, since unresolved issues in these alreadycontentious departments had thrown the entire participation program
into question early in the implementation. There also was widespread
recognition that enthusiasm and the desire to sell participation had led
managers and facilitators to imply that wages would go up in every
redesigned department, and these high expectations could not be ful
filled.
The focus on STS as the sine qua non of progress toward participa
tion also came to be seen as having limitations. Some departments,
such as technical, adapted well to STS and achieved significant suc
cesses. The P5 crew, with its sense of isolation and elite status, refused
to embrace a process that implied that its efficiency and coordination
were below par.
As the Pensacola plant community moved through the challenges of
1986, events led many local observers to decide that norms about inter
active process had to shift, from continuous mill-level negotiations of
contract implementation issues punctuated by formal contract negotia
tions (dominated by higher-level corporate and union representatives)
toward more continuous negotiations processes, over both implementa
tion issues and desired changes in contract language.
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Negotiating the STS Arrangements

The mid-contract wage adjustments required in the redesigned
departments became the chief arena in which the need for new negoti
ating structures and processes became evident. Finishing and shipping
came up first, and the corporate regional negotiator and his counterpart,
the union International representative, rolled into traditional wage
negotiating routines as a reflex. After many rounds of high demands
and low offers, the parties came within 25 cents of each other for a key
job classification and hit an impasse: department members had come to
expect higher wages as a quid pro quo for acceptance of the uncertain
ties of the new work system, and the corporate negotiator had insisted
on adhering to 1985 contract language that required rates to rise only
when new tasks were added which in this case resulted in a zero
adjustment to the top shipping job, according to the company's analy
sis. The embittered local president took the wage package back to his
membership as a nonrecommended proposal, and it was unanimously
rejected by department members including the design team.
Management demonstrated quick reflexes. Despite contract lan
guage that would have permitted unilateral establishment of new lines
of progression for finishing and shipping, area managers quietly
installed just those changes absolutely required for the upcoming start
up of the rebuilt P5. Managers, both on the human resource and operat
ing sides, also decided to change the format for upcoming wage negoti
ations in the technical department. Talks began with an emphasis on
integrative problem solving, moving into economics only on the sec
ond day. The shop steward in this case was committed to the plan, and
the existing wage schedule was clearly below industry norms. The
UPIU International representative also drew on his experience in other
companies to press for an agreement on composition of a joint certifi
cation group, which met immediately and developed a workable plan
that codified the new work system and posited higher wages.
Later, when the power house area was ready to begin work on its
STS redesign, team members were accorded more time to work, more
technical and facilitator assistance, and periodic meetings with the
regional negotiator to discuss contract-related issues before they
reached the more formal and distributively oriented wage negotiations
table.
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Thus, despite the cooperative gains, the negotiations over change
surfaced many differences within and between the parties. All agreed
that they had underestimated the planning, training, and overall time
their ambitious change agenda would require. The local president
involved in the finishing and shipping imbroglio remained an implaca
ble foe of redesign, joint committees, and participation in any form
despite the International representative's efforts to move ahead. Philo
sophical differences between mill-level and corporate-level human
resource managers, first highlighted by the midterm wage negotiations,
continued to be evident as preparations began for the 1988 negotiations
at Pensacola and other Champion mills.

1988 Contract Negotiations—Mixed Bargaining
The 1988 contract negotiations demonstrated that hard distributive
bargaining continued to be the dominant mode for formal, periodic
contract negotiations, even if it looked inappropriate to many actors for
periodic mid-contract wage negotiations, and to others for any and all
negotiations.
Many company actions during the 1988 negotiations, however,
reflected new attention to preserving the relationship, and new sensitiv
ity to the intraorganizational consensus and ideological issues faced by
union negotiators. Although company negotiators continued to depend
upon the dominant and moderating presence of the UPIU International
representative, they also (as we describe below) took local union poli
tics into account in many of their proposals and reactions.
Pensacola had enjoyed a sense of independent and pioneering spirit
since 1985, but emerging corporate and international union agendas
created a major challenge to the lead negotiators: the human resources
manager and the UPIU International representative. Each saw potential
for a shift away from the absolute sway of hard, distributive bargaining
in the approaching negotiations, but each had reason to be uneasy
about this prospect.
The corporation had declared itself, both in word and deed, commit
ted to eliminating premium pay for scheduled Sunday work. In an ear
lier time, this might have been a difficult issue, but the negotiating
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norms would have been obvious. It would have seemed clearly appro
priate for corporate officers to press for this rollback across the com
pany, and mill-level negotiators would have followed this lead; debate
would have been joined at the formal negotiating table in terms of rela
tive power and quids pro quo.
In 1988, in a context at Pensacola of emerging joint experimenta
tion, union members were infuriated by early corporate statements and
actions about the Sunday premium. Corporate attempts to explain its
position in an integrative bargaining mode by carefully crafted refer
ence to mutual goals, the reasonableness of company negotiators, and
the ostensible lack of an absolute company position caused even
greater anger. Key leaders within both parties, both before and during
the 1988 Pensacola talks, agreed that the Sunday premium was one
issue that would in fact have to be presented and discussed in a fairly
traditional, distributive bargaining spirit.
Corporate labor relations strategists also realized that many milllevel managers, both human resource and operating, perceived a con
tradiction between the new stated methods of participative manage
ment and what they feared was an inflexible corporate commitment to
elimination of the Sunday premium regardless of whether or not
equivalent, alternative reductions in labor costs could be developed by
local union-management groups.
Company negotiators also realized that many earlier statements to
Pensacola employees and their unions could be taken as a promise that
their cooperation with management change efforts would eventually be
rewarded with "a bigger piece of the pie." The paradox for some man
agers was that the efforts to enlist employees' "sense of ownership"
through shared information about company and mill performance had
now borne fruit. As one manager put it:
Everyone knows that things have been going very well in the mill
and in the company. May's production figures were very good.

Other issues affecting intraorganizational consensus were addressed
in novel ways at Pensacola in 1988. Once the parties exchanged agen
das, the union made an unprecedented distribution of both negotiating
agendas to its entire membership. This action surprised company nego
tiators, but the mill human resources manager also had moved quickly
to acquaint foremen and department supervisors with the content of
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both agendas. Several operating managers formed part of the company
negotiating team in an attempt to address intraorganizational consensus
issues critical to successful implementation of new joint ways of man
aging, and to bring technical operating expertise to the table. By corpo
rate policy, the mill manager himself was not a member of the
company committee. The unions also named an unusually large com
mittee.
Talks began in May of 1988. After rapid consideration of "house
keeping" issues such as contract dates, the committees moved to major
noneconomic issues. These discussions can be characterized as a mix
ture, on both sides, of "traditional" distributive and "new" integrative
modes.
Discussions of one set of issues related to filling vacancies indicate
the tenor of the 1988 talks. Under previous contracts, managers were
required to fill vacancies in lines of progression as they occurred, by
calling in off-shift workers in temporary circumstances. As part of the
1985 drive to secure greater management control over labor use, the
company had negotiated the right to use a setup from within a shift to
fill a temporary vacancy. In 1988, the company proposed language that
would permit managers to move people between departments located
above the bottom of their lines of progression. At the same time, the
union proposed reversion to pre-1985 contract language.
Company negotiators argued in favor of their proposal in terms of
operating efficiencies, citing cases where workers known to have spe
cific skills needed in their former departments had to remain in new
assignments, while employees with needed skills were called in with
extra costs and delays to replace absent workers. The UPIU Interna
tional representative replied that "the company has more flexibility
than they know how to use intelligently now," and he and other mem
bers of the union committee cited examples of abuses observed and
grievances filed under post-1985 company vacancy practices.
The parties reached an integrative resolution of their differences.
They agreed to language that allowed for department-specific solutions
to be worked out on their merits rather than attempting to specify a new
set of mill wide rules.
During these early discussions, as both sides tried to sense the tenor
of the relationship, the corporate negotiator was pleased to note a
change from attitudes he had seen during the 1985 negotiations. He
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realized that the trend toward sharing business information, begun
under the 1985 contract, could be a double-edged sword in negotia
tions now that performance was rising rapidly, but he also thought he
could see growing satisfaction in the success of the mill.
Generally people are pleased with the situation here in the mill.
They like being involved, and the mill's making good profits. But
the union is saying, "We've got more knowledge and you should
pay us for that knowledge share the pie with us." But that in
itself is very different from previous years. There's no more talk
of "compensation for this terrible job."

After the end of the first week of negotiations an external event sig
nalled the extent of change at Pensacola. By earlier arrangement, and
despite fears that the negotiations would cause union participants to
renege, a Pensacola union-management group attended an Ecology of
Work conference in Louisville, Kentucky. Three effects could be dis
cerned. Foremost in some minds was the fact that a joint group could
attend a conference during the negotiating season indicating that an
improved relationship was undamaged by the strains of formal negotia
tions. Second, Pensacola managers and unionists alike were able to
gauge their real progress against the struggles recounted by other par
ticipants, and to share the pride felt by members of the converting
department who were told that they should be presenting rather than
just listening to others' achievements. Third, UPIU members from
Pensacola were questioned closely by their union brethren from other
Champion mills, wanting to know how the Pensacola group intended
to react to company demands for an end to the Sunday premium. In this
regard, members of the Pensacola group were reminded of companywide interest in their progress, which extended not only to the efforts
toward participation and commitment for which they had been congrat
ulated, but to the outcome of their pending contract negotiations as
well.
After the conference, negotiations continued in mixed bargaining
style. Management evinced more consciousness of union officers'
needs in achieving intraorganizational consensus by agreeing:
to notify the union before outside contractors performed in-plant
work, in order that union officials would be informed when asked
about unfamiliar workers and vehicles; and

162 Combined S trategies

to postpone discussion of a controversial drug-screening program
until after a labor agreement had been signed.
Company negotiators also took care not to undermine the UPIU Inter
national representative's direction of the union negotiating committee:
These negotiations are pretty much following the standard for
mat, but the approach is different because we're coming to a reso
lution much more quickly than other locations I've negotiated.
Things are tested maybe once, and then we'll get off of it. It's
been pretty traditional. . . . because it is negotiations, and because
[the UPIU International representative's] control would be lost if
things were more participative, and this would not help the com
pany at all.

Company labor strategists took the multitiered nature of labor-man
agement relations into account in other ways. They delayed presenting
their economic proposals until after a scheduled meeting of the UPIU
Champion Council (comprising all Champion mill locals). No one
from Pensacola had planned to attend, and the union committee did not
request that negotiations be postponed. At the same time, the realiza
tion developed that any show of corporate force could threaten a deli
cate local negotiating balance.
Company negotiators dealt with several different compensation
issues within a single new concept: the continuous process allowance.
The Sunday premium originally had been established as an inducement
to workers to abandon the traditional inviolability of Sunday as a day
of rest in order to run the mills seven days a week. Meal allowances
and shift differentials also had been established over time as compen
sation for the demands of continuous process manufacturing.
By 1988, some nonunion paper mills had established "continuous
process allowances" in lieu of the mechanisms described above. Cham
pion proposed to install such an allowance at Pensacola in order to
streamline its compensation system. The company's precise construc
tion of this proposal was intended to do several things at once: avoid
enumerating the pay practices to be replaced and avoid adding the con
tinuous process pay to the regular paycheck to which many other bene
fits were indexed. The union accepted the concept without major
objection, but demanded, in traditional fashion, a far larger hourly
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increment (initially 70 cents per hour compared to management's offer
of 17 cents per hour).
Union spokesmen also persisted in treating participation language as
a rather undesirable company demand, rather than the mutually
embraced declaration of philosophy that company negotiators hoped to
achieve. As economic proposals appeared on the table, the union com
mittee reiterated its opening position: Pensacola workers had taken
wage cuts and had ceded areas of job control in order to save the mill in
1985, and now the mill was profitable. Not only was it time to restore
wages, in the union view, but those wages had already been promised
in exchange for cooperation with both a corporate and plant change
agenda of participation and union-management cooperation.
Negotiators on both sides proceeded to move between distributive
and integrative modes in new ways, especially in recognition of their
opponents' intraorganizational political needs and in view of the evolu
tionary nature of the changes underway, and they tacitly evolved guide
lines to assign issues to appropriate negotiating processes: integrative
bargaining for participative and cooperative programs and distributive
bargaining for wages, work rules, and other work-related policies.
However, the distinction broke down somewhat when the union contin
ued to insist that management itself had linked participatory programs
with financial rewards and was trying to separate the two. Toward the
end of negotiations, when the union announced that it did intend to
propose participation language, it insisted that agreement in this area
be linked to company movement on other issues, although by this time
it was not specifying which issues these might be.
As the parties tackled the sensitive issue of Sunday premium pay,
the process came close to reverting to the very traditional adversarial
mode. The chief corporate negotiator had made the company's ada
mant position clear in his opening remarks, but once he commenced
negotiating the status of Sunday premium pay, he unfurled the com
pany's major argument that the economic context of the paper indus
try and competitor companies' reactions to that context had resulted in
a trend toward elimination of Sunday and other premium pay. He
argued that Pensacola had to follow the pattern, and he buttressed his
arguments carefully with a host of statistics, as if he were relying upon
persuading the union committee of the merits of the company's posi
tion.
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Union reaction to this presentation reflected the perils of transitional
relationships and processes. As the mill human resource manager
recalled later:
As the week wore on, the more we talked about justifications for
the Sunday premium, the madder the guys got.

The UPIU International representative charged that the company was
disingenuous in using other paper companies' actions as a justification
for its own, in view of the fact that the company had accepted compro
mise arrangements in earlier negotiations at several other mills. It was
also becoming clear that the union negotiators saw political advantages
in being forced to accede to an unpopular and symbolically controver
sial change. The Sunday premium had become an explosive issue
among some Pensacola workers, and UPIU locals at other Champion
mills anxiously awaited results at Pensacola as they prepared for their
own negotiations in 1989. In this arena, an overt forcing strategy might
work more to the advantage of both parties than would the difficult
realignments and intraorganizational negotiations required to achieve
the result by any other process. In fact, the corporate negotiator finally
said, during a late session, "Let's not try to justify it, let's just work out
ways to deal with it." The International representative, for his part,
informed the company that the union had no intention of "just giving
up" on the Sunday premium, and issued a barely veiled threat: He
would hate to have the hard work it had taken to maintain this relation
ship wasted, only to deteriorate into implemented contracts and lock
outs.
At the same time, leaders of both committees acknowledged
changed expectations for negotiations. They no longer saw formal con
tract and informal mid-contract negotiations as different species. The
international representative said later: "The point was not just getting a
contract, it was getting a contract and maintaining a relationship."
A management observer pointed to the disposition of one union
agenda item as an illustration of a new approach. The union had pro
posed one day at a time (ODAAT) use of vacation time, which manage
ment resisted on grounds of administrative difficulties with scheduling.
The union finally proposed a side agreement which would permit a
one-year experiment with ODAAT vacations and an assessment of its
performance after one year. The company committee accepted the
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union proposal, at once as a reasonable compromise and as a way of
reinforcing the union's problem-solving approach that led to integrative language sensitive to both union and management concerns.
The union's participation language, finally placed on the table dur
ing the last week of negotiations, delighted company proponents of
union-management cooperation. The proposal's significant clauses
were: a strongly worded endorsement of the importance to the mill of
commitment and participation; a call for the creation of a joint steering
committee to oversee all participation programs; a requirement for
union approval of all design committees' final proposals; protection of
seniority during every design process; protection of existing grievance
and discipline practices; no loss of employment or pay through the
actions of participatory teams; and the union's right to terminate the
memorandum on 60 days' notice without penalty.
Mill managers were willing to press the parent corporation for the
employment and wage guarantees and argued only mildly against the
union's request that the language be framed in a Memorandum of
Agreement, preferring to have the principles included in the new con
tract. The company argued successfully for exclusion of the union's
seniority language, and the parties agreed to jointly written language
recognizing the inevitability of change.
Many final economic proposals were negotiated in traditional fash
ion, with offer and counteroffer accompanied by many feints and
threats. The International representative reminded company negotia
tors that package rejection would lead to a strike vote, which was only
a reiteration of UPIU bylaws. The company negotiator declared that a
strike vote would not affect the finality of the company's offered pack
age, also a traditional remark. The union finally did accept a buyout of
the Sunday premium, which consisted of a new continuous process
allowance and lump-sum cash payments. The Sunday premium was,
however, to be phased out with time and one-half pay for the first con
tract year (in addition to the buyout) and straight time thereafter. There
were general increases over the second and third years of the contract,
and increases in many benefits.
At the end of the following week, 80 percent of the members of the
four UPIU and IBEW locals approved and ratified the contract signed
by their committee. The contract signing ceremony was a businesslike
affair, neither the bitter, defeated event of 1985 for unionists nor a
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hearty celebration of a renewed relationship. The UPIU International
representative took the opportunity to denigrate the financial settlement
in view of company profit levels, and to warn his members against tak
ing consultants' and facilitators' rosy promises too seriously.
Over the next several years, management continued to make head
way by negotiating employee commitment and union-management
cooperation. Participation continued to broaden in scope and deepen its
penetration into the management of operations. Union officials gener
ally became more trusting of participation, in particular and mill man
agement's intentions in general. The union officials who were
entrenched in their opposition to participation activities became less
active and more neutral in their positions. Performance of the mill con
tinued to improve in ways that drew high praise from corporate execu
tives.

Outcomes
By 1994, the substantive and relationship outcomes at Pensacola
had been highly favorable. Perhaps the most significant outcome was a
shift in the frames of reference of the parties.
Prior to the 1985 contract negotiations, both parties took their stable,
accommodative relationship for granted. However, the erosion of the
profitability of the mill's kraft paper products and the sale of the mill to
Champion were critical events that portended major changes. Manage
ment indeed entered the 1985 negotiations with a new frame that
competitive conditions called for major substantive changes in terms of
employment and would require a forcing strategy. The size of manage
ment's demands shocked the union negotiators. The union, for its part,
did not see the need for the particular changes, but eventually accepted
the power realities that enabled management to have its way. As a
result, the accommodative relationship was soured.
In effect, management exploited their new-owner status and fol
lowed a forcing strategy that was significant in several respects: (1)
controls over costs and labor deployment were negotiated (via hard
bargaining) before constructive labor-management relationships had
been established, and (2) all four union locals were established as sig-
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natories to a contract whose provisions became integral to subsequent
fostering efforts. As a result, even overtly antiparticipation union offi
cials became engaged in participatory processes as a part of their inter
est in effective contract administration.
The mindset that evolved for labor during the years between the
1985 and 1988 contract negotiations included an expectation that the
gains from commitment and cooperation would be distributed equita
bly between labor and the company. This change in frame toward a
more participative workplace counted on the cumulative effect of
many activities, including the joint off-site meeting and the STSrelated changes in the plant.
Management's choice of STS as the heart of its change processes
made the company's simultaneous embrace of management-won flexi
bility and employee involvement intelligible: department groups would
use the STS approach to participate in their departments' implementa
tion of hard-bargained contractual changes, and they might benefit
financially from that participation as well. For Pensacola, in the throes
of complex technological change during much of the 1980s, STS also
had the potential not always realized for engaging union members
in their changing worklives in a proactive way.
Pensacola's story also demonstrates the myriad dilemmas and diffi
culties posed by the need for continuous, multilevel, negotiations. The
process in the finishing and shipping departments, for example, ran
aground on inadequate integrative bargaining and incomplete attention
to intraorganizational consensus between design teams and the rest
of their department, and between local leadership (on both sides) and
corporate negotiators.
Then, in 1988, when management adhered to the corporate multimill bargaining agenda to take away Sunday premium pay as such,
union officials felt compelled to revise their approach toward a more
"realistic" notion of their relationship. Labor as well as mill manag
ers were forced to recognize that both sides would not only cooperate
to increase the size of the pie, but that each would compete to get
favorable shares for their own constituents.
Other lessons emerge from the experience of the 1988 negotiations.
Some issues were decided in small problem-solving groups, and man
agement in particular attempted to positively influence union commit
tee members through unprecedented information sharing. Although
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some management strategists had come to value consensus-seeking
over power bargaining, it became clear that the intraorganizational
consensus needs of elected union counterparts were sometimes best
served by hard distributive bargaining. Specifically, the Sunday
premium issue demonstrated the difficulties inherent in maintaining
the pretense of integrative bargaining over an issue on which the par
ties' interests as well as positions were fundamentally different, and on
which one or both teams were at risk politically.

Lessons Learned
In most respects, the Pensacola story appears to be an exemplar.
Despite some similarities with the Bidwell situation (new ownership
arrangements, use of outside consultants, and implementation of
QWL-type programs), the results at Pensacola far exceeded the aborted
change efforts at Bidwell.
In retrospect, it is clear that the parties would not have been able to
agree on fundamental changes in the contract in 1985 via a fostering
strategy. Management needed to employ the power inherent in its "new
arrival" and the urgency inherent in forcing to secure changes neces
sary to justify its investment. In fact, it is interesting that the company
did not make its purchase of the mill contingent on a revision of the
contract, but elected to tackle this subject at the first negotiations after
arriving on the scene. This willingness to work things out in the course
of normal collective bargaining and to do so with key officials at the
local level created a positive backdrop to the hard distributive bargain
ing that was necessary.
The question should be asked whether the local unions at Pensacola
could have responded differently. They found themselves managing
many dilemmas. Similar to the DeRidder situation, management at
Pensacola moved aggressively to involve rank-and-file workers in a
series of activities aimed at increasing commitment and motivation.
But the unions at Pensacola were not held at arm's length indeed they
were afforded many opportunities to become co-sponsors of these pro
grams. Local union leadership adopted, for the most part, a stance of
supporting joint programs, but also bargained vigorously on behalf of
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member interests short of taking strike action. As a result, they were
able to share some of the credit with management for improvements
associated with the work redesign. Equally, management indicated the
important role of the union in its efforts to temper the impact of forcing
during the 1988 round of collective bargaining.
In all, the Pensacola case points out the complex mix of negotiations
associated with fundamental changes in a labor-management relation
ship. The parties' success reflects not only action taken, but also criti
cal choices that prevented escalating conflict early on and that avoided
a collapse in relations during hard bargaining after a period of foster
ing.

INTERWEAVING FORCING AND FOSTERING STRATEGIES
The Budd Company, the UAW, and the CAW
Over the past decade, labor-management relations between Budd
and the UAW have moved toward social contracts based on worker
commitment and union-management cooperation. 2 This case highlights
plant-level forcing and fostering initiatives primarily in Budd's
Detroit, Michigan plant, as well as tracing key developments between
the international union and the corporation.
Specifically, in the early and mid-1980s, Budd engaged in forcing,
as was the pattern for many auto supply firms. As a result, it received a
number of important economic concessions. As a backdrop for the con
cessionary pressure, the company had engaged in massive layoffs dur
ing the early 1980s sometimes linking concessionary demands and
threatened movement of work. Concurrently, Budd had initiated an
employee involvement (El) program modeled on initiatives begun at its
automotive customers. This focused on shop-floor participation in
decision making on issues of safety, work organization, and other mat
ters. Unlike many of its competitors, however, Budd did not seek to
escape from union representation on any large scale even though the
company did open a new nonunion facility in the late 1980s. The UAW
worked closely with Budd management at plant and corporate levels,
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but an element of caution was always present, given the history of con
cessions and concerns over the nonunion facility.
At the level of national negotiations, the company attempted in
1987, to achieve concessions and mutually beneficial innovations by
opening contract talks early and engaging in extensive communica
tions. The first attempt failed, but a second attempt succeeded, and the
parties signed a four-year agreement that set in motion a relationship
characterized by quarterly meetings and continuous attention to com
mon problems.

Significant Features
At the plant level, the Budd case illustrates several important dimen
sions:
A long list of company demands departed from past practice and
presented a "procedural" challenge to the union apart from their
content.
Union leaders who were persuaded of the company's need for con
cessions were rebuffed by members who were not persuaded. Sub
sequently, both management and union adjusted their tactics and
embarked on a major communication effort prior to a subsequent
round of negotiations.
The negotiation of a hit-to-hit agreement for die transition teams at
the Detroit plant involved a shift of negotiating power from indus
trial relations to manufacturing management.
The juxtaposition of forcing (around the movement of work and
layoffs) with fostering (around employee involvement and labormanagement committees) helped to establish the importance of
both the employee involvement and joint labor-management initia
tives, and probably prevented even greater job losses.
At the national level, additional important dimensions include:
Customers (especially the Big Three automakers) made demands
on auto parts suppliers that the UAW found more credible than
when the demands had originated solely with management.
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The parties created a quarterly forum to deal with "quality issues"
that subsequently was used for potentially contentious issues
providing, in effect, a vehicle for continuous bargaining.
Continued tensions were observable around the union's role in new
production facilities located in "right-to-work" states.
The Budd case, then, is in many ways typical of mid-size firms fac
ing considerable competitive pressures and saddled with histories of
adversarial relations. While the parties at Budd generated many impor
tant joint innovations, they also experienced numerous difficult con
frontations in which the outcomes were not always mutually beneficial.
Ultimately, a complex mix of negotiations was required for the parties
to make the substantial progress that they experienced in transforming
their relationship.

Background
The Budd Company, a large independent auto supplier, was founded
in 1912 by Edward G. Budd. The company has expanded steadily, with
a worldwide workforce of 14,000 and sales of $1.3 billion as of the
early 1990s. Budd was organized into three main divisions: stamping
and frame; wheel and brake; and plastics. The majority of production
operations were located in Michigan and Ohio, but the company also
had facilities in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, California, and Kentucky, as
well as in Canada, Argentina, and Germany. The company was owned
by the German conglomerate Thyssen AG at the time this case was
written.
The UAW first organized workers at the Budd Company in the
1940s, and the majority of Budd manufacturing facilities remained
unionized. In Canada, the Canadian Automobile Workers Union
(CAW) represents Budd workers. Historically, labor relations have fol
lowed the pattern set by the UAW with the original equipment manu
facturers (OEMs), including arm's length collective bargaining, high
levels of wages and benefits, and very formal and adversarial contract
administration.
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Early Forcing and Fostering Initiatives at the Plant Level
The decade of the 1980s began with massive layoffs throughout the
Budd Company. The Detroit plant was among the hardest hit, with
union membership declining from 2,800 to 1,200 between 1979 and
1982. In this turbulent climate, the social contract between labor and
management surfaced as a topic of negotiations.
Initial Concession Bargaining

Before the largest of the layoffs, which occurred in 1981, the com
pany pressed for concessions. Many union leaders were persuaded that
adjustments were needed and agreed to a mid-contract reopener. An
agreement was reached, which involved significant wage and benefit
concessions. This was presented to the membership, with the stated
alternative being the loss of the plant's wheel and drum business,
accounting for over half of the plant's workforce.
Although local union president, Norm Tunessi, recommended ratifi
cation, the membership was not convinced of the need for change. A 95
percent vote against the agreement devastated local union leaders, who
had been persuaded that the company's situation was indeed serious.
Following the rejection, jobs were indeed shifted out of the Detroit
plant, resulting in a layoff of an additional 900 employees. As one
union leader commented on the membership's vote against the conces
sions:
We had a ferocious membership meeting. Talk about being scared,
we had to be escorted out of the meeting ... They (the member
ship) never believed it until the machines were disassembled.

This early forcing (with limited fostering) ended up costly to both
sides. The union and the membership suffered the loss of jobs, while
the company incurred the costs associated with shutting down nearly
100,000 square feet of plant capacity.
The experience, which had parallels in other Budd facilities, illus
trates the limiting effects of each side's frame of reference. Manage
ment assumed that its statements of the need for deep changes would
be taken seriously since, from its perspective, the need was self-evi
dent. For many in the union membership, however, there was no prior
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experience to suggest that management's statements were anything
more than stronger versions of past rhetoric.
Following the layoffs, an increased willingness by union members
to make informal accommodations was evidenced. As the local presi
dent recalls:
We had 2,800 people in 1979, and 1,600 got laid off by 1981. One
of the biggest problems was with the job classifications. Jobs were
merged, and it became a problem for the bargaining committee....
We had to modify classifications, not by contract but by the bar
gaining committee and labor relations on a daily basis. You didn't
know if the plant was going to survive, so the union was willing to
move.

Employee Involvement and Statistical Process Control
as Customer-Driven Changes

Beginning in 1982, the company and local unions in most Budd
facilities agreed to establish employee involvement (El) programs and
statistical process control (SPC) programs. Both initiatives were dic
tated by the firm's customers, but in different ways. The adoption of
the El program was an example of the connection across companies in
the auto industry; GM and Ford had pioneered quality of worklife
(QWL) and El programs, respectively, and Budd joined many other
auto suppliers in adopting similar language in its collective bargaining
agreements. In contrast, SPC represented one of the first domains
where the OEMs insisted that their suppliers implement new work
practices.
The structure of the El and SPC efforts at Budd were patterned after
the respective programs at Ford and GM. Union appointees and man
agement designees served as staff coordinators. Also, the entire El pro
cess was administered by a joint committee that made decisions on a
consensus basis a key shift in the norms of interaction. 3
The most challenging negotiations associated with El and SPC
efforts, however, took place at the individual level. These involved
negotiations over workers' voluntary participation and commitment to
the new initiatives. As such, bargaining occurred between supervisors
and employees, between QWL or SPC coordinators and employees,
and among groups of workers. By the mid-1980s, the El effort had
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expanded to include approximately one-quarter of the workforce in the
Detroit plant, but very few other workers were interested in the pro
cess. This plateau in the number of volunteers occurred in other Budd
locations and was typical of many El initiatives (Cutcher-Gershenfeld,
Kochan, andVerma 1991).
Many comfort and hygiene concerns of the workers were addressed
via the El process, along with some redesign of equipment and work
operations aimed at greater efficiency. For example, an El team
improved quality and safety by developing a custom piece of sheet
metal feeding equipment, dubbed the "Goesinta," since it takes metal
from one press and helps as it "goes into" another. The SPC efforts also
contributed to improved product quality. However, management was
convinced that these joint efforts alone would not be sufficient to meet
the competitive challenges in the auto supply sector where customers
had begun to pressure suppliers for annual price cuts of 1 to 3 percent.
For some union members and leaders, despite the history of layoffs
and lost business, there was still considerable skepticism about the
need for fundamental changes. For example, during the mid-1980s, the
Budd Detroit plant was working high levels of overtime. As one union
leader noted:
It's hard to get the membership thinking long term, especially
when the people are working all the overtime they want, actually
more than they want to. It is hard to convince them their jobs are
in jeopardy.

There were also institutional-level pressures on the union. For
example, in the Detroit plant, the company repeatedly indicated its
desire to cut back on the number of full-time paid union positions
(which had remained constant despite reductions in the size of the
workforce). Finally, here as in other locations, there were tensions
regarding the ability of union leaders to engage in new forms of dia
logue with management while still being seen as independent from
management (Cutcher-Gershenfeld, McKersie, and Weaver 1988).
This role conflict experienced in the union was vividly illustrated by
deliberations over the shape of the table in a special meeting room used
by the union bargaining committee. The bargaining committee rejected
a square table as lending itself to competing sides, but also rejected a
round table as "going too far." The result was an oblong table with one
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end squared for the union and management co-chairs of the joint
effort illustrative of the parties's cautious commitment to a new
social contract around commitment and cooperation.
Negotiating Flexibility and Autonomy in Detroit
In 1987, local negotiations began early at the Detroit facility paral
leling early national negotiations (which are discussed below). The
negotiations focused on a key aspect of economic performance in the
stamping plant the time required to change dies. This was a process
by which large metal dies (some weighing as much as 50 tons) were
removed from presses at the end of a production run and replaced with
new dies for stamping a different part. Addressing the issue posed a
dilemma, since it was not clear that a solution could be found via tradi
tional collective bargaining.
The focus of the discussions centered on the establishment of a hitto-hit, labor-management committee that would provide oversight to
autonomous teams of approximately twenty craft employees responsi
ble for changing dies. The goal for the die transition teams was to
reduce the time between the last good stamping or "hit" in one produc
tion run and the first good "hit" in the next run.
In all, the local negotiations lasted about four months, with most of
the time spent in discussions about the function of the hit-to-hit com
mittee. Eventually the parties agreed to draft a letter of agreement that,
in the words of the plant manager, required a new approach.
We tried to do it the old way, but it didn't work. It could not be
developed in traditional bargaining language. Thus, we got rid of
the "mays," which has always been interpreted as something I
don't have to do and the "snails," which is something that I must
do.
Yet drafting the letter proved difficult. The task initially fell on the
plant's industrial relations department, but as the director of industrial
relations commented:
The die transition letter was important. We really struggled with
that and modified our proposal three or four times. They didn't
like it. We told them "You do it! If you don't like it then you write
one up." ... It was surprising, they came back with an almost per
fect letter.
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A UAW International representative recalled that the union was able to
draft the letter on the basis of experiences in other locations:
We put together language that was out of the norm for us. They
acted like they won a million bucks. They called a caucus right
away. We had a smooth flow after that point.

Critical to reaching agreement was a shift that occurred within the
management team. It was the production manager (rather than the
industrial relations manager) who took the lead. One union official
characterized the role of local staff and line management in the bar
gaining as follows:
In the local negotiations it was clear that local company IR guys
were not running the show. The production manager had more
clout than the local IR people. In the past there would be labor
relations people and no one else in the room. Production people
put positions across. This is still ongoing.

This tighter integration of line management into collective bargaining
suggested some new requirements were being addressed for managing
internal differences in the context of integrative negotiations.
Continued Complexities in the Management
of Internal Differences

The split between line and staff management that emerged in collec
tive bargaining continued during the administration of the new contract
language, with line management taking an activist role in the adminis
tration of the hit-to-hit committee. As one line manager commented:
Certain groups are excluded from hit-to-hit. You are better off
without their [industrial relations] involvement. It eliminates faceto-face discussions because for some groups it is best not to com
municate. All people have labels in the company. IR does not do
well in certain situations. A group will assume the personality of
the individuals. When it gets down to the nitty-gritty, the key is
partnership. The relationship has been building. The union has
trust in [production management].
We make sure that all the parties play by the initial rules cre
ated by the union and company in negotiations. We rule on partic
ular areas. I guess it has taken over the traditional unionmanagement role. During the meetings there are a lot of discus-
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sions and negotiation. It's not really negotiations, it's mostly dis
cussions. IR has no authority for hit-to-hit. What do you really
need a labor relations department for in this setting?

The local union president echoed the manager's comments:
When I'm in the plant, sometimes I go through the right channels
and sometimes I go directly to managers. I know my job is to go
through IR managers and not to the floor, but I have an advantage
having worked with most of the people before.

In a conversation with the production manager, these relations were
confirmed:
I communicate with the union all of the time. I go with Herb (the
local union president) to seminars and the union presidents in all
three plants go to high-level quality and hit-to-hit meetings. It is
difficult to get the okay for them to go. Vice-presidents and presi
dents don't understand why you would want to bring the union. I
get them involved in everything I do...I don't ignore IR, but I look
to do the job myself.

The forging of stronger links between line management and union
leadership implicitly established a new norm regarding interactions,
namely, solutions were driven more by functional needs than by formal
protocols. Thus, when a bargaining issue related to production opera
tions, line management pushed to take the lead in addressing the issue.
In practice, the die transition teams were a dramatic success. Instead
of the traditional linear sequence of trades handling the removal, instal
lation, and setting of dies, a cross-skilled team of about a dozen indi
viduals descended on a production line, and an almost choreographed
process followed. The bottom line result was a reduction in downtime
by over 50 percent.
The broad implications of expanded interactions between line man
agement and the union were severalfold. On the one hand, the organi
zation was able to perform more effectively, since decision making
increasingly involved key stakeholders. On the other hand, bargaining
was multichanneled, which meant that there were increased opportuni
ties for destabilization via "end runs." As well, certain roles had the
potential for becoming rigid and isolated in problematic ways. For
example, the industrial relations function had come to be defined more
narrowly around bargaining over wage and benefit issues and the pro-
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cessing of formal grievances and discipline all of which were issues
that tended to be distributive. Thus, not only was management speak
ing with more than one voice, but the industrial relations function
became constrained in its ability to generate joint gains with the union.
The new linkages also raised complex political pressures within the
union. Like the splits within management, internal union tensions
emerged around the role of staff appointees in programs such as El and
SPC and members serving on die transition teams. The threat posed by
the El, SPC, and die transition team programs lay in their creating
channels of communications between management and labor that were
separate from the grievance procedure and outside the formal manage
ment hierarchy. The very success of these initiatives depended on the
new channels successfully tackling meaningful issues, yet the potential
for success made them threatening to others in the union.

Shifting Patterns of Interaction at the Level
of the Corporation and the International Union
While issues stemming from manufacturing operations were being
more directly integrated into plant-level negotiations, a broader set of
economic issues were being integrated into the national negotiations
between the Budd Company and the UAW. The process began early in
1987, when Budd was pressured by customers who knew that the col
lective bargaining agreement was scheduled to expire. As one execu
tive noted: "The customers became antsy and wanted a buildup of
inventory." This buildup would have set in motion the traditional cycle
whereby inventory is expanded before bargaining, making it possible
for the company to contemplate taking a strike or ensuring layoffs if an
agreement was reached on schedule. Either way, there would be sub
stantial costs for both sides.
In order to avoid the inventory dilemma, Budd approached the union
regarding early negotiations indicating that an early agreement that
avoided an inventory buildup might be sweetened with some of the
resulting cost savings. This inducement to depart from arm's-length
bargaining helped provide the union with an incentive and internal
legitimacy for beginning discussions early. The union leadership was
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also persuaded that the competitive pressures were real. As a local
UAW president commented:
In March, 1987, the company notified us of a desire to negotiate
early in order to be able to bid better on new work with better cost
estimation.... We were told that this would help get the company
into a more competitive position. The window would be open now
on bids. We were persuaded that this was a legitimate situation.

As another local union official commented:
In fact, part of what drove us to the table early was the fear of
what would happen if Philadelphia lost 40 percent of their work
that's a lot of work. We have the same problem in Detroit. It's all
vehicle-specific work. If that's pulled with a new model, we are in
trouble. We don't want Budd to lose customers. Time forces you
to do different things.

However, in reflecting on the experience, union leaders also expressed
some caution. As one senior UAW official commented:
We had ongoing discussion to make Budd more ... I don't want to
use the word "competitive," but there were competitive issues, and
as a result, we were willing to look into the contract.

While the request was legitimate, framing the effort solely in competi
tive terms was uncomfortable for some union leaders.
Management Takes the Initiative

The bargaining process that followed was directly contrary to the
established practice where the union made most of the opening
demands in bargaining. Here, the company advanced a set of concrete
proposals designed to improve the company's competitive posture. The
shift was difficult for union leaders. One regional official in the UAW
described the 1987-1988 UAW-Budd national negotiations as follows:
In the fall we started with local negotiations, which we couldn't
resolve, then went to national negotiations. This was not tradi
tional negotiations. The whole process was different. I was
shocked by their demands. . . . They came out demanding and I
don't like bargaining this way. It was "this or else," with the
demise of a couple of plants as a possibility held over our heads.
We got to the point of no return. I told them to bag their ass.
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In local negotiations, there was also a reversal of traditional patterns.
As a personnel official in one of the Budd plants recalled:
The local agreement was very different from what I'd seen before.
We had eighteen items on the table and the union had only one.

The decision by management to come to the bargaining table early,
with its own demands, clearly represented a pivotal event. Manage
ment's approach created a real dilemma for the union leadership. If the
union engaged in negotiating the issues that management had initiated,
it would be acknowledging the legitimacy of management taking simi
lar initiatives in the future i.e., establishing a new norm. If the union
refused to work on the new issues, then the existing norms would be
reinforced, but a deterioration in the relationship would most likely
result.
Thus, the challenge was first whether to bargain early and then how
to do so. The parties met the first challenge, but had difficulties with
the second. As one local union leader commented on these negotia
tions:
We need a capacity to communicate in a different way. You don't
know if they are reading your signals and we aren't sure what they
say. The union is reactionary, and it depends on what the company
does.

The formal negotiations began in the fall. Although talks continued
for three months, the union broke off bargaining in mid-December
1987. Even with the incentive of sharing the gains derived from not
building inventory and the recognition of legitimate competitive pres
sures, the union was uncomfortable with the discussions especially
with the implied departure from an adversarial bargaining process. In
retrospect, it is clear that the parties were attempting to make two
potentially contradictory shifts in their pattern of interactions. First was
the attempt to shift to a more integrated mode of interaction around
what were acknowledged to be competitive pressures. Second, man
agement's very efforts to enlarge the bargaining agenda carried distrib
utive overtones. These complexities and dilemmas accounted for the
union's withdrawal from early negotiations.
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Information Sharing and New Norms of Interaction

Following the holidays, the company began a campaign to educate
the union leadership and the workforce on the economic pressures it
was facing. The information sharing was designed not just to shape
union leader attitudes, but, based on the experiences of the early 1980s,
the company started to educate the union membership directly. One
senior executive described the process as follows:
The communication process is the key element. One of our jobs is
to meet the expectations of not only the UAW but also, for lack of
a better word, the lowest member of the organization. We must
communicate to individual workers, not just to Solidarity House.
Our workers can't expect to get what Ford (workers) get and we
have to communicate this.

As one union leader commented, the communications after the col
lapse of the first round of early negotiations represented a significant
break from traditional practice:
I was a bit surprised by the early negotiations, but more surprised
by the company presentations. Roth and Harper [corporate and
division executives] met with the hourly workers and let them
know what was going on with the company. They were being hon
est and that was different.

A labor relations official in the Detroit plant also discussed these meet
ings:
Roth met with groups of about 100 employees in Detroit and
Philly. He talked to them face-to-face about the potential loss of
business for the Lincoln and Econoline models. Something hap
pened here, I saw a reaction and many scared people.

Another labor relations official noted that it was not just the infor
mation sharing, per se, but the fact that it was presented in a noncoercive way:
Jim Roth's talks helped considerably. They (the workers) were
getting the company message and it wasn't filtered. There was a
better feeling of trust in this negotiation because we gave them the
facts. It would not have worked if we had just held out the ham
mer.
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In all, the communications process included the following elements:
(1) initial management meetings with the union bargaining committee;
(2) plant meetings where the division president spoke to all employees;
(3) a shift in the content of the plant newsletter toward more businessoriented stories (and away from bowling scores); (4) Budd Bulletins
issued at corporate level with further economic information; (5) UAW
vice-president, Odessa Komer, spoke to management, helping to
increase understanding regarding the UAW's interests; (6) state-of-theplant meetings, and (7) additional meetings with high-level Budd labor
relations staff and UAW-Budd department officers. One UAW Interna
tional official concluded that:
These were the most updated long-run forecasts that the company
has ever given us. Everybody's eyes were wide open going in. It's
not like they said "trust me." When the top guy in stamping comes
in and says "I'm not going to bullshit you," we knew what he was
going to say. It was a sellable approach.

The emphasis on education signaled a different tone from manage
ment, and brought the union back to the bargaining table. As one union
leader on the national negotiations team commented:
After Christmas, we started on national negotiations again. They
were not as demanding.... Some of the locals, like Philly, moved
to consider work practices.

In fact, the simultaneous local discussions (which were discussed in
more detail earlier) also set these negotiations apart. One local UAW
president stated:
These were much different than in 1984. . . . This time there was
no clear distinction between the national and local. It was a bundle
of issues and one set of negotiations.

Elements of a New Contract

The parties settled in early 1988, over six months prior to the sched
uled contract expiration. A key element of the agreement, beyond the
early settlement, was the four-year term. As one union official
explained:
We went with a four-year agreement rather than three years
because Budd has the ability to say we have a long-term contract.

Combined Strategies

183

Their ability to go in the market and bid for work is improved. A
lot of their work was turning over. Work was especially being
pulled out of Philly.

In fact, subsequent to the settlement, Budd was able to procure a longterm contract for business with Ford. Still, extending the length of the
agreement raised a concern regarding bargaining issues that might
arise during the term of the agreement. In response, the parties put in
place a formal structure for quarterly meetings of the principals from
both bargaining teams a significant departure from the approach then
extant among the major auto manufactures.
In other respects the parties also departed from the pattern of the
OEMs. In fact, given that the settlement was early, only Ford had
reached an agreement at that point, so the terms of all OEM settle
ments were not available for comparison (which would usually be the
case). In the agreement, the union won wage increases but the incre
ments for the second, third, and fourth years of the agreement were to
be paid as lump sums (that would not be added to base wages). Also,
while a holiday was added in the third year, there was a diversion of
cost-of-living adjustment benefits and below-pattern settlements were
reached on certain retiree benefits (reflecting the cost implications for a
company with more retirees than active workers). These economic fea
tures of the settlement were designed to provide value to the member
ship while also enhancing the company's ability to bid on new
business. The process also tightened the link between local and inter
national negotiations. As one participant observed:
For the first time, all local agreements were settled on the same
day as the master agreement. Locals were present at the national
table. We shortened the process.

One insight into the workers' perception of the 1987 Budd/UAW
collective bargaining agreement can be seen in the ratification vote,
which was 82 percent (even though the wage settlement was less than
half that at Ford). The union was careful to not characterize the agree
ment as concessionary. As one union official commented:
We sat down and structured an agreement. There were increases in
wages and pensions, but it was subpattern. It was not reduced
cost it would be a mistake to call it that. But it did give Budd a
better ability to project cost.
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This individual also outlined the approach taken by the union leader
ship to the membership:
External pressures force all parties to rise above the past and
above internal politics. We told our people straight, we won't tell
you that you can't get it, but look at the long-range liability. You
better start looking at the year 2000 if you want work in old facili
ties.

A senior Budd executive commented on the same situation:
There was no backwash after ratification. Both sides are happy.
It's an economic settlement that you have to make politically
acceptable. The union and Budd must cooperate to create realistic
expectation levels in order for the company to survive.

The ratification was, in many ways, a ratification not just of substantive
terms, but also of the new direction in relations. Traditionally, a large
"yes" vote is seen as a victory for the union and a bare majority as a
victory for management. In this case, both sides sought a large major
ity in favor of the agreement.
Thus, in the course of one round of national negotiations, the parties
departed from their normal practice in terms of: the timing of bargain
ing, the length of the agreement, the substance of the settlement, the
relationship between local and national negotiations, the approach
toward ratification, and the structure of subsequent relations.
Movement Toward More Continuous Bargaining

The agreement between Budd and the UAW to hold quarterly meet
ings of the bargaining committees throughout the four-year contract
was not part of the initial proposals from either side. Rather, the parties
were caught in a distributive debate over wages that was resolved with
a package proposal that established a new committee around quality
issues. As Budd's vice-president for industrial relations recalled:
The last thing on the table was another $.10 for the plants. The
spontaneous solution to this was that we decided to give a lumpsum bonus of $150 if a supercommittee addressed quality
improvement. It will meet quarterly and has potential for longrange communication for the life of the agreement.
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These quarterly meetings of the labor-management committee were
held on a regular basis. At the meetings, the parties used the forum not
just for quality issues, but also for discussion of potentially contentious
outsourcing issues and job security concerns. The broader scope of the
quarterly meetings was reflected in the following description by a
senior UAW official:
At quarterly meetings we want to take a high-level look at prob
lems cost problems like insurance. We want to look at the longrange viability of the operation. Too often, neither side knows
what to do with a problem. They haven't communicated the prob
lem. You want to avoid the mentality that says, "Cross this line
and I'll kick your ass." You want to avoid what might be a major
stumbling block in upcoming negotiations.
Clearly, the function of the quarterly meetings was not just to foster
discussion of issues of common concern it was also a forum to sur
face potentially contentious issues that would only fester if left for the
next formal contract negotiations. Further, so that the discussions at the
quarterly meetings can be meaningful, both the company and union
have assigned staff to work (independently and jointly) on issues that
would be on the agenda for future meetings. Given the scope of issues
addressed and the continuing nature of preparations to address these
issues, the meetings represented a significant move toward more con
tinuous collective bargaining.
The idea of continuous collective bargaining has been discussed by
collective bargaining professionals for several decades, however the
concept remains controversial. Both labor and management have been
generally reluctant to see a signed agreement reopened during the life
of the contract. In the case of Budd and the UAW, the parties were
careful not to place the renegotiation of the economic package on the
agenda for the quarterly meetings.
Still, the viability of this new forum underwent a severe test when a
highly distributive issue entered the agenda. Specifically, when Budd
opened a new facility in Shelbyville, Kentucky, the union status of the
workforce in this facility came up for discussion at a quarterly meeting.
Budd indicated that it was unwilling to grant to the union automatic
recognition (with the same terms as other UAW contracts at Budd)
since typical wages and benefits were so much lower in this area. The
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union was unwilling to accept any substandard agreement. Subse
quently, a union recognition election was held in which local company
officials campaigned strongly for a workforce vote against union repre
sentation. When a majority of the workforce did indeed vote "no," the
leadership from the international union took personal offense at the
perceived inconsistency between espoused values and behavior on the
part of management. While hard feelings about the election persisted at
the national level, the parties did not abandon the quarterly meetings.
Joint discussions even tackled new subjects, such as health care cost
containment.

Analysis
The Budd case features both substantive and relationship outcomes.
The outcomes can be summarized in tabular form.
Significant Outcomes—The Budd Company
Managementemployee
Substantice
Managementrelationships
outcomes
union relationships
Some movement
Early economic
Movement toward
toward commitment more continuous
concessions
under El
bargaining and use
Work-rule
of joint
Sustained
flexibility
subcommittees
Pilot work redesign movement toward
tensions
Continuing
within
commitment
initiatives
die transition teams over union status in
a new facility

Other outcomes
Modest
improvements in
economic
performance
Massive layoffs in
the late 1970s and
early 1980s

Unlike many of the other large, independent auto suppliers, Budd
has not systematically sold older unionized facilities and purchased or
built newer nonunion facilities (i.e., the company has not engaged in
wholesale escape from the union). Early on, it relied on a mix of forc
ing and escape as primary change strategies. While these options were
operative in the early 1980s, the middle 1980s saw increasing reliance
on a set of narrowly defined fostering initiatives around employee
involvement, safety, and statistical process control. Consequently, the
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most important shifts in negotiations occurred at the plant level around
issues of employee commitment and compliance, as well as instituting
local union-management cooperation.
Both parties came to see the narrowly focused fostering efforts as
inadequate to fully address their core interests, and consequently the
locus of negotiations broadened. In both local and national negotia
tions, culminating in agreements in 1988, the parties joined a set of core
issues around compensation, benefits, employment security, and flexi
bility. As a result, labor-management negotiations now occur on a more
continuous basis, via multiple channels, raising a host of internal issues
for both labor and management.
In the case of the Detroit plant before relations turned the corner
there were rejected contracts and substantial cutbacks in employment.
Even the employee involvement program did not serve as a sufficient
catalyst for fundamental change. No one event or driving force can be
identified as responsible for the shift in approach that emerged in the
late 1980s and carried forward into the 1990s. The timing of the change
can be associated with the shift in leadership for many agenda items
from industrial relations to line management and by the breakthrough
work of the hit-to-hit committee. It took a decade of mounting eco
nomic pressures and a trial-and-error approach to change before the
conditions were right for a "sea change" in labor-management rela
tions.
Similarly, at the national level it appeared that matters had to get
worse before they could get better. While the company's initiative to
open negotiations early failed at first, it set the stage for an extensive
communication program and an eventual agreement that brought the
parties together on a continuing basis to deal with a range of common
concerns such as health care and pensions.
Could Budd and the UAW have reached an accommodation
earlier in the decade? Possibly. Several factors might have made a dif
ference. First, if the customers had exerted pressure earlier, change
might have happened sooner. Second, if union leadership, both locally
and nationally, had taken a stand with the membership calling for
changes, then the revised contracts might have become a reality sooner.
But this is not certain. The Budd story features a reappraisal process
that slowly grows in intensity and it is not clear that the preparation
phase would have been shortened by any of the above tactics.
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Lessons Learned
To observe that it takes a decade of halting attempts before signifi
cant progress can be made does not alone make for a very noteworthy
conclusion. Are there some aspects of the Budd story that stand out and
that might have relevance in other situations? Several possibilities can
be identified:
Management's campaign to educate the membership helped union
leadership in resolving internal differences.
The addition of financial managers at the table enhanced the per
ception within management of the importance of the terms of the
new agreement.
The joint research conducted within the various subcommittees
created a common information base and facilitated an attitudinal
shift that important issues needed to be approached as problems to
be solved.
The active involvement of line management was instrumental in
labor's willingness to go ahead with an open-ended experiment on
new procedures for die transition.
Continued competitive pressures provoked episodes of hard dis
tributive bargaining within an ongoing fostering initiative.
Thus, the Budd case offers many tactical insights into the dynamics
of strategic negotiations. Unresolved, however, are larger questions
regarding alternative paths available to the parties. In many ways, the
broad strategies of forcing and fostering were driven as much by mar
ket pressures and specific customer pressure for substantive gains as
they were by the reinforcing evidence of relationship improvement.

CONSTRUCTING NEW SOCIAL CONTRACTS
The Case of Packard Electric and the IUE, Local 717
The Packard Electric division of General Motors produces the vast
majority of wiring harnesses and related components used by GM. The
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home manufacturing facility is located in Warren, Ohio, where about
half of the division's 25,000 employees work. All production workers
in Warren are represented by the International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers (IUE), Local 717.
For many years, Packard Electric and the IUE had engaged in tradi
tional arm's-length labor relations, which had deteriorated steadily.
Morale was low, absenteeism was high, and economic performance
was declining. During the summer of 1977 alone, for example, there
were three work stoppages. That same year, 97.9 grievances were filed
for every 100 hourly employees. This statistic increased slightly in the
next year, and then declined steadily thereafter, reflecting a shift in
labor-management relations that began in the fall of 1977.
Indeed, as a result of a series of joint activities initiated in 1977,
Packard Electric and the IUE moved to the forefront of U.S. employers
and unions seeking a new social contract via a fostering strategy. The
company and the union were among the early pioneers in the applica
tion of QWL principles in unionized locations in the United States.
Like most QWL efforts, the initial focus was on shop-floor employee
involvement, later expanding to include notable instances of work
redesign, the joint design of new manufacturing facilities, and a dra
matic quid pro quo linking a multitier wage system with unprecedented
job security.

Significant Features
There are many significant dimensions to the Packard Electric case,
including the following:
The initial combination of forcing and fostering hinged on the
credibility of management in arguing that cost competition was
threatening the business. Ultimately, it took a loss of jobs before
this message could be heard and affirmed.
The education of the rank and file regarding the economic situation
was critical to the union's handling of internal differences.
The provision of employment security was an important quid pro
quo to the creation of a multitier wage system.
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The union made strategic choices expressed in its willingness to let
certain work go offshore in exchange for job security for the
remaining, high-value-added work.
The independence of the IUE from the UAW pattern created a con
siderable degree of freedom for the union leadership.
Among our cases, the Packard Electric case covers the longest time
frame within which negotiations served as the vehicle for transforming
the industrial relations system. Although it began with a fostering ini
tiative, this quickly became a combined strategy as a result of the com
petitive pressures in the auto supply industry. Ultimately, a substantive
accord addressing core economic concerns for both labor and manage
ment provided the turning point for a predominantly fostering strategy.
Even within the fostering context, however, key distributive episodes
created ongoing negotiating challenges. Ultimately, this transformation
of a labor-management relationship turned on a combination of pivotal,
high-profile negotiations, combined with a host of day-to-day negoti
ated exchanges.

A New Labor-Management Relationship—Initiation to
Institutionalization
Packard Electric and the IUE first negotiated language on improving
QWL in 1973, modeled on the pioneering letter of intent agreement
signed by General Motors with the UAW in the same year. The initial
efforts at Packard Electric emphasized easily identified areas of com
mon concern, such as a toys-for-tots program, a joint safety communi
cations program (featuring company and union logos), a joint United
Way drive, voter registration, and credit counselling.
Broadening the Focus of the Cooperative Efforts

In 1978, the company established a management task force to
increase productivity in the Warren operations. In response, the union
leadership called for direct union involvement, which led to the forma
tion of the Jobs Committee in May 1978 a pivotal event. The purpose
of the committee was to "develop an ongoing union-management
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approach that will maintain job security and identify opportunities for
hiring in the Warren operations." There were three ground rules: (1)
Discussions regarding quality of worklife projects must be open and
off-the-record; (2) No employee would lose employment as a direct
result of a project; and (3) Bargaining must be reserved for the bargain
ers. As one of its first activities, the Jobs Committee jointly designed
and administered a QWL survey in September, 1978 the first joint
survey undertaken in a GM facility.
In February 1979, the Jobs Committee reached an agreement on a
plan to hire 100 new employees the first new hiring in the Warren
plants of Packard since 1973. These employees, the first hires under the
auspices of the Jobs Committee, demonstrated that jobs could be com
petitively placed at branch plants in Warren, Ohio rather than in com
pany facilities in Mississippi or Juarez, Mexico. Under this agreement,
the branch plants reduced job classifications, implemented job rotation,
and introduced an emphasis on teamwork. At the union's urging, the
facilities were located in the outlying communities to be more accessi
ble to the residences of many employees.
Top union and management leaders spent many hours Grafting the
"operating philosophy" statement for the new Warren branch opera
tions:
We believe every business has a responsibility to its customers, its
employees, and the community in which it exists, and shall strive
to satisfy the needs and security of each.
We share in the belief that a successful business provides and
maintains an environment for change and is built on a foundation
of trust, where every person is treated with respect and offered an
opportunity to participate. We are totally committed to the
patience, dedication, and cooperation necessary to build this foun
dation.
We also believe that this can be accomplished through a function
ing partnership built on the wisdom, the knowledge, and the
understanding of the employees, the union, and management.

With this statement, the parties put into words their emerging social
contract.
Following the establishment of the branch operations, the Jobs
Committee addressed ways to retain the plastic molding business and a
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series of other related issues. Altogether, by June of 1981 the Jobs
Committee had played a role in the addition of 850,000 square feet of
floor space, $100,000,000 of new investment, and 379 new jobs. In the
1980 model year alone, Packard Electric distributed $454,000 in
awards to Warren employees for suggestions that saved a total of $2.36
million.
A close look at the process by which these gains were achieved sug
gests that, in addition to extensive joint problem solving, several
important distributive moves occurred. First, it took a union confronta
tion to establish the joint Jobs Committee as an alternative to a man
agement-only effort. Then, at a number of critical junctures (such as
the deployment of the Warren branch facilities), the union pressed for
joint analysis and successfully halted management from implementing
announced plans to locate work elsewhere. For its part, management
pressed hard in the committees for flexibility and other changes bear
ing on cost competitiveness. Thus, interest-based confrontations by
both sides played a key role in arriving at the "cooperative" gains.
Continued Competitive Pressures

Despite productivity gains achieved via the union-management
efforts, it became clear to management in late 1981 that the Warren
operations could not remain competitive in the face of declining auto
sales and the cost advantage of doing business abroad particularly in
Mexico.5 In the late 1970s, wages and benefits in Mexico were around
$2.50 per hour, compared with over $19.00 an hour in Ohio, and this
gap grew wider when the peso was devalued in the early 1980s.
In December of 1981, the company's executive committee and the
union's bargaining committee met for a two-day, off-site session. This
was a pivotal event in which management presented to the union a
long-range analysis showing that, under current trends, only 64 percent
of the business would remain cost-competitive within five years (leav
ing 3,800 jobs at risk). The result of the session was a jointly developed
five-year business plan entitled the "Plan to Compete." It featured the
twin goals of keeping jobs in the Warren area while being cost-compet
itive in all lines of work by 1986. Under the plan, the more labor-inten
sive final assembly work would be moved to low-wage-rate locations,
while lead wire preparation would be brought back from Mexico to
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Warren (with investments in new technology). In addition, early retire
ment options would be developed with an attrition goal of 1,650 direct
labor jobs.
As the parties prepared for the 1982 collective bargaining negotia
tions, Richard Huber, then director of personnel and public relations,
made the suggestion that the parties move the relationship to a new
level. He suggested a problem-solving process be used in collective
bargaining, wherein both sides would brainstorm options rather than
resorting to the traditional exchange of demands. While some bargain
ers on both sides were skeptical, they agreed to try the new approach.
Scott Copeland, manager of employee development, designed a train
ing program for both sides and facilitated the new process.
In April 1982, negotiations over the national GM-IUE agreement
concluded prior to the deadline with a number of cost-reducing
changes, including cutting paid absence allowance (PAA) days from 14
to 5 and freezing the cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) until Decem
ber 1983 paralleling changes in the national GM-UAW contract.
Locally, for the Warren operations, the parties discussed a final assem
bly option (FAO), which would involve deep wage reductions (as large
as $6.00 per hour) for new employees hired on any final assembly
work that remained in Warren (in branch facilities). The FAO proposal
was resisted by the union, and (on management's insistence) it was
presented to the membership for a vote, where it was rejected by nearly
a 3 to 1 majority. The rejection created dismay, not just within manage
ment but also within the local community. The Mahoning Valley was
experiencing some of the highest unemployment in the nation at this
time, and the Packard employees were criticized as "snobs" for reject
ing an opportunity for expanded employment.
Consistent with the earlier "Plan to Compete," Packard continued to
shift labor-intensive work from Mexico. However, it did not expand the
number of jobs in Warren. In fact, by the end of 1982, about 2,400
employees were on permanent layoff and about as many were on tem
porary layoff. While all union leaders were critical of the layoffs, one
zone committeeman, Nick Nichols, tackled the issue with a near reli
gious fervor. He charged that the company was violating promises
made back in 1977 that no one would lose their jobs as a result of work
being shifted from the Warren operations or as a result of the use of
new technology. It was based on such promises that he had become a
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leading advocate for QWL programs (abandoning what he termed the
traditional "macho knight in shining armor role").
Nichols took the position that no work could be moved until all laidoff Warren employees were brought back to work. The company
responded that there had not been any formal job loss laid-off
employees were still receiving supplementary benefits and maintained
rehire rights with GM. Other union leaders backed away from Nichols'
strong stance, reportedly because they judged it to be unfeasible, which
created a split in the union.
In the fall of 1983, when local union elections occurred, the layoffs,
the company's approach to QWL, and Nichols' insistence on the job
security guarantees became the main issues. The outcome illustrated
how pivotal intraorganizational developments could be: with the
exception of Nick Nichols, all union officers and bargaining committee
members were voted out of office. Many of the successful candidates
ran on anti-QWL platforms. Nichols, was elected as chair of the bar
gaining committee.
A Crossroad in the Relationship

With 1984 negotiations on the horizon, management paid close
attention as an internal debate unfolded among the newly elected union
leaders. Many argued that the union should withdraw from all coopera
tive activities feeling that there was not sufficient trust to sustain a
social contract based on cooperation. Nichols, as chair of the bargain
ing committee, took a different stance. He indicated that he was still
supportive of the idea of cooperation and that he recognized the com
pany's concern with being competitive, but that the union was also
concerned about job security. He further stated that, without attention
to the union's concerns, "we were both headed for the ditch" (that is, a
hard strike). In explaining the mixture of support for cooperation and
the use of a strike threat, Nichols stated:
There will be conflicts and you have to take them on the merits.
It's like a marriage two don't become one, you are still individu
als it's just that you are now both part of a family. It's a matter of
learning how to deal with the conflict. You can't be caught halfstepping, but nor can you just roll over and play dead.
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Following the union election, the personnel director invited Nichols
to a private dinner to discuss the situation. A series of informal meet
ings followed, involving about a dozen top union and management
leaders. They called themselves the Resource Group since they were
exploring ways to address two core sets of interests a union interest
in job security and a management interest in flexibility and competi
tiveness.
While the actual 1984 negotiations were carried out in a traditional
form (complete with opening positions and offers and counteroffers), a
new spirit emerged from the Resource Group discussions and repre
sented a dramatic departure from the concurrent 1984 negotiations
occurring between the UAW and GM. Ultimately, the union agreed to a
lower starting wage for new employees (at 55 percent of the base wage
as well as 55 percent of COLA), which would increase over ten years
to parity with the rest of the workforce. As a quid pro quo, the contract
included a special section entitled the "Lifetime Job and Income Secu
rity Agreement for the Warren Operations," which featured the exact
language that Nichols felt had been accepted back in 1977:
A. No employee will lose his/her job due to a shift of work from
Warren operations to other locations or because of technologi
cal change.
B. The parties will manage the Warren operations workforce so
that a layoff of protected employees for other than temporary
reasons will not occur.
C. Opportunities to maximize employment for employees will be
provided by training employees and reassigning employees
and/or work with the Warren operations and pursuing new
business so that income security will be provided.

The contract also included the phrase, "This agreement will remain in
full force and effect forever." As such, the contract became one of the
present era's earliest "living agreements."
Clearly, the 1984 negotiations represented a pivotal event. If the
core issues of job security and compensation costs had not been
addressed, the entire social contract would have been undermined.
Once addressed, however, the parties in effect had fundamentally
departed from the industry pattern (in which there was relatively little
wage flexibility, with the compensating option to lay off workers).
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The parties did not come to this unique combination of social and
substantive contracts merely through an incremental set of cooperative
adjustments, building on the QWL base. Each major advance in the
scope of the social contract was preceded by a pivotal event where uni
lateral actions or past understandings were challenged. Expanded prob
lem solving then followed. Critical to the success was the ability of the
parties to engage in problem solving. Equally critical, however, was
their willingness to utilize distributive tactics when necessary.

Emerging Challenges Around Temporary Workers
By the late 1980s, the union at Packard Electric proudly pointed to
the fact that it's contract with multitier wages, the no-layoff pledge,
and the joint approach to strategic planning had succeeded in bringing
all workers back from layoff and on the job. This was in contrast with
other GM divisions that were struggling with large numbers of
employees either on layoff or in holding status under the JOBS bank
provisions of the UAW contract. Still, the parties faced many chal
lenges as illustrated by their experience with temporary workers.
Among the quid pro quos for the no-layoff pledge was an arrange
ment that allowed management substantial flexibility in the use of
short-term temporary workers. This was designed as a buffer to allow
management to handle temporary increases in volume without hiring
workers who would then make it hard to maintain the no-layoff pledge.
The first group of temporary workers was brought in during February
of 1985, and their departure surfaced tensions in the workforce with an
intensity that surprised both union and management leadership. Essen
tially, many of the workers with the job security guarantees did not
think it was fair to make these temporary workers leave.
Three years passed before management again attempted to utilize
the flexibility available to it under the contract. By bringing in a group
of temporary workers it would be possible to keep a partially utilized
facility open which was important to all parties. This time more com
prehensive attempts were made to clarify expectations with the tempo
raries and with the regular workforce. Still, however, upon their
departure there were the same difficulties. In reflecting on manage-
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ment's original request for this flexibility, one union leader com
mented, "there are certain things that you just shouldn't ask a friend to
do, and this is one of them."
In the end, the union was far more divided internally on the issue of
temporary workers than it expected. At the same time, management
was less able to use the contractual flexibility that it negotiated. Thus,
the many successes experienced by the IUE and Packard Electric man
agement did not prevent the continued emergence of complicated and
divisive issues as well.

Analysis
Subsequent to the signing of the 1984 contract, substantial reinvest
ment occurred in the Warren operations (totalling over $300 million).
There also was extensive joint problem solving on the shop floor (via
employee participation groups) and through higher-level union-man
agement dialogue. Employees hired at the lower starting wage pro
gressed toward parity and, as of the early 1990s, there were no longer
any employees on layoff. It is interesting to note that the parties were
aided by the increased use of electronics in automobiles, which assured
an ever-rising volume of orders.
The following chart summarizes the main results of the Packard
story.
Significant Outcomes—Packard Electric
Substantive
outcomes
Multitier wage
system
No-layoff guarantee
Work-rule
flexibility
Management ability
to utilize a buffer of
temporary workers

Managementemployee
relationships
Movement
toward
commitment
with temporary
setback (after
layoffs) and then
sustained
movement
subsequently

Management-union
relationships
Movement toward
cooperation

Other outcomes
Joint design of new
work facilities

Early turnover of union New tensions
leaders on cooperation around the
issue
utilization of
contract language on
Sustained movement
temporary workers
toward cooperation
subsequently
Negotiations around
business strategy
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In many ways, the Packard Electric case is unique. Massive capital
investment was possible, and early workplace innovations (around
QWL) were available both as a result of the company being a divi
sion of General Motors. At the same time, it enjoyed more autonomy in
labor relations than other parts of the corporation, since the IUE was
not as bound by the UAW pattern and since it was in a line of business
experiencing steady growth. Yet these circumstances alone did not
account for the parties' success. Equally important were their
responses to a series of critical events.
Early on, the parties tackled some easy-to-resolve subjects and cre
ated some win-win arrangements that expanded employment. How
ever, the competitive situation continued to deteriorate, and the
company attempted to bargain major changes in its labor costs. This
effort failed, and the company commenced a partial escape strategy by
moving work out of Ohio and laying off the affected workers. Here we
observe a common sequence: limited fostering, the environment wors
ening, the company asking for big changes, and then the union and the
workers saying "No, thank you." We observed this sequence in AP
where at a similar juncture the parties plunged into a bitter confronta
tion.
In the case of Packard Electric, the response to the crisis was differ
ent. Early responses included the Jobs Committee and the opening of
the branch plant operations. Ultimately, even these innovations were
not able to satisfy the need that management felt to force reductions in
labor costs. After a round of layoffs, the rank and file replaced the
union leadership. While the new group came into office on a platform
of stopping the outflow of jobs, the union leadership took a pragmatic
approach and quickly joined the issue, leading to the innovative 1984
agreement.
In subsequent years, negotiations containing both forcing and fos
tering elements occurred not only in collective bargaining, but on a
host of contract administration matters. Ultimately, the Packard Elec
tric case provides insight into the complex array of negotiations associ
ated with a set of change initiatives occurring over more than a decade
and a half.
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COMBINING FORCING AND FOSTERING
Mastering Complexity
The final three cases in this book have featured the most complex
combinations of change strategies. They also embody some of the far
thest-reaching change initiatives. To some extent, the complexity in
these cases arises from external circumstances beyond the immediate
control of union and management leaders at the plant level. Yet, the
complexity also reflects conscious choices and artfully executed bar
gaining tactics that enabled the parties to combine what would other
wise be opposed strategies.
The complexity also mirrors the extended time periods under exam
ination. Packard Electric, for example, was one of the early QWL initi
ators in North America so a complex series of negotiations over a
decade and a half around change issues is not surprising. However, in
earlier chapters we examined cases that involved a single strategy over
equally extended time periods. In particular, the Anderson Pattern case
covers nearly a decade of sustained fostering. By contrast, we also
have examined instances of fostering, such as Bidwell, where the ini
tiative proved short-lived. So what accounts for these complex com
bined strategies?
In two of the cases Budd and Packard Electric a combined strat
egy in the early 1980s was responsive to the coincidence of external
market pressures and customer insistence on evidence of labor-man
agement cooperation. At Pensacola the use of a combined strategy was
more internally driven. The forcing reflected pressure from the corpo
rate parent and the intraorganizational realities within the union (it was
politically better to be forced to agree to economic concessions), while
at the same time Pensacola management was committed to reinforcing
and sustaining its fostering initiatives. Thus, combined strategies may
reflect the intentional juxtaposition of forcing and fostering, or the two
change strategies may occur simultaneously as a result of different (but
concurrent) driving forces. Either way, we are learning important les
sons about this new phenomenon.
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Significant Lessons
Many of the lessons identified in the analysis of sequential strategies
in chapter 4 also apply to these more complex combinations of strate
gies. For example, key leaders from labor and management played
important roles in these three cases, just as they did in the three cases
featuring sequential strategies. Similarly, information sharing, persis
tence, and a learning orientation were also critical here. In addition to
these lessons, further insights emerge from the analysis of the cases
with combined strategies.
In all three cases, episodes of hard distributive bargaining occurred
after sustained periods of fostering. Indeed, in the Pensacola case, the
intensity and scope of the distributive bargaining around the Sunday
premium led us to classify this phase as a combined forcing/fostering
strategy. While a number of issues were also highly contentious at
Packard Electric, they did not involve the sort of sustained pressure in
the face of worker and union resistance that would constitute a forcing
strategy. When management at Budd failed in their first bid to reopen
the contract, they might have been expected to use force on the issue,
but instead chose an educational path followed by a mixture of integrative and distributive bargaining.
Thus, forcing is not, in itself, inconsistent with concurrent or prior
fostering, but many forcing tactics are. When distributive bargaining
(or forcing) follows sustained fostering, the history of fostering leads
to a tempering of hard bargaining tactics and to a focus on long-term
objectives. For example, it would be inappropriate to undermine the
credibility of the other side during forcing that is concurrent with fos
tering even though this is a common tactic in a pure forcing strategy.
Instead, the forcing must literally be justified to the party being forced.
The party must be persuaded of the need, for example, for economic
concessions and be disabused of any suspicion that management is just
exploiting a power advantage.
A related lesson is that sometimes forcing is even desirable in a fos
tering context as a requirement for resolving intraorganizational differ
ences. As we have already indicated, this was vividly illustrated by the
Pensacola case, where the union could not politically agree to loss of
the Sunday premium even if it granted the point that management had
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no alternative but to press the issue. In this situation it was politically
better for the union to have been forced to accept the change.
The same is true when the union forces. For example, when the
union at Packard Electric forced over the issue of job security, manage
ment was not pleased, but it did understand why the subject was of par
amount importance to the union. Local managers would have had a
difficult time persuading corporate officials to endorse a lifetime job
security guarantee, but they could make the case for the arrangement in
the face of union insistence and especially when there were attractive
quids pro quo in the offing (such as wage flexibility and use of tempo
rary workers).
Not only is forcing tempered by concurrent or prior fostering, but
the fostering may actually be enhanced by the forcing. So long as the
forcing is seen as legitimate and even as unavoidable, it signals core
interests i.e., issues on which they are willing to "go to the mat." If
these issues are not surfaced explicitly, they will resurface ultimately in
the form of hidden agendas. For example, when Budd initially began to
use possible job loss as a threat in order to get wage concessions in the
early 1980s, it did not coordinate this forcing with the concurrent El
efforts. As a result, it encountered disbelief on the part of the work
force, and the entire slate of union leaders was voted out of office.
Later when Budd wanted to open the contract early, it learned the les
son: hard bargaining requires substantial and deep education on the
underlying business circumstances giving rise to these issues. In this
context a controversial issue such as health care costs could become
the focus of a joint problem-solving task force. Thus, the forcing pro
vided an outlet and structure for engaging issues that might otherwise
have undercut the fostering and even provided new direction and
energy to the fostering initiatives.
A combination of forcing and fostering is thus likely where one or
both parties is looking for major substantive changes and where one or
both also value worker commitment and union-management coopera
tion. Where there is a well-established history of fostering, the hard
issues are more likely to be raised in the context of distributive epi
sodes rather than a sustained forcing campaign. The one exception, of
course, is where the hard issues are highly objectionable to the other
party and only likely to be achieved via forcing. Either way, the analy
sis in this chapter suggests that it is accurate but incomplete to classify
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the three cases in this chapter as exemplary examples of labor-manage
ment cooperation. Ultimately, they should be viewed just as much as
far-reaching examples of conflict resolution. It is in the throes of nego
tiations associated with transformation and change that we see an inev
itable and critical interweaving of cooperation and conflict.
NOTES
1. Valuable research assistance was provided by Kathleen Rudd Scharf in the preparation of
this case.
2. The majority of the material for the case study of the Budd Company, the UAW, and the
CAW have been derived from field interviews. Also helpful were Herzenberg (1988) and Murphy
(1988). Valuable research assistance was provided by Pat McHugh in the preparation of this case.
3. A vivid example of the consensus process arose when one of the authors of this volume ini
tiated research in the facility in 1985. At that time, all but one of the twenty-member steering com
mittee agreed to be part of the project. The individual (a shop steward) who had reservations about
the research withheld approval for almost two hours, during which time he surfaced a number of
important concerns about the parties being part of a research project. It was only after these issues
were addressed that consensus was achieved and the research was able to begin.
4. The material presented in this case draws on "Packard Electric A and B," written by Elisa
beth Ament Lipton under the supervision of D. Quinn Mills, Harvard Business School Case 9484-109 (1984), other secondary materials, and our own interviews with current and former local
union and management leaders. Valuable research assistance was provided by Pat McHugh in the
preparation of this case.
5. The location of plants in the South no longer served as a lower-cost alternative since the
IUE and the UAW had successfully challenged GM's "Southern strategy," namely, building new,
nonunion facilities in the South. Attempts to organize these facilities, which featured autonomous
work groups and other sociotechnical innovations, had not been successful and the UAW insisted
that GM agree to a neutrality pledge in the late 1970s. This set the stage for the successful organi
zation of most of these facilities including several Packard Electric facilities in the deep South
and the achievement of wage parity.

6
Understanding the Context
and
Choices for Strategic Negotiations
What is the terrain on which strategic negotiations unfold? How do
these contextual factors shape the negotiations? In addressing these
questions, this chapter will focus on eight major topics: (1) the need for
change, (2) the role of vision, (3) the role of leadership, (4) the role of
third parties, (5) the requirements of internal alignment, (6) the oppor
tunity for negotiations to engender a long-term learning process, (7)
assessment of management's strategic alternatives, and (8) assessment
of strategic alternatives for unions. We will also examine the strategic
option of escape and its implications for strategies of forcing or foster
ing.

A Compelling Need for Change
Among labor and management practitioners, there is great debate
over the relative importance of a crisis in motivating change. The social
theorist Kurt Lewin (1951) highlighted the importance of "unfreezing"
existing social relations as the first step in a change process. In today's
parlance, this is referred to as a "significant emotional event." Simply
put, the question arises as to whether a significant emotional event is a
necessary prerequisite to fundamental change.
As we look across our cases, nearly all of them feature significant
emotional events. For example, there were massive layoffs and move
ment of work out of factories in the Budd, Packard Electric, Adrian
Fabricators, and AP Parts cases. Two of the firms we studied Conrail
and Adrian Fabricators went into bankruptcy. Long and emotionally
charged strikes occurred in nearly all of our forcing cases. Further, in
some cases where there was no major significant emotional event
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such as Bidwell the change efforts were easily stalled by disagree
ments around the pace and sequence of training activities. Thus, a
superficial review of the cases would confirm the importance of signif
icant emotional events as forces driving fundamental change.
A closer look at the cases, however, reveals that these significant
emotional events were neither a necessary nor sufficient factor driving
fundamental change. For example, in one case, Anderson Pattern, the
company and the union engaged in a series of interactions that led to a
gradually increasing acceptance of the need for fundamental change.
There were some important learning events, such as a trip to a trade
show by the majority of employees to take a closer look at proposed
new technologies, but no single defining moment that accounted for
what came to be a shared sense of a compelling need for change. In
fact, perhaps the single most important driving force was the success
that resulted from early pilot initiatives and the fact that each side gen
erally lived up to promises made at each step of the way.
There are many reasons why the Anderson Pattern case may not be
typical, however. It is a small, unionized firm with a highly skilled
workforce and an owner who began his career as a skilled tradesman. It
is also in an industry and a community where many other unionized
firms have either gone out of business or the unions have been decerti
fied. Still, the case suggests that a single defining emotional event is
not a necessary requirement for the generation of a perceived need for
deep change.
A closer look at the other cases supports this conclusion. While
bankruptcy was certainly a key driving force for change in the case of
Conrail, the same event did not mark a fundamental shift in the case of
Adrian Fabricators. It was only after a strike and a change in manage
ment leadership that a shared perception of the need for change
emerged at Adrian Fabricators.
Even where a crisis does trigger change initiatives, it is not always
clear that such a crisis will continue to serve as a sustained driver for
change. For example, prior to the acrimonious strike at AP Parts, there
had been earlier rounds of concession bargaining. The concessions by
labor were made in response to management concerns over competi
tive pressures. The concessions were not accompanied, however, by
fundamental changes in the production process that led workers and
union leaders to believe that management was itself changing in

Understanding the Context and Choices for Strategic Negotiations

205

response to competitive pressures. Even though management was
probably accurate in stating that competitive pressures were still
present when they sought nearly $6.00 an hour in additional conces
sions in 1984, that argument in itself was not sufficient to sustain con
tinued substantive change. In fact, with the lack of change in
management itself and its continued requests for concessions, the
deepening of the competitive crisis became a barrier rather than a moti
vator workers felt that they had already given enough and resented
management's demand for more.
In all the cases where fundamental change occurred, a perception
developed on the part of one or both of the parties that there was a
compelling need for change. In many cases, this perception was shaped
by significant emotional events such as layoffs, lost work, and strikes.
Even though our cases do, therefore, confirm that significant emotional
events can be a compelling force for change, they also suggest that
these emotional events will not necessarily produce change if they are
not interpreted as providing compelling reinforcement of the need to
change. Further, we see that change is possible even in the absence of
such traumatic events where a compelling need is appreciated
through education or reinforced through restructuring of resources and
rewards.

A Clear Vision of the Direction for Change
Given the turbulence confronting most labor and management lead
ers, as well as most employees (both exempt and nonexempt), a clear
vision of the direction and goals of change represents one of the most
elusive commodities in the present era. Since we only selected cases
involving the potential for fundamental change, all of our cases feature
at least one (or a few) individuals who possessed some degree of vision
about the desired direction for change. A close look at the cases
reveals, however, that in nearly all of the cases there were gaps in the
initial visions that required learning and adjustment during the change
process which sometimes did and sometimes did not take place.
What constitutes a clear vision of the direction of change? In part,
our cases suggest that a clear vision of the direction of change first
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requires a clear vision of the terrain over which the change process
must travel. This terrain is composed of multiple stakeholder groups
with a mixture of common and competing interests. Those change ini
tiatives that more completely take into account the underlying interests
look, in retrospect, to have been guided by a clearer vision. For exam
ple, the forcing at DeRidder centered on work rules, not wages. Indeed,
the combining of classification resulted in substantial wage increases
for nearly all employees. In this case management held a clear vision
of its own interests (which centered on decreased grievance activity
and increased equipment utilization rather than cutting labor costs) and
an understanding of the interests of the workforce (which included
both safety and continued economic stability and growth). As a result,
just two years after the strike the plant was experiencing record levels
of efficiency and profitability.
The union's interests in this instance (the DeRidder case) were com
promised, however, by the forcing that occurred around work rules. In
the short run, management had a relatively clear vision of how it
wanted to align its interests with those of its employees. In pursuing
this vision the union was marginalized, but not eliminated. Thus, at the
time we concluded our case study, corporate management had decided
to adjust the vision to address the union's interests for realizing institu
tional legitimacy and efficacy. It decided to work on union relations in
all of its mills because in many of them it could only achieve employee
commitment if it also worked toward institutional cooperation with the
union.
A clearly stated position does not necessarily constitute a viable
vision. If that position directly threatens the interests of one or more
stakeholder, and if the change strategy does not fully anticipate the
degree to which these interests are threatened, then we would argue
that such a vision is not well formulated. For example, AP Parts took
very clear positions in the negotiations, but it apparently underesti
mated the degree to which the union would interpret these positions as
a threat to the local and international union (and even to other unions).
It also apparently underestimated the degree to which its stance would
polarize the community and surface concerns among its major custom
ers. With a clearer understanding of this range of interests, it is possible
that AP Parts might have modified its strategy in important ways.
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In cases where multiple unions were involved, the task of construct
ing an effective vision for change proved enormously complex. In fact,
disagreements among multiple unions at CSX and at Bidwell ulti
mately undermined management efforts to implement their respective
change agendas. Instead, a more realistic vision might have called for
joint interactions with some unions and separate dialogue with the
remaining unions, thereby getting underway with the change process
rather than ending up in a stalemate.

Leadership Throughout the Change Process
In negotiations over fundamental change, leaders play pivotal
roles. It is leaders who generally present (or fail to present) a clear
vision of the direction of the change process, and it is leaders who gen
erally have the primary role in articulating and gaining recognition for
a compelling need for change. Yet, it is also leaders who are most at
risk of becoming lightening rods for discontent during the change pro
cess.
The task of leadership is fundamentally different for union and man
agement leaders. Union leaders are elected officials leading political
organizations. Management leaders are appointed officials leading
bureaucratic organizations. The dilemmas that each faces under forcing
and fostering regimes reflect the different contexts in which each
leads a distinction that is central to understanding internal dynamics
within labor and management.
Union leaders in the fostering context face a core dilemma that
involves simultaneously maintaining their independence and working
jointly with management. The dilemma is particularly acute given the
political nature of unions elected union leaders who work jointly
with management are always vulnerable to the charge that they have
moved too close to management and ignored union priorities. This is
exactly what happened in union elections at Budd and Packard Electric
where the entire slates of union officials were thrown out of office on
the basis of the perception that the leaders had become too soft as a
result of cooperative programs. Thus, in order to work effectively with
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union leaders, managers must educate themselves about the nature of
these political dynamics.
Leaders on the management side in a fostering context face a some
what different dilemma that involves ceding joint decision-making
authority on matters for which they are still hierarchically accountable.
The dilemma is particularly acute in that other management officials in
the organization may not necessarily accept union input as legitimate,
especially when it produces different results than would have occurred
in the absence of such input. Yet the test of added value from union
input must hinge on whether the process has raised new options and
generated different decisions.
By the same token, union leaders must educate themselves about the
nature of administrative processes (such as cost-benefit analysis and
strategic planning) in order to work effectively with managers. While
union input may differ from what managers unilaterally would imple
ment, providing the input in a language familiar to managers avoids
being rejected out of hand.
In the forcing case, both union and management leaders must strug
gle with the potential negative consequences of an escalating confron
tation. The stakes are very different for the two sides, however. For
management leaders, the core dilemma involves engaging in a strong
enough confrontation to produce desired change without creating a
legacy of resentment that precludes future movement toward employee
commitment. This involves making critical and often subtle decisions
about what is necessary change as compared to what is desirable
change with the former being much easier to defend as a legitimate
change agenda.
For union leaders, the continued existence of the plant and the union
local is very much at stake in such confrontations. Thus, union leaders
in the early stages of a forcing campaign will be studying every move
made by management in an effort to determine what are legitimate
(albeit controversial) requests for concessions versus opening moves in
a campaign to destroy the union. Once a union leader has reached a
conclusion on this threshold issue, a fork in the road is at hand. Manag
ers contemplating fundamental change need to be mindful of the piv
otal importance of the responses that come from union leaders at this
early stage of the change process.
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Managers demonstrate leadership initially in the way they frame the
debate. At least in the present era, it is primarily management who has
the choice of defining the agenda as broad or narrow, and it is manage
ment who is or is not making a concerted effort to ensure that the
agenda is seen as legitimate. Yet, union leaders have opportunities to
frame the debate as well. Following the initial management request for
change, union leaders can convert the issue into a larger contest over
survival or keep it at the level of a problem-solving dialogue. Thus, a
key function of leadership from both sides is in framing the debate rel
ative to the interests at play. The way each side engages in this task will
have important implications for the process of change.

The Role of Third Parties
While the leadership requirement for effective change is for the
most part the responsibility of key management and labor officials, in
certain crucial circumstances an important role can be exercised by
third parties. In fact, the potential for third parties to play a constructive
role was underrealized in several of our cases. While the two-party lan
guage of labor-management relations still captures most important
interactions, a potential exists for additional parties, at least to some
degree, to convert the bilateral interaction into a multilateral situation.
Included among the additional parties are customers/suppliers, com
munities/governments, and third-party consultant/facilitators.
Current shifts in manufacturing operations toward just-in-time (JIT)
delivery arrangements dramatically alter the links between a plant and
its customers and suppliers. In a highly competitive industry such as
auto supply, the impact of customers and suppliers on labor-manage
ment relations can be significant for example, an increased emphasis
on quality and flexibility. Customers shape the bargaining agenda by
insisting on evidence of labor-management cooperation (prompting
fostering initiatives), while at the same time insisting on price cuts
(often prompting forcing strategies). Some of the customer-driven
changes have the potential to radically rebalance the power equation.
For example, just-in-time delivery arrangements imposed by customers
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can make management more vulnerable to various forms of collective
action by unions.
Communities play particularly key roles in our forcing cases. As the
forcing disputes worsened at International Paper and AP Parts, for
example, community leaders became increasingly alarmed over the
potential loss of jobs. Local officials often ended up taking sides and
sometimes even supported partisan legislation, such as constraints
being placed on replacement workers in Jay, Maine. Thus, in many
cases, communities represent key stakeholders who become central to
a full understanding of negotiations over fundamental change.
There is also some evidence regarding community and government
roles in our fostering cases, such as the use of community training
resources and multiemployer coordination at Anderson Pattern.
Another example was Conrail, where the federal government played a
central role in defining the framework for the entire fostering initiative.
In most fostering cases, however, communities and governments were
more notable by their absence.
It is clear that third-party consultants and facilitators are central to
many of the fostering cases. These outside parties provide technical
assistance via skills training, meeting facilitation, and organizational
redesign, and by conferring legitimacy on what are highly ambiguous
processes. Most labor and management practitioners in the United
States look upon third-party assistance with great skepticism, however.
Calling in a mediator during collective bargaining negotiation is gener
ally considered a last resort prior to impasse. 1 As a result, most practi
tioners have not experienced the potential value that outside
consultants and facilitators can provide in an ongoing relationship, nor
are they skilled in managing the potential complexities in working with
these outside third parties.

The Importance of Internal Alignment
Certainly, a need for change, an adequate vision, and effective lead
ership are key ingredients of a successful change effort. They clearly
represent necessary conditions or prerequisites, but are they sufficient!
In exceptional cases, the answer may be yes, but typically the answer
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would be that additional competencies must be present to deal with
internal alignment.
It is often said in labor negotiations that it takes three agreements to
get one one agreement within labor, one within management, and
one between the parties (Dunlop 1958). This internal or intraorganizational bargaining is often more difficult than the negotiations between
the parties. In examining negotiations that occur at the cooperative and
conflictual extremes, we find that internal dynamics are, if anything,
further magnified.
In our cases, one of the greatest barriers to management effective
ness was fear, resistance, and contrasting priorities within its own
ranks. The intraorganizational implications of fostering derive from the
inherent challenge to the hierarchical structure. Most fostering initia
tives create new channels for communications and problem solving,
while pushing certain forms of decision making to lower levels of the
organization. Such initiatives are not only threatening to middle man
agers and supervisors, but they can prompt a realignment of power
relations across management functions. Moving too quickly with the
change process, as occurred in the Bidwell case, for example, does not
allow sufficient time for factions within management to sort out these
implications. In the Budd case, the link between the union and line
management at the expense of the labor relations function is
another example of a shifting communications patterns creating ten
sions within management.
Similarly, as union leaders grappled with fundamental changes, one
of the greatest barriers they faced was fear, resistance, and contrasting
priorities within the ranks of union members. Union leaders were at
risk both from being accused by members of working too closely with
management and of not working closely enough to preserve jobs. For
example, at the Budd Detroit plant, local union leadership became con
vinced of the competitive pressures facing their plants, but when they
proposed a concessionary agreement to the membership, it was
rejected by over 90 percent of the voting members, and the president of
the local subsequently resigned.
The internal dynamics become even more complex where multiple
unions are involved, such as in the railroad industry. In these cases,
negotiations occurred within each union, across the different unions,
and then between the unions and employer. Thus, the political nature
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of unions as organizations ensures that internal dynamics will be criti
cal factors in the success or failure of change initiatives.
The internal dynamics were equally important in both forcing and
fostering contexts, although they were played out in different ways.
A traditional distributive tactic involves building internal solidarity
while looking to divide the other side (Walton and McKersie 1983). All
of our forcing cases featured sustained efforts to maintain internal soli
darity during the forcing campaigns. The cases differed sharply, how
ever, in the degree to which efforts had the intent to divide-andconquer the other side. In the cases that involved more restrained forms
of forcing, the internal splits within the other side were not exploited to
the fullest extent possible.
The approach to potential splits in the solidarity of the other party is
very different in the unrestrained forcing contests. The forcing at AP
Parts and at International Paper not only featured sustained efforts by
labor and management to build internal solidarity, but both sides
exploited every possible division they could find in the other side.
Management sought to divide the unions in both cases with the threat
ened and then actual use of replacement workers. The unions sought to
divide management with corporate campaigns, direct appeals to cus
tomers, and community pressure on local managers.
A clear lesson emerges from these cases. Neither managers nor
union leaders will begrudge the necessity for the other side to build its
own internal consensus. However, given the volatile context of indus
trial relations where concerns about a company's financial stability
and a union's institutional security are always just below the surface
each side is likely to react defensively and vigorously when its internal
divisions are targeted by the other side. What starts as a traditional dis
tributive bargaining tactic becomes a clear trigger point that distin
guishes restrained forcing from unrestrained, escalating battles.
Internal alignment was also pivotal in the fostering cases, but in a
very different way. The robust fostering cases all featured extensive
educational campaigns to build shared understanding at all levels of
labor and management about the importance of change. For example,
at Anderson Pattern the education included fact-filled monthly newslet
ters, a pivotal trip to a trade show to learn more about proposed new
technology, presentations at annual dinners and other events, and
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extensive training programs developed in conjunction with a local
community college.
At the same time, initiatives that produced little change were charac
terized by inadequate efforts to address divisions within union and
management ranks. For example, many managers and supervisors at
Bidwell felt little ownership for the QWL initiative (they viewed it as a
corporate agenda item), and there were splits among the unions regard
ing the wisdom of working jointly with management on this subject.
These splits fed off each other with each side's ambivalence provid
ing justification for the other side to withdraw.
Interestingly, internal solidarity (achieved increasingly through edu
cation) represents the primary resolution to the classic dilemma that
fostering poses for union leaders. So long as union members are
divided in their views about change initiatives, a union leader who sup
ports them will always be vulnerable to the charge that the union has
grown too close with management. On the other hand, where there is a
broad awareness and understanding of the competitive pressures and
business requirements, the debate will focus on specific programs and
decisions rather than on the merits of participating or not participating
in the fostering initiatives.
Equally interesting are the implications of solidarity within the man
agement ranks. As the DeRidder case demonstrates, if supervisors and
middle managers have bought into the change agenda, they will behave
in ways that reinforce the initiative. Alternatively, where there is inter
nal disagreement within management ranks, workers and union leaders
will observe this inconsistency they will accuse management of "not
walking the talk" and lose faith in the initiative as a real vehicle for
improving operations. It is therefore in the interest of each side for the
other to have high levels of internal education and solidarity regarding
the fostering initiatives.
Thus, internal dynamics within either side represent pivotal ele
ments in the change process. When ineffectively managed, the internal
dynamics can drive a forcing campaign out of control, and they can
bring a fostering initiative to a halt. When skillfully managed, the forc
ing around fundamental changes can at least be acknowledged as legit
imate and the fostering can generate high levels of enthusiasm and
commitment.
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Change as a Process of Continuous Learning, Marked
by Pivotal Events
A key perspective for framing the context for change is the aware
ness that fundamental change usually does not occur in one program
matic burst but is more often a series of steps marked by pivotal events.
Viewed from a short-time perspective, the results of a particular
change effort may not be impressive. However, from a longer-term
point of view (one embracing a sequence of time periods and strate
gies), the results may be much more noteworthy. This perspective
applies especially well to Pensacola and Budd. It was essential for the
key leaders to take the long view, remaining steadfastly interested in
both substantive and social contracts and not allowing the results of a
particular time frame or phase to diminish the commitment to move
forward with change programs.
The effectiveness of the step-by-step approach to change is illus
trated by the progress that occurred at Adrian Fabricators. Ultimately,
it was necessary for the union to see management as a partial ally and
for the membership/owners to see management as concerned about
their interests. Fortunately, there was time for these changes to take
place. (If there had been a sharp downturn in the business, however, the
past history may have been a blinder to the union and the membership
for discovering this potential.)
The long-term view recognizes the potential for the parties to learn
as they go. The journey is marked by what we have called "pivotal
events." These are events or moments in which the very direction and
tone of the relationship are, in effect, "on the table." They are truly piv
otal in that there is more than one possible outcome and at least one of
the alternatives represents a new direction for the relationship.
Returning for a moment to the example of Budd, when the parties
shifted the bargaining process away from specifying the details around
improving die changes, they had just completed a pivotal dialogue. By
deciding instead to agree on the principle and leave the specifics to be
worked out in a joint committee, the overall climate of labor-manage
ment cooperation was reinforced, line management took on a more
central role in labor relations (at the expense of the personnel func
tion), and a key aspect of business operations became a subject of
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shared oversight. It is clear that if they had not been able to find a way
to jointly address the die transition issue, then the relationship could
have shifted in an opposite direction.
We have discussed the strategies of forcing and fostering (as well as
escape) and sequential and concurrent combinations of strategies as
general characterizations of different paths down which negotiations
might travel. In fact, progress along these paths is rarely smooth, con
tinuous, or one-directional. If the events are consistently resolved in a
certain way, then tactical moves take on a larger significance they
aggregate to become a strategy. For example, when the president of
Anderson Pattern first approached the union about adding profit shar
ing to the compensation package, this tactical move did not yet consti
tute a fostering strategy. However, when the parties subsequently
crafted an ad hoc agreement matching flexible work rules with the pur
chase of specified new technology (after extensive information shar
ing), a fostering strategy was beginning to fall into place. Later, this
strategy took on clear form when a general agreement was reached
allowing broad flexibility in exchange for certain job security and
training guarantees. Subsequently, conflicts around the administration
of training (which were also pivotal), were addressed in what had
emerged as an explicitly fostering context.
We conclude that change is not a one-time event. Negotiated change
then becomes a series of interactions in which the linkages across time
are as important as the issues on the table at a given moment.

Assessment of Management's Strategic Alternatives
By this point, the advantages of a strategy that combines both
restrained forcing and robust fostering should be apparent especially
when they are interwoven, as was illustrated in the three cases pre
sented in the last chapter. To the extent that it is possible for the parties
to wisely manage these sequences of pivotal events along lines illus
trated in the Budd, Packard Electric, and Champion-Pensacola cases,
then a superior strategic alternative is in place. However, in many
instances such a combination is not feasible and other pathways must
be chosen.
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In this section, we examine three strategic options for parties initiat
ing change which in the present era is usually management. The
three alternatives include: escape, forcing followed by fostering, and
fostering followed by forcing. Note, however, that the lessons (espe
cially on the later two alternatives) would apply equally to unions
developing strategies to guide change initiatives.
Perspectives on the Strategy of Escape

In the next chapter we will summarize best practice regarding the
primary change strategies of forcing and fostering, taken singly and in
various combinations. At this point, there is one other threshold subject
that merits consideration, namely, the strategy of escape.
While we certainly do not advocate a strategy of escape, it is impor
tant to consider the use of this strategy if only as a tactic to enhance
the effectiveness of forcing and fostering strategies. Several cases
explicitly involved the escape strategy. Also, escape lurked in the back
ground as an option in most of the other cases.
Escape strategies sometimes permit labor-management innovations
that might not otherwise have emerged. However, they can also incur
large social costs for individuals and communities.
The escape option was not equally available in the three industries
we studied. Clearly, it was pursued much more readily in auto supply
than in paper and railroads, where the heavy investment in infrastruc
ture limited geographic movement. However, other forms of escape
were available, as illustrated by IP's replacement of strikers with non
union workers in its Jay mill and Guilford's transfer of assets from one
legal/financial entity to another.
Increasingly, key decision makers (e.g., managers, boards of direc
tors and partners in joint ventures) are making proposed investments
for modernization or new capacity contingent upon specified changes
in work rules. Such quid pro quos were central to the innovative labormanagement relations that emerged both at Anderson Pattern and
Packard Electric. The linkage of a commitment to continue operations
(and to reinvest capital) with changes in work rules and labor-manage
ment relations makes considerable sense. Thus, we conclude that when
business conditions require consideration of options such as possibly
closing a facility or contracting work out, labor and management
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should attempt to negotiate changes that would make such operations
viable on a continuing basis.
Unfortunately, some companies often give up on securing changes
within the existing relationship and resort prematurely to the escape
strategy. In essence, this means that these firms have opted out of nego
tiations forcing, fostering, or some combination of the two and
have decided to abandon the relationship (either by turning over the
facilities to some other owner or by starting from scratch at a new loca
tion).
The auto supply industry is replete with examples where companies
approached the union, received a negative answer, and then decided to
move the facilities; or where companies did not even approach the
union (assuming that the answer would be no) and made strategic deci
sions unilaterally to disinvest, closing down or selling existing facili
ties and starting anew at greenfield sites.
The effective use of escape as a strategy to set the stage for either a
forcing or fostering strategy can be very demanding. First, the threat to
escape cannot be a bluff. In other words, the alternative to continuing
the relationship with the union must be available and creditable. Sec
ond, in underscoring the escape alternative, management must present
the realities in a way that does not permanently sour the existing rela
tionship. The union will always feel threatened by any reference to
escape. However, if it is done in a way that creates understanding (for
example, by persuading labor that "You would do the same thing if you
were in our shoes"), then it may be possible to prevent serious deterio
ration of the existing relationship. Third, the skillful use of escape
requires considerable precision in proceeding step by step but ulti
mately avoiding a "point of no return" unless all else has failed. In the
case of DeRidder, for example, management trained replacements but
waited for the striking workers to reassess the situation before making
any decision to bring the replacements on board. As a result, manage
ment was able to maximize the pressure on the union without turning
its tactic into a strategy.
Forcing Followed by Fostering

A strong case can be made for launching a change effort by first
confronting whatever painful bargaining work needs to be done and
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later proceeding to improve the relationship. Forcing, if successful, can
produce more immediate and certain benefits, but the net advantage of
starting a change effort with forcing depends upon how the forcing
campaign affects negotiations in subsequent phases.
First, this sequence has particular attitudinal effects. Forcing will
put pressure on existing accommodation between labor and manage
ment to the extent that management agendas and pressure tactics are
viewed as more aggressive than past practice, a point underscored by
several of our cases, especially Jay, Guilford, and AP Parts. However,
this shock to established attitudes, if not too severe, can set the stage
for a favorable response to subsequent fostering activities. This helps
explain the improvement in attitudes after the strike at DeRidder.
Second, the sequence has potential educational benefits. Forcing
substantive changes can dramatize competitive pressures, thereby set
ting the stage for a fostering approach to an array of other agenda
items. This attention to economic imperatives may help labor resolve
some of its internal differences. Moreover, the social contract may be
redefined to incorporate competitiveness as a legitimate criteria for
change.
Third, successful forcing can serve to confirm realities about the
power equation. In many situations today management has gained a
power advantage vis-a-vis trade unions, and organized labor finds itself
in a position where its ability to serve its members depends more on its
integrative bargaining skills than its distributive bargaining prowess.
Thus, an initial forcing strategy can help labor adapt constructively to
the new economic power realities sooner rather than later. Finally, of
course, for management intent upon renegotiating the social contract,
the ideal culmination of a forcing episode is contract language that
either enables participation and cooperation (as happened in 1988
Pensacola contract negotiations), or provides for continued negotiation
of flexible work practices (as illustrated by the pay-for-knowledge
scheme won by DeRidder in its 1983 strike).
Thus, the initial forcing can be far-reaching when it occurs within a
context characterized by an adversarial social contract (so there is not a
violation of expectations). While subsequent fostering may be ham
pered by the adversarial aspects of forcing, the fostering that follows
can be aided by the learning and the contrast that derive from the forc
ing experience.
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Fostering Followed by Forcing.
Another option is for management to first attempt to elicit the volun
tary cooperation of employees and their representatives and then sub
sequently reach agreement on substantive matters, e.g., reducing
payroll costs and increasing contractual flexibility via distributive bar
gaining. It is possible that the fostering approach will be adequate, but
the forcing alternative remains available if the need for substantive
change becomes urgent. Management can explain the subsequent shift
in strategy (if required) by stating, in effect, "We tried the persuasion
approach first, and since that has not worked we have to insist on the
changes."
What are the potential advantages of this sequence? Assuming they
are implemented effectively, fostering activities, such as joint commit
tees and communication programs, can provide labor with a better
understanding of competitive realities, including the need to control
payroll costs. Fostering activities can also produce attitudes that make
it easier for the parties to develop integrative solutions to substantive
issues. For example, the experience of jointly designing and adminis^
tering QWL and El programs can produce positive spill over effects,
enhancing the parties' abilities to work together within the larger con
text of collective bargaining.
This attitudinal effect on subsequent contract negotiations is not
assured, however. If the apparent motivation driving the subsequent
forcing strategy is either not compelling to labor or is seen as inconsis
tent with the new social contract (and instead viewed, for example, as
motivated strictly by superior bargaining power), then fostering fol
lowed by forcing can produce resentment and disillusionment. While
not featured in our cases, this outcome characterizes the experiences of
many companies in the paper industry during the mid-to late 1980s
because management's case for work-rule changes and economic con
cessions had not been made credible to labor. Similarly, the use of
mass layoffs at Packard Electric went far beyond the union's percep
tion of the appropriate response to competitive pressures; as a result,
the entire cooperative relationship was called into question.
After initial fostering has moved the relationship toward a new
social contract, subsequent forcing may be required, but it can only be
effective within the framework of a new social contract. Thus, while
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beginning with fostering does not preclude subsequent forcing, it does
change its character. The changed nature of the process that follows
intense fostering is illustrated by the handling of the Sunday premium
issue at Pensacola. Management knew the issue was controversial and
tried to utilize integrative bargaining to be consistent with the overall
fostering strategy. For intraorganizational reasons, the union would not
engage the issue on an integrative basis. Even though management
then felt compelled to force the issue, it did so with restraint and
accompanied its approach with explanations of the business rationale
and a concurrent improvement in compensation via a 401k benefit
plan. Labor did not like the change, but it did not allow the forcing to
undermine the overall fostering momentum.
An important practical advantage of forcing within an overall con
text of fostering is that the drive to reach agreement on substance on a
specific timetable allows the union leadership to characterize the pro
posed changes as a fait accompli. Thus fostering is used to communi
cate relevant information and to create as much understanding as
possible, and then forcing is used to press for agreement.

Assessment of Strategic Alternatives for Unions
Today's union leaders find themselves on the receiving end of vari
ous corporate- and plant-level change initiatives. The following analy
sis is targeted for these union leaders, though many of the principles
apply to any party confronted by a strategic change initiative.
For union leaders, the first and most basic point is that unions gener
ally do not have any viable alternative to the existing relationship. The
prior discussion of the option of escape underscored the possibility that
in many circumstances management can shift (or at least threaten to
move) to other locations. Such a scenario is only feasible for a handful
of unions who are in a position (by virtue of stock ownership or other
forms of strategic influence) to drive the sale of a company or the
replacement of the management leadership team.
When we review the stance taken by unions in the cases where forc
ing was dominant, several conclusions are apparent. First, a strategy of
mild resistance combined with flexibility appears to have been effec-
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live in several instances. For example, at Pensacola and Budd, where
the unions accepted concessions, the strategy consisted of opposing the
employees' proposals, but doing it in a way that preserved the relation
ship and enabled the leadership to deal with internal differences by, in
effect, saying to the membership, "We did all we could to resist these
demands of management. However, our only course of action is to
accept some of the changes and to get on with preserving the business
and our jobs." Specifically, during the 1985 negotiations at Pensacola,
the UPIU attempted to avoid discussion of flexibility issues, and when
the company's final proposal went to the membership, the leadership
took a stance of "nonrecommendation."
Such a posture could be viewed as a very pragmatic response by
unions to economic pressures. In the same vein, unions often advance
their own agendas in order to achieve quids pro quos for the economic
relief sought by management. In many of our cases, we saw the
increased attention given to employment security and joint training
programs, as well as the incorporation of unions into strategic levels of
the business via various arrangements to facilitate consultation.
On the other hand, where unions exhibited strong resistance to a
forcing initiative by management, the matter escalated rapidly. The
response usually was triggered by a perceived threat to the integrity of
the contract and the institutional security of the union. And internal
solidarity within the union was usually enhanced as a result of the
tough stance by the union, at least during the early phases of the con
frontation. But ultimately the unions lost badly, as illustrated by the
Jay, AP Parts, and Guilford stories.
Turning to the fostering strategy, most union leaders in our cases
preferred to adopt a stance of cautious support for the initiatives. For
political reasons (similar to the strategy of mild resistance), the safest
approach for union leaders in terms of internal differences was to keep
the fostering limited to a narrow agenda such as quality of worklife
programs and to proceed on a step-by-step basis rather than embarking
upon wide-ranging joint programs. The subject of new technology can
serve as such an opportunity for the initiation of fostering; the step-bystep approach that the parties at Anderson took to this subject illus
trates one very viable pathway for union leadership where manage
ment is also proceeding on a step-by-step basis.
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However fast or slow the management is fostering change, in time
the initiative either fails or becomes robust. In the later case, the foster
ing typically becomes integral to the union's self-identity. Cases rais
ing these issues include CSX and Packard Electric. The biggest
challenge for union leadership in this context is to deal with internal
differences, since it is likely that at least a few members will question
the ability of the union to maintain its independence and to differ with
management when the occasion requires such a stance. Thus, robust
fostering is a viable strategy only when rank-and-file members are
involved in various joint processes. Size then becomes a key correlate
of the feasibility of this approach. Anderson, a small employer, pos
sessed the ability to involve rank-and-file members much more easily
than CSX, where intense fostering took place at the institutional level
between company and union representatives but did not involve local
union chairmen, let alone rank-and-file members with the result that
the recommended package was rejected.
Thus, the present era confronts union leaders with unprecedented
challenges. Upon encountering a forcing strategy, union leaders must
fashion a counterforcing approach that halts management's forcing
without triggering an escalating "holy war." Upon encountering a fos
tering strategy, union leaders must embrace changes that protect and
expand jobs but at a pace and in a way that preserves their ability to
serve as an independent check and balance in the system. Ultimately,
the question not adequately answered by any of our cases concerns the
ability of unions and their members to take the lead in fashioning their
own effective change strategies.

Conclusion
This chapter has provided various perspectives on the terrain across
which negotiated changes unfold. It is a terrain where small distinc
tions can make a great deal of difference. For example, progress along
the journey is facilitated by a compelling need to change. Yet this com
pelling need does not have to be driven by a crisis. A clear vision for
the direction of change provides guidance, but learning and adjustment
along the way are perhaps more essential. The role of leadership is cru-
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cial, but the challenges are different within union and management
organizations. Internal alignment is essential within both management
and labor, but it is incredibly difficult to achieve and maintain. Ulti
mately, a continuous learning stance is clearly necessary which is the
only certain means for managing the many twists, turns, bumps, and
barriers along the pathways of change.
NOTES
1. Personal conversation with Dale Brickner, East Lansing, Michigan, 1993.
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Learning to be a Strategic Negotiator
What have we learned from a close look at highly cooperative and
highly conflictual negotiations? Each of the cases in this volume repre
sents a different path toward fundamental change in employment rela
tions. All of the paths involved twists and turns. Ultimately, some led to
dead ends or at least took the parties on nonproductive detours. Others
represented highly viable avenues for change. All of the paths offer
valuable insights into the process of negotiating over change.
Indeed, some of the cases stand as unique parables about change.
The story that unfolded at the DeRidder plant of Boise Cascade, for
example, could be a parable for managers desiring both rapid change
and high levels of employee commitment. It is also a story that raises
some challenging questions for union leaders. By contrast, Anderson
Pattern could be a parable about transformed employment relations via
a sequence of successively farther-reaching fostering initiatives. In the
railroad industry, the Guilford story assumes parable status because the
hard forcing stands in contrast to long-standing railroad traditions of
incremental change coordinated across multiple unions. The Interna
tional Paper strike in Jay, Maine and the AP Parts strike in Toledo,
Ohio are similarly significant in their respective industries. They have
literally become touchstones that executives use as object lessons with
their management staffs and the union leaders interpret to their mem
bers often drawing contrasting lessons from the stories.
We hope we have presented these stories in a way that facilitates
learning from individual cases. As our discussion at the end of the
cases suggest, we feel that each teaches many valuable lessons.
Beyond the individual stories, however, there are also common lessons
that cut across the cases.

Lessons from the Cases
The first set of lessons from the cases concerns the use of tactics
within a given strategy. There are many tactics that can serve a particu225
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lar strategy, and we highlight the constructive and destructive potential
inherent in various choices. Next, we highlight lessons specific to the
forcing path, followed by lessons specific to the fostering path and les
sons inherent in various combinations of forcing and fostering. Finally,
we present a set of guidelines designed to support strategic negotia
tions.
The Implications of Tactical Choices
The tactics deployed in support of a particular change strategy pro
vide focus to the strategy. For example, tactics common to forcing
involve making excessive opening demands, providing little supportive
information, and threatening the institutional security of the other side.
This set of tactics will typically engender a back-and-forth forcing con
test where excessive demands are met with excessive counter proposals
and institutional threats are met with counter threats. Similarly, a com
mon set of fostering tactics involves the development of joint mission
statements and ground rules that emphasize consensus decision mak
ing and formal problem solving. This set of tactics will typically focus
attention on the cooperative and problem solving processes wherein
mutual concerns are identified and addressed.
Inevitably, tactics are double-edged. At the same time that a set of
tactics provides a particular focus and direction to a strategy, the tactics
also divert attention from other possibilities. Too often in our cases we
find evidence of tactics providing a misleading focus for a given strat
egy. The tactics are logical steps to take in service of the strategy, and
they indeed often yield short-term advantages. In the long term, how
ever, the strategies can be compromised by these tactics in fundamental
ways.
In the forcing case, the tactical focus on winning the forcing contest
risks winning the battle but losing the war. Some of the very tactics that
are most helpful in winning a forcing contest such as overstated posi
tions, little supportive information, and institutional threats can set in
motion uncontrollable escalating conflict. Further, these tactics can
compromise efforts to reestablish regular operations and relations after
the forcing contest is over.
In this chapter we will challenge the conventional focus of forcing
tactics. Instead of centering on the forcing contest, our research sug-
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gests that the most effective forcing tactics are focused on avoiding
what we see as the two greatest risks along the forcing path. Attending
to these "show stoppers" involves: (1) preventing uncontrollable esca
lation, and (2) ensuring the reestablishment of regular operations at the
conclusion of the forcing contest. Winning the forcing contest is
important, but attention to the risks or downside possibilities is even
more important which leads us to recommend a restrained form of
forcing.
In the fostering case, the tactical focus on cooperative and problem
solving processes may solve some immediate mutual problems, but
may not build an enduring set of relationships. Indeed, some of the
very tactics that are helpful in supporting cooperative and problemsolving processes such as consensus decision making and formal
problem-solving procedures may constrain parties in surfacing con
troversial and potentially divisive issues. Further, the tactics may exac
erbate tensions within each party.
In this chapter we will also challenge the conventional focus of fos
tering tactics. Instead of just focusing on cooperative and problemsolving processes, our research suggests that the most effective foster
ing anticipates two potential "show stoppers" by: (1) enhancing the
capacity of both parties to address controversial and divisive issues,
and (2) increasing the ability of each party to manage internal confu
sion and splits. Cooperative and problem-solving processes are impor
tant, but that alone will not generate a robust form of fostering. 1
The table below summarizes the typical focus of tactics for forcing
and fostering strategies. The table also lists what we term the show
stoppers. These are the issues that we would argue should be the pri
mary focus when implementing a given strategy.
Typical Focus and "Show Stoppers" that Should be the Focus

Strategy

Typical tactical focus

Forcing

The forcing contest

Fostering

Cooperative, problemsolving processes

Focus on potential
"show stoppers"
Preventing uncontrolled escalation
Reestablishing regular relationships
Anticipating divisive conflicts
Managing internal differences
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Lessons Along the Forcing Path

The first three cases presented in this book all began with forcing
strategies by management. In each case AP Parts, Jay, and Guilford the forcing was marked by strong union responses, escalation,
and strikes. While management prevailed in each case, the costs were
substantial. Looking across these cases, there are a number of impor
tant lessons that emerge from travel along the forcing path. While other
cases did not only involve forcing, nevertheless lessons about forcing
can also be derived from the forcing periods contained in these addi
tional cases.
Why would parties force change? Clearly they have concluded that
their counterparts are unlikely to be receptive to the change. Yet, even
where no alternative seems possible, the decision to force is never
made lightly. Parties always explore to some degree what they see as
the risks associated with forcing and the enactment of possible countermeasures on their part to minimize risks. For example, parties will
often see a strike as a likely risk associated with forcing during collec
tive bargaining, and strike contingency plans will be developed.
As we noted in discussion of the implications of tactical choices,
however, parties are too often focused on preparing for and executing
the forcing contest itself. They give much less attention to the process
of setting the stage and framing the issues prior to forcing. Further, par
ties typically give even less attention to the process of recovery after
forcing. Ignoring these pre- and postforcing time periods leaves parties
inadequately prepared for life on the forcing path. Counterforcing and
other forms of direct conflict are not the greatest dangers along the
forcing path. As we have suggested, the real show stoppers are uncon
trollable, escalating conflict, and an inability to not only reestablish but
also upgrade ongoing operations following the forcing initiative.
The following lessons are not necessarily aimed at the back-andforth struggles during a forcing contest. We will not, for example, offer
guidance for managers as to how best to deploy replacement workers
or for union leaders as to how best to conduct a corporate campaign.
Indeed, the successful execution of these provocative tactics is likely to
increase the risk of either of our two show stoppers. Our advice will
instead point toward a set of restrained tactics in the service of an
effective forcing strategy.
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Forcing Lesson 1: Don't force without exploring other options.
Given the big risks associated with forcing, the best course of action is
not to force until the fostering options have been fully explored. If
change can be achieved via fostering, it has many advantages relative
to forcing when it comes to the generation of ideas and commitment to
implement new agreements. However, it is not only for these reasons
that we recommend exploring fostering options prior to the implemen
tation of a forcing strategy. Even where a party has concluded that fos
tering is unlikely to yield results, it is important to precede forcing with
a good-faith exploration of fostering options. We make this recommen
dation for two reasons. First, it is possible that, upon investigation, fos
tering will prove more promising than it seems. Second, even if things
go as predicted, the initial attempt at fostering yields important divi
dends during and after the forcing episodes.
Consider, for example, the comments of the UAW in the AP Parts
case. After the strike, union leaders stated that the company never had
made a genuine effort to work with the union in achieving flexible
work rules, benefit cost containment, or other apparent management
concerns. In this case there was a prior employee involvement effort,
though it was not targeted around the issues that management said
were its priorities going into the negotiations. We will never know if
the union would have been responsive to a well-designed fostering ini
tiative. We will also never know if such an initiative would have been
more likely to achieve what the company gained at the end of the
strike. However, in the absence of a prior fostering, the union was able
to elevate the dispute into a moral contest of right versus wrong
which constrained the company's success in its forcing strategy.
Forcing Lesson 2: Pick issues carefully—be clear about your aim.
That parties embarked upon forcing should pick their issues carefully
may seem obvious. If a party is forcing, after all, shouldn't it be moti
vated by particular issues to do so? The lesson, however, is that a forc
ing party typically contemplates forcing when it perceives itself as
having a power advantage.2 In this situation, it is often tempting to use
the forcing occasion to accomplish multiple objectives. Or, more sim
ply stated, parties sometimes get greedy.
When a party uses its power advantage to accomplish legitimate but
unpopular objectives, it will engender a measure of resistance and
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resentment. But the level of resistance and resentment increases dra
matically if the forcing party is seen as taking advantage of the
moment and pushing for objectives that are not seen as legitimate. In
such a case, the stage is set for an escalating conflict. Consider the con
trast between the strike at the Jay, Maine papermill and the strike at the
DeRidder, Louisiana papermill. In the case of the Jay strike, manage
ment was seen as pushing for economic concessions at a time of record
profits. This context was not seen as a legitimate basis for the power
tactics utilized. At DeRidder, on the other hand, management only
focused on work rules directly tied to data on low productivity levels in
the plant. The workers at DeRidder did not like giving up hard-won
contractual rights, but they were able to reconcile the loss subsequently
when the strike settlement included a generous wage increase and
when they came to see the new team-based work system as a viable
alternative to the narrow job classifications that they had relinquished.
A key point, then, is for the parties especially management to
shape their agenda to what is reasonable. While management may feel
its own needs for concessions are compelling and self-evident, labor
will tend to focus on the way these concessions nullify decades of
hard-won gains, threaten workers' standards of living, and undermine
the union's strength and self-respect. Anticipating such reactions by the
other party enables the negotiator to understand the hostility engen
dered and to take steps to avoid reciprocating it.
When management's demands are not carefully delimited, the union
often misinterprets management's intentions, inferring that the
demands for concessions are more than just a straightforward desire to
improve productivity and reduce costs. Unions, for their part, often
conclude sometimes too quickly that management has set out on a
purposeful path designed to get rid of the union. While getting rid of
the union may well be what many managers would prefer, this reality
does not mean that their forcing actions are necessarily a prelude to
such a plan.
Thus one guideline for management in this regard is to avoid hiring
permanent replacement workers. Permanent replacements are usually
seen by unions as moving matters beyond the point of no return, with
an all-out battle inevitable. Further, management can help contain the
conflict by finding credible ways to demonstrate its acceptance of the
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union as an institution (e.g., by offers to consult with the union on mat
ters previously handled unilaterally by management).
So what are the criteria that will enable a forcing party to pick issues
carefully and limit its objectives? Simply put, a forcing party should be
able to construct a persuasive business or institutional rationale for its
choice. It may seem ironic that a party about to use its power advantage
to force a change should struggle with the construction of a persuasive
rationale. Our point is that this is exactly when it is most important to
be able to make a strong case for the proposed change not because it
is any more likely to make the other party agree, but because it reduces
the odds of the kind of intense resentment that fuels escalation and
because it increases the chances of being able to reestablish regular
operations after the forcing initiative.
Forcing Lesson 3: Utilize forms of power that do not trigger escala
tion. When it comes to the forcing contest itself, parties invariably
make estimates of their own power capabilities. These estimates begin
during planning stages and are continually revised during the contest.
For management, these estimates typically take into account the degree
of shared commitment and resolve within the ranks of supervisors and
managers; current inventory levels and the criticality of the operations
in question; the legal levers available to management; the employer's
vulnerability to external pressure from customers, suppliers or politi
cians; and other factors.
Sometimes the estimates of power capabilities are based on recent
past experience. More often, however, the estimates are based on
unchecked assumptions. It is these assumptions that can be dangerous
in a forcing contest. For example, Guilford management embarked on
the forcing path with certain assumptions about its rights under the
Railway Labor Act and its vulnerability to decisions by arbitrators and
courts. Given the way its efforts ultimately were stalled at so many crit
ical junctures, it is quite likely that Guilford management was acting
on the basis of overly optimistic assumptions. Also, given the history
of labor relations in the railroad industry, it should have been possi
ble with full investigation to check out assumptions about the
potential actions of third parties that might impede the forcing efforts.
The type of power utilized also needs to be selected quite carefully.
For example, too much reliance on attitudinal and intraorganizational
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tactics that seek to undermine the legitimacy of the other side may
serve distributive bargaining well, but such tactics can so heighten the
conflict associated with a forcing strategy that both sides end up in a
prolonged battle that serves neither side's interests.
Hence our third lesson is for forcing parties to check out assump
tions about their own power. Unrealistic assumptions may lead to
overly aggressive forcing initiatives, which then set the stage for an
escalating conflict and a dynamic where forcing takes on a life of its
own, resulting in a legacy of bitterness and resentment.
Forcing Lesson 4: Check assumptions about your counterpart's
power capabilities. This is the companion to Lesson 3, and it is as crit
ical to learn about these assumptions as it is for each party to be clear
about its own assumptions. For managers estimating labor's self-per
ception, for example, it is important to estimate labor's perceptions of
its own internal solidarity; its capacity to disrupt business operations;
its links to the local, regional and national labor movement; and avail
able forms of legal leverage.
Failing to assess the other side's self-perceptions can severely con
strain forcing efforts. For example, management at AP Parts did not
anticipate that labor would interpret their hard line in negotiations as
setting a precedent for concessions in their region. They were sur
prised, therefore, to find themselves the subject of a nationwide boy
cott, with food and financial support for strikers flowing in from across
the nation. Similarly, they probably did not anticipate that the UAW
vice-presidents negotiating with Ford and General Motors (two key
customers of AP Parts) would break off national negotiations to join
the UAW's picket line at AP Parts in Ohio. This is not to say that it
would have been easy for management to predict labor's self-percep
tion, but this is clearly a case were they were far off the mark.
Attention to Lesson 4 has an interactive effect with attention to Les
son 3. The worst-case scenario is one where the forcing party overesti
mates its own power capabilities and underestimates the selfperceptions of its counterpart(s). In these cases, an escalating conflict
is virtually assured. Indeed, all four forcing lessons are interactive.
Ignoring the first two lessons no prior exploration of fostering
options and overly aggressive aspirations not only fuels escalation,
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but it also seriously hampers postforcing efforts to reestablish regular
operations.
Forcing Lesson 5: Communicate regularly regarding the tenor of
negotiations. Sometimes it is not possible to avoid the use of power
with its potential for escalating tensions. In this situation, the best
course of action is to limit the side effects and consequences of distrib
utive bargaining.
When adequate communication takes place, differences over issues
still remain but each side understands the reasons for these differences.
Indeed, the parties may simply "agree to disagree." This is essentially
what happened in the case of Pensacola where the union, strongly
opposed to losing premium pay for work on Sunday, granted that it
understood the reasons motivating management to insist upon this
change. In turn, the company recognized how difficult, in a political
sense, it was for the union to do anything other than to oppose the
change, and consequently the company attempted to make the pay loss
as palatable as possible.
Experienced negotiators (often on a trial-and-error basis) learn how
to signal to one another what is important and what is not important in
the lineup of respective agenda items. Such competency in communi
cations can go a long way in minimizing some of the most serious side
effects of distributive bargaining.
Attending to these lessons generally produces what we have termed
restrained forcing. The forcing is restrained in its scope (to issues that
are justifiable), is deployed with the appropriate intensity (based on
realistic assessments of available power), and is openly acknowledged
in the negotiations. The best guideline to bear in mind is the overall
aim, which is to achieve forcing objectives without inadvertent escala
tion and with the capability for reestablishing regular operations after
the forcing.
Lessons Along the Fostering Path

In contrast with forcing, the fostering path enjoys a certain moral
legitimacy. In our society, it is considered highly appropriate for a
party to reach out and work jointly with others in planning and imple-
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menting change. This does not, however, assure the success of foster
ing initiatives.
Ironically, fostering overtures are not typically welcomed with
enthusiasm. Rather, they are most often greeted with caution and skep
ticism by other parties and even by individuals within the party mak
ing the fostering initiative. Top management may announce a desire to
foster employee involvement. This will be greeted with suspicion not
just by the union, but also by first-line supervisors and middle manag
ers.
The suspicions are rooted in a set of very real risks that lie along the
fostering path. Most parties who travel down the fostering path concen
trate their energy on cooperative processes. As a result, a great deal of
time will be devoted to joint training in running effective meetings,
making decisions by consensus, and utilizing problem-solving pro
cesses. While these activities are all important, our research suggests
that inadequate cooperative processes do not represent the greatest
threat to fostering initiatives. Instead, the greatest risks arise from two
show stoppers: not anticipating episodes of conflict and forcing while
traveling down the fostering path, and not addressing the internal splits
that emerge along the way.
The following lessons, therefore, do not center on the details of
cooperative processes. We are not offering yet another multistep prob
lem-solving model or method for process improvement. Some les
sons such as our focus on making progress through small steps are
consistent with common understandings about cooperative processes,
but we come to these lessons for different reasons. In other cases, such
as our focus on conflict in the fostering context, the lessons could be
seen as constraining or even undermining cooperative processes. How
ever, all the lessons reflect a key insight guiding this book, which is
that fostering initiatives involve negotiated change.
Fostering Lesson 1: Progress is built through small steps. It is con
ventional wisdom that parties engaged in fostering initially look for
small successes before tackling larger, more contentious issues. This
recommendation is based on the assumption that leaders need to build
trust and learn to work together. We come to the same conclusion, but
for different reasons.
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The need for small steps may initially be driven by issues of trust
and interactive skill. However, even where leaders do have some mea
sure of trust and experience working together, it is still essential to pro
ceed through small steps. This is because fostering does not just
involve a restructuring of relations between parties it also involves
restructuring relations within each party.
Each cooperative success has a double-edged quality. It demon
strates the capacity to generate joint gain but it also raises questions
about the independence of each party. For example, the die transition
teams at Budd represented a cooperative success in the way they fos
tered cooperation among skilled trades, resulting in dramatic improve
ments in the time required to change the dies on a stamping line. At the
same time, the operation of the teams raised difficult questions for
union leaders and managers. Union leaders had to answer questions
about whether relaxing job classification increased the risk of manage
rial abuse. Managers had to answer questions about whether the selfmanaging teams would be mature enough to wisely utilize their new
autonomy.
Often the first small steps occur when the parties establish linkages
across respective agendas. Consider several examples. The quest for
greater flexibility in the development of the workforce (a management
priority) usually can be constructively joined to enhanced employment
security (a union priority). Similarly, the desire of the company to
increase the union's sensitivity to competitive conditions can be real
ized by giving the union increased access to key managers and key
business decisions.
The first issues addressed along the fostering path are therefore
important, not just for their substance but also as test events within
each party. Each event is interpreted both for the substantive gains or
losses and the underlying significance for political or power relations.
Many small steps allow for learning not just across but also within each
party.
The substantive quality of each small step is equally important. The
successful instances of fostering, especially Pensacola, CSX, and
Packard Electric, all were characterized by a process that ensured that
substantive agenda items would be considered. Negotiations did not
concentrate on just quality of worklife subjects, the participants were
not just industrial relations types, and the process was not allowed to
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drift. The general point is that when subjects important to both sides
are discussed, when key management officials participate, when vari
ous levels of the union organization have input, and when deadlines are
set, then the likelihood of the fostering strategy producing real move
ment increases substantially.
Fostering Lesson 2: Constituent education and awareness is crucial.
Education and awareness are always cited as important in fostering ini
tiatives. However, most of the education is focused on cooperative
problem-solving skills and other specifics of the fostering effort. It is
presented as a useful support activity. In our research, we find that
internal education and awareness need to be seen as much more than a
supportive activity. We find that a breakdown in communications with
constituents can be a major show stopper.
Internal education is not a one-way communications process, nor is
it limited to cooperative problem-solving skills. A typical threshold
issue concerns a very basic question: "Why change?" Leaders from
labor and management may be acutely aware of the need for new coop
erative initiatives, but their constituents need to be exposed to sufficient
data and experience for them to come to the same conclusions. As the
fostering efforts unfold, continuing education and awareness are
equally essential especially as the consequences of fostering activi
ties are not likely to be unambiguously positive for all concerned.
The collapse of the QWL effort in the Bidwell case can be directly
traced to the parties' incomplete attention to constituent understanding.
Management never fully brought its middle managers on board in rec
ognizing either the importance of the initiative or the necessity of
showing deference to union preferences for the timing of training.
Consequently, there was no foundation of support for QWL to sustain
it when a change in top corporate leadership occurred.
Similar dynamics can be found within labor, as is illustrated by the
experiences at CSX. Here a sustained effort was made to attend to
internal education and awareness. The company brought together the
many unions representing its employees, and within each union efforts
were made to educate middle-level union officials. This comprehensive
effort still fell short. Splits across the unions and within one key union
prevented a comprehensive fostering effort from moving forward.
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Internal political fears and power dynamics could not be overcome and
proved debilitating to the fostering strategy.
We conclude that internal education and awareness are critical, and
that they are far more than a one-way communications process. They
involve a process of intraorganizational negotiations in which the very
fate of the fostering initiative hangs in the balance (Walton and McKersie 1993). Consequently, parties pursuing a fostering strategy must
anticipate supporting this internal dialogue within their own organi
zation and within the other parties' organizations.
Fostering Lesson 3: Manage leadership turnover. Continuity of
leadership is particularly important in a fostering initiative for three
reasons. First, one of the jobs of a leader is to frame the issues. As
such, union and management leaders provide the overall framework
and logic that drives a fostering strategy something that is not easily
recreated when new leaders arrive. Second, another job of a leader is to
provide the necessary resources (tools, information, and skills) for peo
ple to follow their lead. Fostering initiatives are particularly vulnerable
in the absence of tangible support for suggestions and proposals that
emerge from problem-solving efforts. Commitments of support and
even ownership of the entire fostering initiative can be disrupted by the
turnover of leaders. Third, many understandings reached among top
leaders during fostering efforts are not recorded in contracts. Leader
ship turnover requires the remaining parties to reconstruct these many
informal understandings with new leaders when they arrive with the
results often not fully apparent until a pivotal event emerges.
Even though leadership is central to fostering initiatives, our cases
and other field experiences suggest that leadership turnover is a com
mon and predictable event. Managers will often leave as a result of
new assignments in the organization. Union leaders may turn over vol
untarily through appointments to the international union or other posi
tions at the local level. The turnover may also be involuntary as a result
of local union elections.
The importance of leadership is well illustrated by many of our
cases. The new plant manager at DeRidder was crucial to the realiza
tion of positive outcomes, and the president of Anderson Pattern dem
onstrated leadership in offering profit sharing without seeking anything
in return framing the fostering efforts around mutual interests. The
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continued tenure of this individual proved essential for the incremental
change process that has unfolded for nearly a decade.
At Adrian Manufacturers, by contrast, fostering efforts were con
strained by a president who had a nonparticipative, unilateral manage
ment style. It was only after this individual left the firm that a fostering
strategy unfolded. This case illustrates that leadership turnover is not
always negative in its implications.
Since it is rare within the time frame often required for a fostering
effort not to encounter leadership turnover, the real challenge lies in
managing the dynamics effectively. This means that critical decisions
made in the fostering process need to be well documented. Transition
procedures need to be developed to debrief departing leaders and to
educate new leaders. Ultimately, however, increased ownership and
leadership for the fostering process at multiple levels may be the best
insurance against the disruption that arises with the inevitable turnover
of key leaders.
Fostering Lesson 4: Anticipate forcing episodes. The emergence of
divisive conflicts can be a major show stopper for a fostering initiative.
Unfortunately, too many "experts" and leaders guiding fostering
become preoccupied with joint activities. The focus is entirely on
teamwork, cooperation and consensus. As a result, leaders are not ade
quately prepared to handle the divisive conflicts that inevitably emerge
in the context of a fostering initiative.
It is important to distinguish between two types of divisive issues
that may emerge in the same context with fostering. First, there are
divisive issues that are unrelated to the issues around which fostering is
occurring. Second, there are divisive issues that are directly interwoven
with the fostering effort. Our recommendations are very different in
these two contrasting situations.
The Pensacola case provides a good illustration of a divisive issue
unrelated to the fostering initiative. In this case, corporate management
mandated that local management bargain for the elimination of Sunday
premium pay in local collective bargaining negotiations. The corpora
tion wanted to present a united front across all its plants. Initially, local
management attempted to pursue a fostering approach with the union
on this issue, but was told by the union that there was no "nice" way
for them to agree to such a concession. In the end, management forced
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the issue and the union said to its members, in effect, "We don't like it,
but we don't have a choice." In retrospect, separating the issue from the
fostering efforts proved most constructive for both parties. Both man
agement and labor were under less pressure to reconcile the forcing
incident with their ongoing fostering activities.
By contrast, the layoffs at Packard Electric set the stage for union
forcing that was completely interwoven with the fostering efforts. The
union, in effect held the QWL and other joint activities hostage over
the layoff issue. In this case, the union argued that a no-layoff pledge
had been given by management as a precondition for the union's part
nership in the fostering, and this pledge was in the process of being
broken. The confrontation had many ramifications involving internal
turnover within the union and extensive side-bar meetings between
labor and management. Ultimately, however, the parties did reach a
landmark agreement providing lifetime job security in exchange for
substantial management flexibility and a multitier wage scale. In this
case, both parties' interests were best served by linking the divisive
issue with the fostering initiative.
How do we make sense of these two contrasting incidents? The
answer lies in the substance of the issues. Where the issues are largely
unrelated, it will serve all parties to keep them separate. It is unrealistic
for management to expect a joint problem-solving dialogue on a dis
tributive issue, and it is inappropriate for the union to hold fostering
efforts hostage. On the other hand, where divisive issues involve prin
ciples that are central to the fostering initiative it is appropriate and
even essential to be explicit in attending to these linkages. In these
cases, joint dialogue even if contentious must be undertaken. It
would even be appropriate for either party, often labor, to hold joint
activities hostage in order to compel such dialogue.
Unions must preserve their power to restrain work and their ability
to force the resolution of issues when necessary. Concurrently, union
leaders can derive influence from their participation in a fostering pro
cess, assuming there are positive benefits (especially if workers deliver
more value as a result of problem solving and involvement). Or to
make the point more concretely, the payoffs from the successful nego
tiation of commitment and cooperation in Champion Paper's Pensacola
mill, Anderson Pattern, Packard Electric, and Conrail included not only
increased competitiveness of the enterprise but also enhanced dignity
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and voice for labor. At the same time that unions draw strength from
the process and results of fostering, they must also retain a degree of
independence and freedom to challenge management on fundamental
issues.
Lessons from Combinations of Forcing and Fostering

Inevitably, forcing and fostering strategies are combined. Some
times they are concurrent, such as when Packard Electric pursued
QWL activities concurrently with massive layoffs in the corporation.
At other times the strategies are sequential, such as when Boise Cas
cade shifted from forcing to fostering in its DeRidder mill. Forcing and
fostering are complex on their own, but infinitely more challenging
when they are pursued in combination. As we have suggested above,
the strategies invariably become intertwined, which presents a chal
lenge for all to share and to solve. The following lessons focus on the
combinations of the two strategies.
Combined Lesson 1: Actions speak louder than words—so be sure
that consistent actions are taken and sustained. While actions always
speak louder than words, this lesson is particularly important in mak
ing the transition from forcing to fostering. Even a restrained form of
forcing will erode trust and raise larger questions about the other side's
long-term commitment to the relationship. As a result, cooperative
overtures following forcing will be treated with suspicion. A sustained
pattern of actions that demonstrate a genuine concern for common
interests will accomplish what words really cannot.
For example, in reestablishing relations after the strike at the DeRid
der mill, the new management team concentrated for nearly a year on
improving safety practices including disciplining a supervisor guilty
of driving unsafe practices. While safety is an issue of common inter
est, management helped shift from forcing to fostering by giving prior
ity to safety over other issues, including managerial authority.
Combined Lesson 2: Roles become redefined—so anticipate a pro
cess to guide the redefinition. In the shifting from forcing to fostering,
the roles of labor and management become redefined. This occurs on a
daily basis with small interactions and to a larger degree as well. Union
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and management representatives commonly find themselves shifting
from contentious to common concerns countless times in a given day.
Over a longer time period, within the context of a restrained forcing
initiative, each party will ultimately engage in some activities designed
to support concurrent or future fostering. Similarly, within the context
of a robust fostering initiative, each party will inevitably engage in
some activities designed to support concurrent or future forcing.
At the Budd Company, such role complexity was evident in the
ascendant influence of line management over industrial relations staff.
The issue of die transitions involved a combination of forcing and fos
tering. On the one hand, management needed flexibility from the rigid
lines of demarcation among skilled trades. On the other hand,
employee commitment to any proposed solution was essential.
Because line management was closer to the issues than the industrial
relations staff, it was better able to target the forcing to just the level of
flexibility it needed, and it was more willing to take the risk in trusting
the employees to make the new arrangement work without detailed
contractual rules. In the process, however, the roles of these depart
ments within management shifted substantially.
Combined Lesson 3: Effective combinations offorcing and fostering
transform the individual strategies—so build constituent expectations
for a complex mix offorcing and fostering. Where forcing and foster
ing are effectively combined, each strategy becomes transformed or
it risks failure. Forcing needs to be restrained or it risks two show stop
pers (escalating conflict and the inability to reestablish regular opera
tions). Fostering needs to be robust or it risks two show stoppers
(divisive conflicts and unmanageable internal differences). As each
strategy attends to these interactions with the other strategy, it will
change in form and focus.
For example, when the QWL effort at Packard Electric encountered
the early test event of work being moved to Mexico, the joint steering
committee proved an effective forum to discuss this divisive issue. The
result was an agreement to build the branch plants, which had a differ
ent wage scale and flexible work rules. If the divisive issue had not
been successfully handled it would have undermined the success of the
QWL effort. Yet, in addressing the issue, the focus of the joint activities
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expanded well beyond the off-line, group problem solving that had
been the primary feature of the initiative.
Combined Lesson 4: The successful juxtaposition offorcing and fos
tering drives changes in organizational structure and operations—so
anticipate new organizational forms. Considering the various combi
nations of forcing and fostering that are possible, the most challenging
task is to create approaches and structures that allow distributive activ
ities to take place within a fostering regime.
The resolution of differences in the context of a fostering strategy
occurs at both interpersonal and institutional levels. At the interper
sonal level, it is important to facilitate the clarification of core interests
and the surfacing of underlying feelings and values. In this way, con
flict is seen as legitimately deriving from the exploration of interests
and hence appropriate even in the midst of joint brainstorming and
other collaborative activities.
At the institutional level, management and union leaders can make
available multiple avenues for surfacing and addressing complaints.
These can include formal grievance procedures, open-door policies to
reach top executives, regular skip-level meetings, confidential sugges
tion/complaint boxes, and the offices of an ombudsperson. Within the
union, the presence of a similar range of forums for meaningful debate
among subgroups can be extremely important.
Combinations of forcing and fostering thus illustrate the dynamic
nature of negotiated change. Not only are the negotiations over sub
stantive change, but the process of discussing these issues also changes
the relationship and the organizations involved. Ultimately, it is a chal
lenge of never ending adaptation. Relations are either improved or
compromised by the way the forcing and the fostering strategies are
implemented there is no middle ground.
Since both forcing and fostering strategies are usually necessary to
achieve both substantive and relationship changes, it is essential for the
parties, especially management, to anticipate indeed plan for an
effective sequence or combination of the key strategies.
It is interesting to note that management's planning seldom looked
beyond the extant strategy. Even in our three forcing-followed-by-fostering cases, at least two of them developed along these lines based on
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a perceived need for fostering that developed only after the forcing epi
sode was completed.
Similarly, in the cases where management used fostering as the first
major change initiative, management seemed to suspend any idea it
would also have to engage in forcing.

Simple Reminders to Guide Strategic Negotiations
As forcing and fostering become intertwined, the guidance neces
sary for success becomes similar for each strategy. Certain tactics and
behaviors turn out to be equally critical for both fostering and forcing.
These insights are captured in the following table, which identifies
helpful tactics and simple reminders for negotiators.
Useful Tactics and Simple Reminders
Useful tactics

Simple reminders

Data collection and analysis:
Interest-based assessment:

Do your homework
Be realistic

Targeting the issues

Don't be greedy—be constructive

Bargaining over how to bargain:
Education within and across:

Negotiate the "rules of the game" '
Explain why

Constancy of purpose:

Don't give up on core values and principles

Feedback and adjustment:

Learn from experience and celebrate success

To fully explain the logic underlying the recommendations in this
table, each tactic and simple reminder is addressed below.
Data Collection and Analysis: Do your homework.

The first tactical move prior to either forcing or fostering is data
collection and analysis. Initially, the data collection is wideranging so
as to help guide the development of the change agenda. Here parties
should refrain from just focusing on what they think are the issues, but
instead develop many channels for input. This avoids centering forcing
or fostering efforts on what may turn out to be symptoms, rather than
root causes.
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As a forcing or fostering initiative unfolds, additional data collection
and analysis is required. In these cases, the data are more narrowly
focused on the particular issues that have emerged. While the early
data collection and analysis serves to prevent overly rapid narrowing of
focus, later data collection and analysis serves to ensure that negotia
tions are not proceeding on unchecked assumptions.
Thus, our simple reminder is to "do your homework." We might also
remind negotiators to "get your ducks in a row." The point seems obvi
ous, but it is not possible to restrain forcing or to ensure robust forcing
without adequate data collection and analysis.
Interest-Based Assessment: Be realistic.

Effective data collection and analysis begin to surface deeper under
standings about priorities and those of the counterparts. We recom
mend pushing those understandings further into a formal interest-based
assessment (Fisher and Ury 1991). That is, any party contemplating a
forcing or fostering change initiative should fully examine its own
interests and those of the parties with whom it is negotiating.
Examining interests results in the parties becoming less focused on
positions. Becoming too focused on positions and being inattentive to
the other side's interests can lead to uncontrolled forcing. Similarly, in
fostering, becoming too focused on positions can create unrealistic or
rigid expectations on the part of principals and constituents, while
being inattentive to the other side's interests makes it much harder to
anticipate divisive conflicts.
Our advice, then, is to "be realistic." An interest-based analysis can
help guide the establishment of realistic aspirations for both forcing
and fostering.
Targeting the Issues: Don't be greedy—be constructive.

Prior data collection and analysis, combined with interest-based
analysis, offers an effective foundation for formulating the objectives
of a forcing or fostering initiative. We urge parties to be clear in the
way they express their objectives. Management may want to increase
machine up-time, for example, but the message is lost if forcing is cen
tered on working "bell-to-bell."
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Targeting does not mean pressing a power advantage. Even if a forc
ing contest reveals the other side as weaker than anticipated, pushing
for more than originally requested creates a legacy of bitterness and
mistrust. In fostering, the targeting serves primarily to pace progress
and for the lead negotiators to remain aligned with their constituents.
The simple reminder is, "don't be greedy be constructive." If stra
tegic negotiations go well, be satisfied.
Bargaining Over How to Bargain: Negotiate the "rules of the game."

Traditionally, the "rules of the game" in labor negotiations have
been largely tacit. They would only be discussed in the context of per
ceived inappropriate behavior. By contrast, the pursuit of forcing, fos
tering, and combined strategies represents an intentional effort to
change the way negotiations occur. Our recommendation is that such
changes should not be made unilaterally. Instead, we urge parties to
build their skills and capabilities to bargain effectively over how they
want to bargain.
So much of our upbringing and early educational experiences teach
the exact opposite message to follow the rules of the game and not
question authority. Even when faced with unconstructive rules, it is not
always natural or instinctive for parties to focus on the renegotiation of
these rules. Further, negotiating over the rules of the game is a highstakes process, since these new rules then provide a framework for sub
sequent interactions. Difficult as it is, however, bargaining over how to
bargain is preferable to the alternative which is trying to achieve
desired ends via a bargaining process that is limited in its scope, focus,
or structure.
Education Within and Across: Explain why

Being able to explain the reasons for a strategic initiative is critical
for forcing or fostering. It may seem ironic that a forcing party would
have to explain itself, but we have seen that such justifications can tem
per an escalating conflict and aid the reestablishment of regular opera
tions. Education in the fostering case is especially critical to help
manage internal differences that might otherwise derail the initiative.

246 Learning to be a Strategic Negotiator

Remembering to "explain why" is the key. Other parties may dis
agree and oppose the proposals for change. However, the interaction
may lead to reflection and adjustment. Even where adjustment is not
required, however, explaining "why" helps to keep the forcing
restrained, while ensuring that the fostering will be robust.
In several instances the prospect of losing a major chunk of business
provided such a required justification. Merely promulgating informa
tion about what management perceives as compelling circumstances
for change, however, does not guarantee that the recipients of this
information will accept the proposed changes as justifiable. In some
cases, rational arguments appeared to fall on deaf ears. For example,
AP Parts attempted to use the leverage of a new contract with Ford to
secure important changes in operating practices. The explanations have
to be believed by the stakeholders.
Education also serves the purpose of achieving internal alignment.
Negotiations, of any variety, do not occur unconnected to constituents,
who have important stakes in the outcomes. Consequently, it is espe
cially important to ensure that the internal negotiations are coordinated
with developments at the institutional level. To the extent that the par
ties are able to reach agreement and bridge their respective interests,
and possibly even enhance working relations as a result, then these
accomplishments need to be shared with all concerned. Developing a
track record wherein a combination of forcing and fostering strategies
serves the needs of the parties for dealing with key agenda items can
develop competencies and support for realizing change on a continuing
basis.
Constancy of Purpose: Don't give up on core values and principles

Constancy of purpose has been highlighted by Dr. Deming (1986) in
his recommendations for effective management. We extend this idea to
the negotiations arena. Parties who are initiating either a forcing or a
fostering campaign must be prepared to stay the course. It is essential,
however, that the "course" be determined on the basis of data collec
tion and analysis, interest-based assessment, targeted issues, and exten
sive education (within and across the organizations).
In the absence of a proper foundation, the forcing or fostering activ
ities may be poorly focused. The change efforts may be centered on
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positions that address symptoms, rather than root causes. In such cases,
constancy of purpose can turn into debilitating inflexibility. Constancy
of purpose thus involves being clear and firm regarding core values and
principles, but being flexible in their application.
Thus, a key recommendation to the strategic negotiator is, "Don't
give up on core values and principles." Half-hearted support for the ini
tiative or shifting objectives will undermine both forcing and fostering
strategies. Our caution here, however, is to ensure that the constancy of
purpose is centered on core values and principles, linked to a well-con
structed strategy.
Feedback and Adjustment: Learn from experience and celebrate
success
Even with the best preparations, unanticipated or pivotal events arise
in the course of a change initiative. Consequently, an effective process
includes mechanisms for ongoing feedback and adjustment.
When there are shifts in either forcing or fostering initiatives, they
should be guided by all of the above recommendations. That is, a shift
in approach should be driven by data collection and analysis, be guided
by an interest-based assessment, involve a retargeting of the issues, be
accompanied by extensive education (within and across), and represent
true constancy of purpose (rather than inflexible adherence to an early
stance).
Celebrating success is a critical form of feedback. Such celebrations
send powerful signals about the aims and outcomes that are valued.
This, in turn, enables others to learn from the experience.

Conclusion
Clearly, negotiated change is a dynamic process. We have found that
forcing strategies are most effective when they are restrained which
requires constant attention and adjustment. We have also found that
fostering strategies are most effective when they are robust which
also requires constant attention and learning. A strategic negotiator
may not anticipate every event that arises along the path of change, but
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it is essential to anticipate the inevitable interweaving of forcing and
fostering strategies. Remember: Do your homework. Be realistic.
Don't be greedy be constructive. Negotiate the "rules of the game."
Explain why. Don't give up on core values and principles. Learn from
experience and celebrate success.
NOTES
1 The concept of robust fostering is distinct from, but consistent with the Robust Unionism
urged by Arthur Shostack
2 Alternatively, a party will force when it sees itself as having no other alternative though
even here it is rare that forcing will be initiated by a party that expects to lose
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Pensacola mill (1985 and 1988), 145-47
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CSX gainsharing proposal, 80
in fostering initiative, 237-38
of management in change process, 2079
role in forcing strategy, 62-63
roles in change process, 207
in sequential strategy cases, 140-41
of union in change process, 207-9
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sequence, 108-12
change at Adrian Fabricators, 126-27
gains in Guilford dispute resolution, 54
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union-management IP Jay plant, 39-43,
46-49
See also Labor contract negotiation
NMB. See National Mediation Board
(NMB)
Northeast Rail Service Act (1981), 134
Outcomes
Adrian Fabricators, 130-32
Anderson Pattern fostering strategy,
100-102
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for new technology at Anderson
Pattern, 97-102
Trust
Adrian Fabricators, 129
in CSX case, 83
in fostering strategy, 103
lacking in AP Parts case, 36
lacking in Guilford case, 59
mechanism at Adrian to develop, 12829
Union role
1985, 1988 Pensacola contract
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national level, 119-20
See also Canadian Automobile Workers
Union (CAW); International Union of
ELectrical, Radio and Machine
Workers (IUE); United Auto Workers
(UAW); United Paperworkers
International Union (UPIU); United
Transportation Union (UTU)
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